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Chapter 1
General Introduction
More than 250 years ago, Adam Smith pointed out that an appropriate tax system
would be a crucial determinant of a country’s economic success. According to him,
"little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the
lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice: all
the rest being brought about by the natural course of things." (Smith, 1755). Since
then, generations of economists have investigated various aspects of taxation, such as
the optimal design of tax systems, the factors which shape tax policy across countries
or the effects of taxation on individual behavior and overall welfare. However, several
aspects within the broad field of taxation are still unexplored and quite a number of
questions have not been answered yet. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the vast
existing literature by singling out three particular topics related to taxation which
are examined in the following chapters.
Broadly speaking, taxation is "a means by which governments finance their expen-
diture by imposing charges on citizens and corporate entities" (Business Dictionary,
2014). As this simple definition points out, taxation creates a relationship between
the state which levies taxes, i.e. establishes tax laws, manages tax administration
and ensures enforcement, on the one side, and individual persons and firms who
and which react on it by paying taxes, avoiding or evading it on the other side.
Figure 1.1 illustrates this basic relationship and indicates on which of these parties
the focus of the following chapters rests on.
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Figure 1.1: Thesis overview
In each of the three following chapters, the focus is on a different party involved in
taxation. Since taxation emanates from the state, Chapter 2 starts with examining
its role while the further chapters examine the responses of individuals (Chapter 3)
and firms (Chapter 4) on taxation. More precisely, Chapter 2 theoretically analyzes
how governments invest in their fiscal capacity, i.e. their ability to raise taxes, in an
environment which includes the possibility to raise debt. Chapter 3 experimentally
investigates the tax compliance behavior of individuals, especially in the context of
a permanent tax amnesty. Chapter 4 empirically examines how the complexity of
the corporate tax system influences the location choice of multinational firms. All
chapters are written in such a way that they can be read independently of each
other.
Chapter 2 (co-authored with Christoph Esslinger) is a political economy analysis
which investigates the incentives of governments to accumulate public debt and state
capacity, i.e. the capacity of the state to raise taxes (fiscal capacity) and to support
markets, particularly by providing a functioning legal system (legal capacity). As the
Greek debt crisis has shown, high public debt combined with low state capacity can
put even developed countries into turmoil. However, the existing political economy
literature of state capacity does not investigate the interaction of these capacities
with public debt. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the incentives behind raising debt
and building state capacity in an integrated analytical framework. We examine the
impact of political stability, cohesiveness of institutions (which corresponds to the
degree to which clientele politics are prevented), and income fluctuations on the
3political outcome, while allowing for sovereign default.
We find that the possibility to raise debt can provide a novel incentive to invest
in state capacity because debt allows bringing future state capacity at the disposal
of the current government. As long as debt can be used to protect the current
government from an adverse use of future public funds, it is no longer necessary
to use low investments in state capacity as a protection device. However, we also
find that this novel mechanism can be weakened in a world with income fluctua-
tions and the possibility of default. When high costs of raising debt make it very
expensive to draw all relevant future public funds to the present, the mechanism of
lowering investments resurfaces. Specifically, this mechanism is more prominent for
high income fluctuations because they increase the proportion of public funds that
can only be drawn to the present at high costs. For such an environment, we get
results that are closest to the original model without debt by Besley and Persson
(2011). In particular, an unstable political environment combined with non-cohesive
institutions can lead to a situation of low state capacity. Furthermore, in our model
allowing for the possibility to raise debt, this weak state situation is even worsened
by a high built up of debt, leading to a positive probability of sovereign default.
Chapter 3 experimentally examines the question how a permanent tax amnesty
influences compliance behavior of tax payers. A number of countries, including
Germany, allow for voluntary disclosures regarding tax evasion, granting exemption
from legal prosecution under certain conditions, which can be seen as permanent
tax amnesties. While several empirical studies about the effects of tax amnesties
exist, no empirical or experimental analyses of permanent tax amnesties exist so
far. Therefore, studying permanent tax amnesties seems desirable since its effects
on tax compliance are likely to be different from those of a one-time or repeated tax
amnesty. The reason is that a permanent tax amnesty might reduce tax compliance
if people anticipate that they can choose a voluntary disclosure at any time in the
future. This might lead to an increase in tax evasion since the permanent possibility
of a voluntary disclosure creates a kind of ‘insurance’, for instance against a rise in
the audit rate or the punishment.
In my experiment, all participants earn and declare income in an environment with
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a fluctuating audit rate. In one treatment, the current audit rate is announced, in a
second treatment, the participants are informed about the audit rate of the previous
round while in a third treatment, the audit rates are completely unknown to the
participants. Within these treatments, a permanent tax amnesty is introduced which
allows for voluntary disclosures to repay evaded taxes in order to go unpunished in
case of future audits. The treatments allow me to explore whether a permanent tax
amnesty lowers compliance by creating an insurance as explained above, whether this
insurance effect decreases with less information about the audit rate and whether
or not a permanent tax amnesty has an impact on tax compliance even beyond the
insurance effect, for example by influencing social norms.
My main finding is that, if the audit rates are announced, the permanent tax
amnesty significantly lowers tax compliance but that this effect vanishes if infor-
mation about the audit rate is reduced. So, the experimental results suggest that
a permanent tax amnesty lowers tax compliance if the informational setting allows
using a permanent tax amnesty as an ‘insurance’ against an increase in the detection
probability.
Chapter 41 (co-authored with Johannes Voget) contributes to the empirical litera-
ture about corporate taxation and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by investigating
the impact of tax complexity, employing a large database of German multinational
enterprises. More precisely, we analyze the impact of tax complexity on the location
choice of about 4500 new German FDI projects in OECD countries from 2005 to
2009. The question whether and how much tax complexity suppresses investment
is highly relevant for policy making since, if tax compliance indeed suppresses in-
vestment, simplifying the tax system would be a source for stimulating economic
activity without decreasing the tax revenue. In order to measure tax complexity, we
use the Doing Business data published by the World Bank. The topic Paying Taxes
of this database includes variables which have been constructed by defining a fictive,
standardized firm for which tax experts calculated taxes and answered some survey
questions for a large set of countries. We use the variable which captures the time
it takes to comply with taxes, i.e. to prepare, file and pay taxes in the respective
1This chapter is based on and includes parts of my dissertation proposal which counted as a
Master thesis in the "Economic Research" track of the Master in Economics at the University of
Mannheim (cf. Müller (2011))
5country, as a measure for tax complexity.
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is twofold. First, we evaluate
the impact of tax complexity on FDI using firm-level data to analyze the issue on
the economic level where the decision process regarding FDI actually takes place,
which allows us to test firm-level hypotheses. Second, we analyze the effects of tax
complexity on FDI employing a panel dataset, which allows us to estimate the effect
of within-country changes in tax complexity on FDI.
We find two main results. First, our estimates suggest that a higher level of tax
complexity significantly decreases the probability to locate an FDI project in that
country. Second, we investigate the interaction between the corporate income tax
rate and tax complexity and find that the negative effect of tax complexity becomes
weaker if the corporate income tax rate increases. This finding is consistent with
the explanation that, in addition to the negative effect caused by compliance cost,
tax complexity also has a positive effect since it creates room for tax optimization,
which becomes more valuable if taxation is high.
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Chapter 2
State Capacity and Public Debt:
A Political Economy Analysis
2.1 Introduction
The combination of high public debt and low capacities of the state to raise taxes
and to support markets can upset even developed economies. A recent example
is the case of Greece. Its rather high shadow economy1 points to a low level of
fiscal capacity, the institutional infrastructure necessary to collect and enforce taxes.
Furthermore, low property rights protection2 indicates a low level of legal capacity,
the legal infrastructure necessary to provide a secure investment climate. State
capacity, the combination of legal and fiscal capacity, is a crucial determinant of a
state’s financial strength. A country with low state capacity that has at the same
time a tendency to accumulate high public debt might run into severe problems.
The European debt crisis has exemplified this in an inglorious way. In light of this,
it is important to understand the mechanisms underlying the combined evolution of
state capacity and public debt.
However, the political economy literature of public debt3 usually takes the insti-
1Buehn and Schneider (2012) estimate that the average size of the Greek shadow economy
between 1999 and 2007 amounted to 27.5 percent of official GDP.
2The International Property Rights Index 2013 ranks Greece on the 62th place behind China
and India, which is the lowest rank of a western European country (see Property Rights Alliance,
2013).
3A review of the recent contributions to this literature can be found in Battaglini (2011). For
a survey of the earlier contributions see Alesina and Perotti (1995).
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tutional infrastructure necessary to raise taxes as given and does not consider this
fiscal capacity as an investment object of the government. The legal infrastructure
necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy is also not modeled as
an endogenous political choice in this literature. In contrast, the recent political
economy literature of state capacity, pioneered by Besley and Persson (2009), en-
dogenizes fiscal and legal capacity as investment objects of the state. However,
this literature does not include public debt. Analyzing the combined evolution of
state capacity and public debt necessitates an integrated analytical framework. Oth-
erwise, important aspects of the interaction between these dynamic variables will
remain unexplored. We provide such an integrated model, and we uncover interac-
tions between state capacity and public debt that cannot be understood by studying
the two issues separately.
We generalize the baseline model of state capacity investment in Besley and Pers-
son (2010, 2011) to include public debt, fluctuating incomes, and the possibility of
default. In a dynamic framework, an incumbent government cannot be sure to re-
main in power in the future. It wants to benefit its own clientele, and decides about
investments in the future fiscal and legal capacities. The incumbent government
can additionally spend on a common-interest public good or redistribute money to-
wards its own clientele. The ‘cohesiveness’ of institutions determines to what degree
this redistribution is possible. Following Besley and Persson, we say a country has
low cohesiveness, when it is very easy to do clientele politics to the benefit of the
own group. Importantly, the incumbent can also raise debt now. Debt is restricted
by future state capacity, because the latter determines repayment capacity in the
second period. The income level attainable for a given legal support as well as the
value of public goods fluctuate over time, introducing a business cycle component
into the model. The implied possibility of default gives us a tractable way to study
the effects of increasing costs of debt financing.
We derive two main sets of results. First, in a simple basic model without fluctu-
ating incomes and without default, we show that the possibility to raise debt can
create an additional incentive to invest in state capacity. The intuition is that debt
allows to draw future tax resources to the present. This circumvents the problem of
a use of future public funds that is not in line with the current incumbent’s objec-
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tive. Specifically, high political instability and low cohesiveness make the first period
incumbent afraid of giving additional state capacity to the future government. By
high political instability, this government is likely to be from the opposed group,
and by low cohesiveness, it can use the higher taxing power to heavily redistribute
away from the period-1 incumbent group. In the model without debt (c.f. Besley
and Persson, 2010, 2011), the only possibility to protect against such an adverse use
of future public funds is to lower investments in fiscal and legal capacity. We call
this the low-investment-mechanism. However, if debt can be used to bring future
public funds at the disposal of the first period incumbent, then this incumbent can
decide about their use. Given that there are profitable uses of tax resources in the
first period, the incumbent now has higher incentives to invest in state capacities
in order to increase the amount of public funds at its disposal. We call this the
debt-mechanism. The strength of this mechanism depends on how easy it can be
used. For the basic model without default, there are no restrictions on using this
mechanism. Therefore, it can completely cancel out the original low-investment-
mechanism.
However, our second set of results shows how the debt-mechanism can be weak-
ened, thereby allowing the original low-investment-mechanism to partly resurface.
Specifically, with fluctuating incomes, the cost of raising additional debt depends on
the possibility of default. When debt is raised to the point where default becomes
possible, it becomes increasingly expensive to use the debt channel to draw future
public funds to the present. In particular, for investments in fiscal capacity, a part
of the implied future public funds can then only be drawn to the present at high
costs. To the extent that it is very costly to draw newly created future public funds
to the present, the low-investment-mechanism resurfaces. Specifically, it resurfaces
the stronger, the higher are the income fluctuations. For high income fluctuations,
we therefore get results close to the original no-debt model. In particular, a country
with low cohesiveness and high political instability will invest only little in state
capacities. Furthermore, this ‘weak state’ situation is now worsened by a built-up
of high debt, leading to a positive probability of default.
From these results, we can draw the following policy implications. Besides polit-
ical instability, cohesiveness is identified as an important driving force behind the
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combined evolution of state capacity and public debt. Cohesiveness enters as an
exogenous parameter in our model, but our comparative static results show which
implications follow from changing it. In our model, a country with high cohesive-
ness will be close to the social planner optimum. Increasing cohesiveness in the real
world necessitates deep reforms that go at the core of the functioning of the state.
Examples of such reforms include implementing a functioning system of checks and
balances, establishing an independent press that names and shames clientele politics,
creating provisions in the constitution that prevent clientele politics, or strengthen-
ing the constitutional court in its power to enforce such provisions. Comprehensive
reforms in these directions should prevent a country from running into a situation
of high debt and low state capacity.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the relation
of this chapter to the existing literature. Section 2.3 sets out a basic model of
state capacity and public debt which does not yet include fluctuating incomes or
default. We extend the setup of Besley and Persson (2010, 2011) by introducing the
possibility to raise debt to the government’s policy set. Comparing the results to
the model without debt, we find that the possibility to raise debt can create a novel
incentive to invest in state capacity. In Section 2.4, we introduce exogenous income
fluctuations into the model to allow for sovereign default. We investigate when
public debt and state capacity investments move in the same or opposite directions
in response to exogenous parameter changes. In the latter case, countries can run
into the situation with low state capacity and high public debt. We take a brief look
at cross country data and find correlations which are mostly in line with the results
of our model. Section 2.5 generalizes our model by introducing quasi-linear utility
functions. This allows us to establish the robustness of the previous results and to
gain a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms. Section 2.6 concludes
and discusses topics for future research.
2.2 Relation to the Literature
Analyzing the political incentives behind investing in state capacity and raising
public debt, we bring together the two strands of the political economy literature
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that have analyzed these concepts in isolation. The concept of state capacity was
brought back to the minds of economists by Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson in
a series of recent papers (Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010).4 These were condensed
into their book Pillars of Prosperity (Besley and Persson, 2011). All of these models
include two aspects of state capacity, legal and fiscal capacity, in a tractable political
economy model with two periods.
Our model builds on the workhorse model in Besley and Persson (2011). This model
has been extended in several directions. Besley and Persson (2009), for instance,
provide a micro foundation for the growth enhancing effect of legal support by
explicitly modeling a credit market whose effectiveness depends on the level of legal
support. Besley et al. (2013) drop legal capacity and extend the remaining fiscal
capacity model to comprise multiple periods and to include decreasing marginal
benefits of public good spending. They show that the main results from the two-
period model generalize to this setup.
The main novel feature of this chapter is that we consider in one model the inter-
action of the strategic use of debt and the decision of an incumbent government to
invest in its future powers to raise taxes and to grant legal support. With regard to
the state capacity literature, we find that the possibility to raise debt can provide
an additional mechanism to incentivize state capacity investments that cannot be
seen in a model without debt. However, debt might be used to tie down the ad-
ditional investments for uses that are not in accordance with the social planner’s
objective. However, we also derive conditions under which the link between debt
and state capacity investments is weak. In this case, the ‘weak’ state situation of
low investments in state capacity, identified by Besley and Persson, is worsened by
an additional buildup of high debt.
While the state capacity literature has not included the debt channel at all, the
debt literature usually includes taxes. Nevertheless, this latter literature takes fiscal
capacity as given. Implicitly, institutional capacity to raise taxes is often assumed
to be maximal in this context. In particular, when labor taxes are considered, the
upper bound on taxation is given by the tax rate maximizing the resulting Laffer
4Early studies concerning state capacity are the ones of Cukierman et al. (1992) regarding
fiscal capacity and Svensson (1998) regarding legal capacity. In recent years, Acemoglu (2005) and
Acemoglu et al. (2011) made further contributions to the literature on state building.
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curve. Therefore, fiscal capacity is not included as an endogenous dynamic variable
in this literature.
The strand of the debt literature closest to our setup is the literature on strate-
gic debt initiated by Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990)
and Tabellini and Alesina (1990).5 Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and
Tabellini (1990) consider debt in the setup of distortionary labor taxes. The cost of
raising debt therefore involves higher tax distortions in the future. Both papers show
that in political competition between parties with differing objectives, too much debt
is raised compared to a normative benchmark. This happens because a currently
ruling government cannot be sure to remain in power in the future and therefore uses
debt to bind its successor’s hands. Since our model has non-distortionary taxation,
it is more closely related to the one of Tabellini and Alesina (1990). They examine
a two-period model with non-distortionary taxation and a group of heterogeneous
individuals with different preferences over two public goods. Again, the social plan-
ner would run a balanced budget, but in the political equilibrium the uncertainty
regarding the future median voter leads to a positive debt level to bind the hands
of the future median voter.
A similar trade-off as in these models also arises in our setup. The spending purpose
on which groups have differing preferences is now redistributive transfers. Also
similarly, our model can produce the incentive to over-accumulate debt compared to
a social planner. In our setup, redistributive transfers correspond to clientele politics
which are not beneficial from a social planner’s point of view. A social planner will
therefore only spend money on public goods. This implies that the social planner
will not raise debt when the future value of public goods is expected to be higher
than in the present. At the same time, a political government might still accumulate
debt in order to finance redistribution towards its own clientele in the present.
In addition to the literatures about state capacity and public debt, the model of
Section 2.4 is related to a third strand of literature, the literature about sovereign
default. The literature of borrowing with default goes back to the seminal study of
5Recent models in the field of political economy of public debt with rich dynamic frameworks
can be found in Battaglini and Coate (2008), Yared (2010), Song et al. (2012). For a political
economy model of debt which endogenizes political turnover but shares the two-period setup with
our model see Lizzeri (1999).
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Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Arellano (2008) extends their approach and applies it
to sovereign debt default, especially in the context of developing countries. Both
studies use an infinite horizon model in which the borrower can choose to default.
The incentives to not default are given by an embargo on future borrowing, an
additional penalty, or direct output costs. Due to the two period setting, our model
does not include the embargo on future borrowing. It is therefore somewhat in
the spirit of Alesina and Tabellini (1989), who also rely an a two period model of
sovereign debt default. Furthermore, we only model ability-to-pay default and not
willingness-to-pay default. The reason is that the modeling of default is used here
mainly to include increasing costs of debt financing in a tractable way. A more
involved modeling of the default decision is left to future research.
2.3 Basic Model Setup
To focus ideas and establish a benchmark for our further analysis, we first extend the
simple workhorse model of state capacity investment in Besley and Persson (2011) to
include public debt. The following presentation of the basic model setup is therefore
mainly a condensed presentation of the model set out in Besley and Persson (2011)
with the necessary modifications for the inclusion of public debt. The full model
with fluctuating incomes and the possibility of default will be presented in the next
section.
The model has two periods s = 1, 2 and considers a country consisting of two
equally sized groups of individuals. The total size of population is normalized to 1.
One of the groups holds governmental power in the first period. Individuals that
are a member of the incumbent group in a given period are superscripted by the
letter I, whereas members of the opposition group are superscripted by the letter O.
With exogenous probability γ, power is transferred to the other group after the first
period. Higher γ thus captures higher political instability from the point of view of
the first period incumbent group.
In period s, an individual of group J ∈ {I, O} has an income of ω(pJs ), where ω(·)
is an increasing and concave function of legal support pJs granted to group J . More
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broadly, one can think of pJs as any kind of market supporting policies that increase
the private income of individuals of group J . Following Besley and Persson (2009,
2010), we interpret pJs as legal enforcement which is conducive to a more efficient
functioning of capital markets.6
The utility of an individual of group J ∈ {I, O} in period s is linear in private
consumption cJs and public good consumption gs:7
uJs = αsgs + cJs (2.1)
where αs parametrizes the marginal value of public good consumption relative to
that of private consumption. Income available for private consumption is determined
by the non-distortionary tax rate ts on income ω and the per-capita transfers rIs , rOs
awarded by the government to the different groups. Therefore, individual utility in
period s becomes:
uJs = αsgs + (1− ts)ω(pJs ) + rJs (2.2)
Future utility is discounted with the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
The value of public goods fluctuates over time. In a developing country setup, a
period with a high value of public good spending can be interpreted as a situation
with a high threat of an external war. For a developed country, it is harder to find a
perfect real world match for this assumption. Nevertheless, we can think of certain
rescue actions in times of an economic crisis whose benefit to the overall economy
exceeds possible additional private benefits by far. The stabilization of the economy
can then be interpreted as a quasi-public good whose value is high in crisis times.
One example would be the nationalization of a system-relevant bank.
To model this fluctuation in the simplest possible way, the value of public goods
is drawn each period from a two-point distribution: αs ∈ {αH , αL}, with αH > 2 >
αL > 1, and Prob[αs = αH ] = φ. As will become clear in the subsequent analysis,
the high value αH is chosen such that public good spending in this state of the world
will be preferable to transfer spending. In a situation with αL, this is not necessarily
the case. Since public goods benefit everybody the same, the desired size of fiscal
6Note however, that we do not model these capital markets explicitly. For a microfoundation
of the above reduced form modeling, see Besley and Persson (2009).
7Note that the whole analysis is in per-capita terms.
2.3. BASIC MODEL SETUP 15
infrastructure will depend on the probability φ of ending up in a situation where
the state definitely spends on common-interest public goods.
The crucial feature of the model in Besley and Persson (2011) is that it includes
two aspects of state capacity, fiscal capacity τs and legal capacity pis. Existing fiscal
capacity τs puts an upper bound on the tax rate that can be raised from income
in period s: ts ≤ τs. In this simple model, (1 − τs) can be interpreted as the
fraction of income that an individual can earn in an informal sector. To increase
second period fiscal capacity τ2, the period-1 government can invest in the built-
up of [τ2 − τ1] additional units of fiscal capacity.8 For the sake of parsimony, we
assume zero depreciation of the stocks of state capacity, in contrast to Besley and
Persson (2011). We require [τ2 − τ1] ≥ 0, so disinvestment is not allowed. There
is an increasing and convex cost F (τ2 − τ1) of carrying out the investment, with
F (0) = Fτ (0) = 0. Here, as in the following, subscripts on functions denote partial
derivatives, and the last equation can be interpreted as the first marginal investment
having negligible costs.
Legal capacity pis puts an upper bound on the legal support to both groups: pJs ≤ pis
for J ∈ {I, O}. The idea is that existing legal infrastructure restricts the level of
legal support a government can grant to any group. The government in period 1
can invest in the future legal capacity that becomes available in period 2 via an
increasing and convex cost function L(pi2− pi1) with L(0) = Lpi(0) = 0. As for fiscal
capacity, we require [pi2 − pi1] ≥ 0, so disinvestment is not allowed.
Our main innovation in this section is to introduce the possibility to raise debt.
Specifically, the country is assumed to start with a stock of debt equal to zero,
b0 = 0. The period-1 incumbent government can now issue one-period risk-free
bonds b1 ≥ 0 on an international bond market. These bonds have to be repaid in
the second period. The interest rate which has to be paid on bonds is given by
ρ = 1/δ − 1 , where δ is the discount factor of the individuals. Since the bonds
are supposed to be risk-free, the maximal amount of bonds is determined by the
8There will be a technological maximum τ¯ < 1 above which fiscal capacity cannot be expanded
(τs ≤ τ¯). Here, this would be determined by the fact that some small black market jobs just cannot
be detected. Besley et al. (2013) interpret τ¯ as "the highest technologically feasible tax rate" (while
τs is "the highest institutionally feasible tax rate", p. 212) and argue that in a richer model with
distortionary taxation, τ¯ could be the peak of the Laffer curve. However, in the following, we focus
on a situation where the optimal level τ2 will not hit this upper bound.
16 CHAPTER 2. STATE CAPACITY AND PUBLIC DEBT
requirement that fiscal and legal capacity in the second period must be high enough
to repay the bonds: b1 ≤ τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ . The right-hand side of this inequality is the
discounted maximal tax revenue that can be raised in the second period. Following
Besley and Persson (2011) we still assume that the citizens themselves cannot save
or borrow. Firstly, due to the linearity of the utility function, this assumption does
not alter the results. Secondly, at least for the developing world, there is evidence
for private agents’ lack of access to credit markets (see Claessens, 2006).
The incumbent group government is assumed to maximize its own group’s utility
subject to a usual budget constraint and a constraint imposed by the country’s ‘co-
hesiveness’ of institutions. The budget constraint requires that government revenues
are enough to finance all government expenditures:9
∑
J∈{I,O}
tsω(pJs )
2 + bs ≥ gs +ms + ns +
rIs + rOs
2 + (1 + ρ)bs−1 (2.3)
where ms and ns represent the investment costs in fiscal and legal capacity, which
only occur in period 1, and hence are given by
ms =

F (τ2 − τ1) if s = 1
0 if s = 2
(2.4)
and
ns =

L(pi2 − pi1) if s = 1
0 if s = 2.
(2.5)
Since the groups have equal size, rIs+rOs2 is the average per-capita transfer that the
government pays out.
The institutional constraint requires that for each unit of transfers awarded by
the government to its own group it must transfer at least σ ∈ [0, 1] units to the
other group. Besley and Persson (2011) introduce the parameter θ = σ1+σ ∈ [0, 12 ]
to describe the ‘cohesiveness’ of institutions. θ = 12 refers to completely cohesive
institutions which make sure that the opposition is treated in exactly the same way
as the incumbent group. For θ < 12 , clientele politics are possible that lead to a
redistribution of money towards the incumbent group. Given that the incumbent
9Recall that total population is normalized to 1.
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government respects the institutional setting as just another constraint, but ulti-
mately is only concerned about its own group’s utility, it will set transfers to the
opposition as small as possible:
rOs = σrIs =
θ
1− θ r
I
s (2.6)
In the following, we therefore assume the government is choosing only transfers rIs
to its own group, while implicitly setting rOs according to (2.6).
Plugging (2.6) into the budget constraint (2.3), we arrive at a modified budget
constraint that already includes the constitutional constraint:
∑
J∈{I,O}
tsω(pJs )
2 + bs ≥ gs +ms + ns +
rIs
2(1− θ) + (1 + ρ)bs−1, (2.7)
with b0 = b2 = 0.
The timing of the whole two-period model is now as follows:
1. The initial stock of fiscal capacity is τ1 and group I1 is in power. Nature draws
the public good value α1.
2. The government from the currently incumbent group I1 chooses the set of
period-1 policies
{
t1, g1, r
I
1, b1, p
I
1, p
O
1
}
and by its investment decision chooses
the period-2 stocks of fiscal capacity τ2 and legal capacity pi2.
3. I1 remains in power with probability 1− γ, and nature draws α2
4. The government from the future incumbent group I2 chooses period-2 policies{
t2, g2, r
I
2, p
I
2, p
O
2
}
while honoring the debt commitments.
The applied solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
2.3.1 Analysis of the Basic Model
Debt and state capacity investments generate a dynamic link across periods. How-
ever, given the linear utility function, we can derive the optimal policy decision
between public good spending and transfer spending for any period taking as given
the levels of state capacity, state capacity investments and debt. Furthermore, the
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non-distortionary nature of taxes makes the level of taxes in a given period depend
only on the level of fiscal capacity in that period. In a second step, the optimal
debt level will be determined using the optimal policy functions on public good
and transfer spending and still taking state capacity and state capacity investments
as given.10 Having derived the optimal policy decisions on spending and debt for
different levels of state capacity investments, the optimal level of these investments
can then be determined in a last third step.
Intra-temporal policies
Turning to the first step, legal protection will be set maximally for both groups:
pIs = pOs = pis. This is because, first, the incumbent group gains from an increase
of the own income. Second, it also benefits from an increase of the other group’s
income, because the resulting higher tax revenues can be used for additional public
good or transfer spending.
Taxes will be used up to the full fiscal capacity: ts = τs. The reason is the following:
The marginal benefit of public spending is always at least as high as the opportunity
cost of lost private consumption, since max{αs, 2(1− θ)} ≥ 2(1− θ) ≥ 1.
Compared to the model without debt, the introduction of debt does not change
the trade-off between public goods and transfers. This trade-off depends solely on
the constant marginal benefits of these two forms of spending. The only effect is on
the level of spending. Specifically, the residual revenues have to be adjusted for the
net inflow of money after issuing new debt and repaying old debt, bs − (1 + ρ)bs−1.
The optimal policy function for public good spending becomes
G(αs, τs, pis,ms, ns, bs, bs−1) =

τsω(pis)−ms − ns + bs − (1 + ρ)bs−1 if αs ≥ 2(1− θ)
0 otherwise.
(2.8)
That is, public goods are provided at the maximal level, if the gross marginal value
of public good spending, αs, exceeds the gross marginal value of transfers for the
10The reason that the debt decision can be analyzed before the state capacity decisions has to
do with the constancy of the marginal value of spending in each period.
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incumbent group, 2(1− θ). At the same time, transfers and therefore redistribution
towards the incumbent group are zero. If the ordering between the marginal values
is the opposite way, we only get redistributive transfers and no public goods.
Using the new budget constraint (2.7) with ts set to τs and pJs set to pis, the indirect
payoff function for group J ∈ {I, O} in period s becomes:
W (αs, τs, pis,ms, ns, bs−1, bs, βJ) = αsG+(1−τs)ω(pis)+βJ [τsω(pis)−G−ms−ns+bs−(1+ρ)bs−1]
(2.9)
where βI = 2(1− θ) and βO = 2θ can be interpreted as the gross marginal value of
transfer spending for the incumbent (I) and for the opposition (O), respectively.
Note that we have suppressed the arguments of the G function. Furthermore,
βJ [τsω(pis)−G−ms − ns + bs − (1 + ρ)bs−1] ≥ 0 are the transfers to group J .
The ‘value functions’ capturing the within-period utility in the second period for
a group that is the incumbent (I) or the opposition (O) become:
U I(τ2, pi2, b1) (2.10)
= φW [αH , τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2(1− θ)] + (1− φ)W [αL, τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2(1− θ)]
= φ[αH(τ2ω(pi2)− (1 + ρ)b1) + (1− τ2)ω(pi2)] + (1− φ)W [αL, τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2(1− θ)]
UO(τ2, pi2, b1) (2.11)
= φW [αH , τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2θ] + (1− φ)W [αL, τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2θ]
= φ[αH(τ2ω(pi2)− (1 + ρ)b1) + (1− τ2)ω(pi2)] + (1− φ)W [αL, τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2θ]
Note that, when the value of the public good is high, whatever is left after repaying
debt, (τ2ω(pi2) − (1 + ρ)b1), will be spent on the public good. Finally, the total
expected utility of the period-1 incumbent group, as seen from the first period, is:
W (α1, τ1, pi1, F (τ2−τ1), L(pi2−pi1), 0, b1, 2(1−θ))+δ([1−γ]U I(τ2, pi2, b1)+γUO(τ2, pi2, b1))
(2.12)
Intra-temporal policies
Having solved for the optimal intra-temporal policies, we now turn to the inter-
temporal policies b1, τ2 and pi2. To make the following analysis easier, we define λ1,
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the gross marginal benefit of public funds in period 1, and E(λ2), the expected gross
marginal benefit of public funds in period 2. We have
λ1 ≡ max{α1, 2(1− θ)}
and
E(λ2) ≡ φαH + (1− φ)λL2 (2.13)
with
λL2 =

αL if αL ≥ 2(1− θ)
(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ otherwise,
(2.14)
since E(λ2) depends on the use of public funds in the future, which is uncertain.
With this notation, the inter-temporal maximization problem of the incumbent
group in period s=1 becomes:
maxτ2,pi2,b1 EV
I1(τ2, pi2, b1)− λ1(F (τ2 − τ1) + L(pi2 − pi1)− b1) (2.15)
s.t. τ2 ≥ τ1,
pi2 ≥ pi1,
b1 ≤ τ2ω(pi2)1 + ρ ,
λ1 ≡ max{α1, 2(1− θ)}
with:
EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1) = δ((1− γ)U I(τ2, pi2, b1) + γUO(τ2, pi2, b1)) (2.16)
Choice of debt
The three dynamic variables fiscal capacity, legal capacity and debt are interlinked
by the following fact. The amount of debt which can be raised is limited by the
amount of future fiscal and legal capacity. The latter two determine the money the
state can raise to repay debt. Furthermore, the investment and debt decisions deter-
mine the amount of residual revenue a government has at its disposal for financing
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public good spending or transfers after all other expenditures are covered. We now
analyze the choice of debt taking the levels of fiscal and legal capacity investments
as given.
The simple linear model has the advantage that, in each period, the use of residual
government revenues either on public goods or transfers is exactly determined. Fur-
thermore, the marginal benefit of that residual use is constant in either case. This
marginal benefit is what we referred to as the gross marginal benefit of public funds
and denoted by λs.
Debt allows to make future public funds available in the present. Therefore, the
optimal debt level can be found by a simple comparison of the gross marginal benefit
of public funds in the two periods. Specifically, if λ1, the gross marginal benefit in
the first period, is higher than E(λ2), the expected gross marginal benefit in the
second period, then it is optimal to raise the maximal debt that is allowed by future
state capacity: b1 = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ . If E(λ2) > λ1, then no debt is raised: b1 = 0.
11,12
Summarizing the above analysis in a policy function for the debt level chosen in
period 1, we have:
B(α1, τ2, pi2) =

τ2ω(pi2)
1+ρ if λ1 > E(λ2)
0 otherwise.
(2.17)
Choice of fiscal and legal capacity
With this, we have arrived at the third step of the analysis, the decision about
fiscal and legal capacity investment. We substitute the policy function (2.17) for b1
in (2.12) and maximize the resulting function with respect to future fiscal capacity
τ2 and legal capacity pi2, subject to the constraints that fiscal and legal capacity
investments cannot be negative, [τ2 − τ1] ≥ 0 and [pi2 − pi1] ≥ 0, and transfers must
11The implicit assumption behind b1 ≥ 0 is that the government cannot invest in assets on the
bond market.
12Furthermore, this result requires Assumptions (2.22) and (2.23) which will be introduced
after having derived the optimal state capacity investments. We need these additional technical
assumptions here because for E(λ2) > λ1, we could otherwise get that all first-period tax revenue
is used for investments in future state capacity. With low enough costs of investment, it could then
be beneficial to use debt for bringing future tax revenues to the present and finance even more
future state capacity.
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also be weakly positive. From this, we get the following ‘Euler equations’
δ([1− γ]dU
I [τ2, pi2, B(α1, τ2, pi2)]
dτ2
+ γ dU
O[τ2, pi2, B(α1, τ2, pi2)]
dτ2
)
+Wb1 [α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, B(α1, τ2, pi2), 0, 2(1− θ)]
∂B(α1, τ2, pi2)
∂τ2
(2.18)
≤ −Wm[α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, B(α1, τ2, pi2), 0, 2(1− θ)]Fτ (τ2 − τ1)
c. s. τ2 − τ1 ≥ 0
and
δ([1− γ]dU
I [τ2, pi2, B(α1, τ2, pi2)]
dpi2
+ γ dU
O[τ2, pi2, B(α1, τ2, pi2)]
dpi2
)
+Wb1 [α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, B(α1, τ2, pi2), 0, 2(1− θ)]
∂B(α1, τ2, pi2)
∂pi2
(2.19)
≤ −Wn[α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, B(α1, τ2, pi2), 0, 2(1− θ)]Lpi(pi2 − pi1)
c. s. pi2 − pi1 ≥ 0,
where dUI
dτ2
, dUO
dτ2
, dUI
dpi2
and dUO
dpi2
are total derivatives. The trade-off is between the
marginal benefit of future fiscal or legal capacity (left-hand side) against the marginal
cost of financing that fiscal or legal capacity (right-hand side). Also analogously to
the model without debt:
λ1 ≡ −Wm[α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, B(α1, τ2, pi2), 0, 2(1− θ)]
= −Wn[α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, B(α1, τ2, pi2), 0, 2(1− θ)] = max{α1, 2(1− θ)}
The opportunity cost of using government revenues for financing investments is the
gross marginal benefit of period-1 public funds.13 It depends on the form of residual
spending (public goods or transfers) in period 1.
The crucial difference to a model without debt are the left-hand sides of (2.18)
and (2.19). The left-hand side of (2.18) describes the marginal benefit of addi-
tional future fiscal capacity, as seen from the first period. If no debt is raised, it
is δω(pi2)[E(λ2) − 1]. E(λ2) is the expected gross marginal benefit of future public
funds and is given in (2.13) and (2.14). However, when debt is raised, it is raised
maximally and uses up all public funds in the second period. Therefore, the gross
13This result depends again on Assumptions 2.22 and 2.23. These technical assumptions exclude
the case where it is optimal (and through debt possible) that the marginal money to finance future
fiscal capacity actually comes from the future. Cf. the previous footnote.
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marginal value of public funds is then determined by the use of debt. Since debt
is used to finance first-period expenditures on public goods or transfers, the gross
marginal benefit of future public funds becomes λ1. The point is that debt allows to
make future public funds available in the present. Therefore, the benefit of future
public funds is then given by the present benefit of residual spending. According to
this discussion, the optimality condition (2.18) can be rewritten as:
δω(pi2) [max{λ1, E(λ2)} − 1] ≤ λ1Fτ (τ2 − τ1) (2.20)
c. s. τ2 − τ1 ≥ 0
Given the assumption Fτ (0) = 0, a necessary and sufficient condition for positive
investments in fiscal capacity is now max{λ1, E(λ2)} > 1, which is always satisfied.
This is a crucial difference compared to the model without debt and is discussed in
more detail in Section 2.3.3.
The left-hand side of (2.19) describes the marginal benefit of additional future legal
capacity, as seen from the first period. Following the same reasoning as for fiscal
capacity, the optimality condition (2.19) can be rewritten as:
δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2[max{λ1, E(λ2)} − 1]] ≤ λ1Lpi(pi2 − pi1) (2.21)
c. s. pi2 − pi1 ≥ 0
Given the assumption Lpi(0) = 0, there is always positive investment in legal capac-
ity.
Considering the left-hand sides of equation (2.20) and equation (2.21), we notice
that an investment in one of the two state capacities increases the marginal return
of the other. This is because we have max{λ1, E(λ2)} > 1. So, fiscal and legal
capacity are complements. Note that the analogous condition in Besley and Persson
(2011), E(λ2) > 1, was not guaranteed to always hold. In contrast, the introduction
of debt into the basic model implies that complementarity between the two forms
of state capacity investment will always hold.
As in Besley and Persson (2011) this complementarity is not only an interesting
fact, but also allows us to apply results on monotone comparative statics. By Theo-
rem 5 and 6 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), any factor that increases the left-hand
sides of equation (2.20) and equation (2.21) leads to an increase of both fiscal and
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legal capacity investments.14 This reasoning is used to establish the comparative
statics stated in the propositions in the following two subsections.
For all of the subsequent analysis, we make the following assumptions.
Assumptions
δω(pi2)[αH − 1] < αLFτ (τ¯2 − τ1) (2.22)
δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2[αH − 1]] < αLLpi(pi2 − pi1) (2.23)
for some τ¯2, pi2, so that L(pi2 − pi1) + F (τ¯2 − τ1) = τ1ω(pi1). So, τ¯2, pi2 are levels of
future state capacity which can be financed if the current tax revenue is only and
fully used for that purpose. These assumptions mean that the curvature of the cost
functions F (·) and L(·) is high enough for the marginal cost of increasing fiscal and
legal capacity to surpass the marginal benefit at an interior level of investment. That
is, we don’t allow the marginal benefit of investment to still surpass the marginal
cost at the point where all possible tax revenues are only used for investments in
fiscal and legal capacity.15 These technical assumptions are only necessary in the
linear model. As we will see, they can be dispensed with in the quasi-linear setup
of Section 2.5.
In the following, we first analyze the normative benchmark of a social planner.
2.3.2 The Social Planner’s Solution
The maximization problem of a Utilitarian social planner who weights the utilities of
both groups equally is equivalent to the version of the model where full cohesiveness
(θ = 1/2) restricts the incumbent group in both periods to provide the same transfers
to both groups. Then, since αL > 2(1 − θ) = 1, the social planner always uses all
residual money to provide public goods. For the basic model with debt, the results
14For a more detailed formal treatment, see the proofs in Appendix A.1.
15Note that the left-hand sides of (2.22) and (2.23) give the absolute maximum for the marginal
benefits of fiscal and legal capacity investment. The right-hand sides give the absolute minimum
for the marginal costs.
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about debt and state capacity investments of a social planner are summarized in
the following proposition:16
Proposition 2.3.1. Suppose that the decisions about debt and state capacity invest-
ments are made by a Pigouvian planner with Utilitarian preferences. Then:
1. If α1 = αL:
(a) No debt is raised.
(b) No transfers are paid.
(c) There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
(d) Higher φ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity.
2. If α1 = αH :
(a) Debt is raised maximally: b1 = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ .
(b) No transfers are paid.
(c) There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity and the invest-
ments are higher than when no debt can be raised.
For a social planner we have λ1 = α1. That is, the gross marginal value of public
funds in the first period corresponds to the value of public goods in the first period.
Moreover, for the social planner the gross marginal value of public funds in the
second period is E(λ2) = φαH + (1− φ)αL > 1.
For the first part, note that λ1 = αL < E(λ2) implies that no debt will be raised.
In a model without debt, the results of the first part are valid for both, α1 = αL
and α1 = αH as stated in Proposition 2.1 in Besley and Persson (2011).
In the model with debt, if α1 = αH , we have λ1 = αH > E(λ2) and debt will
be raised maximally in order to make future public funds available in the present.
Therefore, the net marginal benefit of future public funds is greater than it was
without debt, which raises incentives to invest in fiscal capacity. Basically, debt
allows the social planner to use the tax system of the future to finance a highly-
valued public good today. Given a high need for public funds today versus a lower
need tomorrow this increases incentives to invest in fiscal capacity for the purpose
of increasing spending today. By complementarity, investments in legal capacity
increase as well.
16The proofs of this and of all subsequent propositions are collected in Appendix A.1.
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We now turn to the analysis of the political equilibrium.
2.3.3 Three Types of States Revisited
The outcome of the political game will depend on the interplay of the parameters
governing how cohesive political institutions are (θ) and how stable the political
system is (γ) with the public good parameters (φ, αH , αL) summarizing the main
features of the economic environment. In Besley and Persson (2011), the following
condition ensures that political institutions are sufficiently cohesive to make the
political outcome coincide with the outcome under a social planner:
Cohesiveness: αL ≥ 2(1− θ)
This condition will hold if the parameter governing the cohesiveness of political
institutions, θ, is close enough to 1/2, the value it takes for a social planner. Recall
that θ = 1/2 ensures that both groups have to be treated equally and therefore
captures perfectly cohesive political institutions.
If the cohesiveness condition fails, but the stability of the political system is high
enough, Besley and Persson (2011) get a state that still has positive investments in
state capacity. The corresponding stability condition is:
Stability: φαH + (1− φ)[(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ] > 1
This condition will hold when the probability of staying in political power, 1−γ, is
big enough. That is, from the point of view of the period-1 incumbent government,
the political system is stable in the sense of not endangering its power. However, the
condition goes further. In fact, it refers to stability in the sense of not endangering
the interests of the period-1 government. This can also be ensured by the economic
environment. For instance, if a high value of public good spending is expected with
certainty (φ→ 1), the stability condition will also hold. The interest of the period-1
government in future public good spending is then respected no matter who is in
power in the future. In order to compare our results to the ones in Besley and
Persson (2011), we consider the same three types of states that they derive and
investigate if these types still arise after the introduction of debt.
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Common-Interest State
In the case where the cohesiveness condition holds, we get the following result:
Proposition 2.3.2. If Cohesiveness holds, then the outcome is the same as under
a social planner (see Proposition 2.3.1).
This result is analogous to the model without debt (Proposition 2.2 in Besley
and Persson (2011)). The reason is that high cohesiveness makes redistribution
unattractive compared to public good spending even when the latter has a low
value. Therefore, by choice, each government will provide only public goods thereby
behaving exactly like a social planner. Additionally to the model without debt, the
shifting of public resources over time also follows the structure of the public good
values and again coincides with the social planner behavior. In line with Besley and
Persson (2011), we call this state the common interest state.
Redistributive State
Assume that Cohesiveness fails, but Stability holds. We get the following results:
Proposition 2.3.3. If Cohesiveness fails and Stability holds, then:
1. If α1 = αL and 2(1− θ) < φαH + (1− φ)[(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ]:
(a) No debt is raised.
(b) Residual revenues in period 1 are used to finance transfers.
(c) There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
(d) Higher φ increases investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
(e) A lower value of γ unambiguously raises investments, whereas an increase
in θ raises investments if γ > 1/2.
2. If α1 = αH or if α1 = αL and 2(1− θ) > φαH + (1−φ)[(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ]:
(a) Debt is raised maximally: b1 = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ .
(b) There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity and the invest-
ments are higher than when no debt can be raised.
(c) If α1 = αH , the levels of fiscal and legal capacity investments are the same
as those chosen by a social planner in the same situation (see Proposition
2.3.1 Part 2).
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(d) If α1 = αL, residual revenues in period 1 are used to finance transfers.
(e) Political instability γ does not have an influence on the investment deci-
sions. If α1 = αH , cohesiveness θ does not have an influence either.
In an environment with a low public good value in the first period, the incumbent
government prefers to spend on redistributive transfers in this first period. However,
when the condition in Part 1 of the proposition holds, the expected value of future
public spending is still higher than the value of this first-period transfer spending.
The implied preference for future spending leads to the result that no debt is raised,
because this would mean taking resources from the future. Therefore, the remaining
results in the first part of the proposition are analogous to the model without debt.
When one of the conditions in Part 2 of the proposition holds, there is a preference
for the present. Specifically, the incumbent group in period 1 can no longer be sure
that spending in the second period will be in its interest in expectation. However,
with debt, the period-1 government now has the possibility to bring future public
funds at its disposal. Thereby, it can decide about the spending purposes which
these future public funds will be used for. This will actually allow the incumbent
group to solve the problem of future redistribution against itself and hence raises
incentives for investing in fiscal and legal capacity.
Importantly, these bigger incentives can be driven by the desire to finance redis-
tributive transfers in the present, which is not in the spirit of a Utilitarian social
planner. Therefore, we do not only get spending on the ‘wrong’ issues, we can even
get the incentive to finance more of this ‘wrong’ spending through the issuance of
debt. In this case of the basic model, the additional debt-induced incentive to in-
vest in fiscal and legal capacity therefore creates a bigger deviation of the political
outcome from the social planner optimum.
‘Weak’ State
The last possibility arises when both the cohesiveness and the stability condition
fail. Besley and Persson (2011) call such a state a "weak state" (p. 62). In their model
without debt, such a state has no incentive to invest in fiscal capacity (Proposition
2.4 in Besley and Persson (2011)).
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As we have already seen, the introduction of debt can raise incentives to invest
because what drives these incentives is now the use that period-2 public funds can
be put to in the first period. This strongly suggests that the weak state situation,
which is based on the fear of future public funds being used against the own group,
will no longer arise in this basic model with debt. The next proposition confirms
this hypothesis:
Proposition 2.3.4. In the basic model without the possibility of default, if Cohe-
siveness and Stability fail, then:
1. There is positive investment in fiscal capacity which is higher than the zero
investment in the case without debt. Moreover, there is positive investment in
legal capacity which is higher than in the case without debt.
2. If α1 = αH , the levels of investment in fiscal and legal capacity are the same as
those chosen by a social planner in the same situation (see Proposition 2.3.1
Part 2).
3. Debt is raised maximally: b1 = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ .
4. If α1 = αL, residual revenues are used to finance transfers.
So, the weak state situation as in Besley and Persson (2011) does no longer arise
when debt is allowed since the possibility to raise debt creates incentives for investing
in state capacity. We even get the social planner’s investment level if α1 = αH . For
the case α1 = αL, we also get positive investments in state capacity, potentially even
higher than the social planner’s investments. However, from the perspective of a
social planner, this case is now even worse than in the model without debt since all
future tax revenue is now drawn to the present and used for transfers directed to
the incumbents clientele.
The arguments for all these results and their interpretations are the same as for
Part 2 of Proposition 2.3.3, which described a redistributive state.
It is important to note, however, that this result of the weak state situation no
longer arising depends on the highly stylized setup of the basic model. As soon
as we introduce the possibility of default, the costs of raising high debt enter the
analysis. Doing so in the model of the next section, we can reestablish the possibility
of a weak state.
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2.4 Full Model
Despite providing a very good starting point for further analysis, the basic model
needs some modification to accommodate the introduction of debt in a more realistic
manner. Until now, the interest rate of government bonds is constant and so it is
independent of the level of debt, future income and tax revenues are perfectly pre-
dictable, government default is impossible and the model has a bang-bang solution,
i.e. either maximal debt or no debt at all. In the following section we extend the
model by allowing income ω to be subject to shocks. As we will see below, this leads
to varying interest rates, the possibility of government default and inner solutions
for public debt.
In this section, we allow the income ωs(pis) of the economy in period s to fluctuate so
that tax revenues τsωs(pis) are also uncertain. The following can thus be interpreted
as a parsimonious way of including an exogenous business cycle component into
the model. Specifically, we assume ω¯(pis) > ω(pis), ω¯′(pis) = ω′(pis) ≡ ω′(pis)17 and
Prob (ωs(pis) = ω¯(pis)) = ψ.
In such a setting, the interest rate is endogenously determined by R(b) = ρ +
r(b). r(b) is the risk premium, which is nonzero if b exceeds a certain threshold b,
characterized below. So far, the interest rate ρ = 1/δ − 1 was pinned down by the
discount factor δ of the consumers, and therefore it was independent of the debt
level b. However, in reality the interest rate a country has to pay in order to issue
government bonds depends on the level of public debt. The higher interest rate
captures the risk premium due to a higher probability of default.
The analysis now requires a more precise description of the timing in the game. Let
the timing be as described in Section 2.3. However, since the investment decision
regarding fiscal capacity might influence the solvency of the state and therefore the
credit terms, one has to be careful regarding the timing of issuing debt and investing
in fiscal capacity. Let us divide stage 2 of the timing from Section 2.3 into two stages
2a and 2b. Assume that in stage 2a the government makes the decision regarding the
17Note that this is equivalent to assuming ωs(pis) to have the following form: ω¯(pis) = w(pis)+ v¯
and ω(pis) = w(pis)+v. This means we assume the income shock (e.g. due to business cycles) to be
additive and not depending on the level of legal capacity. Therefore, increasing legal capacity leads
to a higher expected income (a positive growth trend), around which the actual income fluctuates
with an amplitude that is constant with respect to pi.
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investments in fiscal and legal capacity and in stage 2b all other decisions including
debt.18 In such a setting, the investors that buy the government bonds condition
their expectations regarding the future solvency of the state on the future levels of
fiscal and legal capacity, τ2 and pi2.
Besides lending money to the government, we assume that the international in-
vestors have the possibility to invest in riskless bonds which just compensate them
for their time preference. These riskless bonds therefore have an interest rate of
ρ = 1/δ − 1. Since investors are assumed to be risk neutral, the expected return
from lending money to the government has to be just high enough to equal the
interest rate of the risk-free asset.
The threshold b is defined such that for b ≤ b, bonds plus interest are fully payed
back even for the low income realization ω(pi2). In this case, there is no risk that
needs compensation, so R(b) = ρ. The threshold b is given by:
b(τ2, pi2) =
τ2ω(pi2)
1 + ρ (2.24)
For b > b, debt will be payed back fully in case of high income ω¯(pi2) but par-
tially else. The function for the risk premium, r(b), that makes investors indifferent
between lending to the country and investing in the risk-free asset is defined by
(1 + ρ)b1 = ψ · (1 + ρ+ r(b1))b1︸ ︷︷ ︸
repayment in case of ω¯(pi2)
+(1− ψ) · (τ2ω(pi2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
repayment in case of ω(pi2)
. (2.25)
Rearranging terms leads to the expression r(b1) = 1−ψψ (1 + ρ− τ2ω(pi2)b1 ).
It is clear that there has to be a maximum level of debt b. This is defined by the
maximum debt that can be fully payed back including interest in the case of high
income ω¯(pi2). This level is given by b = τ2ω¯(pi2)1+ρ+r(b) . Solving for b, this leads to:
b(τ2, pi2) =
τ2(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))
1 + ρ (2.26)
When debt is not completely paid back, which means that there is sovereign debt
default, the country incurs a penalty P . For reasons of tractability, the penalty is
assumed to reduce the after-tax income. It would certainly be more realistic to have
18We can also think of these actions as taking place simultaneously under the constraint that
the bundle of debt, interest rate and state capacity investments is so that investors are indifferent.
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the penalty reduce gross income as in many models of sovereign debt default (e.g.
Alesina and Tabellini (1989), Arellano (2008), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)). How-
ever, the above assumption is made to avoid technical complications. The penalty
can be interpreted, for instance, as credit restrictions on retailers which make it
more expensive to supply imported goods. The ensuing reduction in the purchasing
power of income is captured in our simple model by the direct reduction of after-tax
income through the penalty.
We assume that the penalty has the following form (where ∆ is the amount not
repaid):
P =

0 if ∆ = 0 (no default)
P (∆) if ∆ = (1 +R(b1))b1 − (τ2ω(pi2)) and ω2(pi2) = ω(pi2)
Pmax else.
(2.27)
This means, as long as the government shows good will, in the sense that it repays as
much debt as it can, the penalty depends on the amount of debt that is not repaid.
P (∆) is assumed to be increasing and convex for ∆ ∈ [0, (1 +R(b))b− (τ2ω(pi2))] =
[0, τ2(ω¯(pi2) − ω(pi2))] with P (0) = 0. If the country repays less than possible and
defaults purposely, we assume the punishment to be maximal, Pmax. We assume
Pmax to be high enough to prevent the government from defaulting purposely. That
is, we only consider ability-to-pay default and not willingness-to-pay default. This
allows us to model rising costs of debt financing without having to burden the
analysis with a more involved modeling of the default decision.
Concerning the intra-temporal policies, with the same reasoning as in the model
without debt, fiscal and legal capacities are always fully employed. As for the policy
function for public good spending, it also looks analogous to before:
G(αs, τs, pis,ms, ns, bs, bs−1, ωs) =

τsωs(pis)−ms − ns + bs
−min {(1 +R(bs−1))bs−1, τsωs(pis)} if αs ≥ 2(1− θ)
0 otherwise.
(2.28)
where ωs can now be the high or low income realization ω or ω. For simplifying the
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notation, the following contains the ‘expected’ policy function G = ψG(ω) + (1 −
ψ)G(ω), where ψ is the probability for the high income realization ω.
The inter-temporal maximization problem of the incumbent group in period s=1
becomes:
maxτ2,pi2,b1 EV
I1(τ2, pi2, b1)− λ1(F (τ2 − τ1) + L(pi2 − pi1)− b1) (2.29)
s.t. τ2 ≥ τ1,
pi2 ≥ pi1,
b1 ≤ b(τ2),
λ1 ≡ max{α1, 2(1− θ)}
with
EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1) = δ((1− γ)U I(τ2, pi2, b1) + γU0(τ2, pi2, b1)) (2.30)
= δ((1− γ)(φEW (αH , τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2(1− θ))
+ (1− φ)EW (αL, τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2(1− θ)))
+ γ(φEW (αH , τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2θ) + (1− φ)EW (αL, τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2θ)))
and
EW (α2, τ2, pi2,m2 = 0, n2 = 0, b1, b2 = 0, βJ) = (2.31)
α2G+ (1− τ2)(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))− (1− ψ)P + βJ [τ2(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))
−G− ψ(1 +R(b1))b1 − (1− ψ)min {(1 +R(b1))b1, τ2ω(pi2)}] ,
which is the indirect payoff function for group J ∈ I, O in period s. This function
is now an expected value itself, because future income ω2(pi2) is uncertain. Note
that for the analysis here, we assume that the fluctuations in income and in the
valuation of public goods are independent. In the quasi-linear setup of Section 2.5,
we will consider the other extreme, a perfect correlation between the two in the
sense that public good spending has a higher value in times with low income. The
most realistic modeling probably lies at some intermediate level of correlation, but
the extreme cases allow us to keep the analysis tractable.
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Plugging (2.31) into (2.30), leads to:
EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1) =δ[(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))(1− τ2)− (1− ψ)P (2.32)
+ [φαH + (1− φ)λL2 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡E(λ2)
·[τ2(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))
− ψ(1 +R(b1))b1 − (1− ψ)min {(1 +R(b1))b1, τ2ω(pi2)}]]
with λL2 defined by (2.14).
2.4.1 Solution of the Model
Regarding the solution of this optimization problem, several cases can arise:
- case a) : b1 = 019
- case b) : b1 ∈ (0, b)
- case c) : b1 = b
- case d) : b1 ∈ (b, b)
- case e) : b1 = b
When do these cases emerge? The first order conditions with respect to b1 in case b)
and d) lead us to the relevant conditions. In case b), the first order condition with
respect to b1 gives us λ1 = E(λ2) and in case d) λ1 = E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆ . It follows
immediately that if E(λ2) < λ1 < E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
, we are in case c), if λ1
exceeds E(λ2)+ (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
, we are in case e) and if λ1 is smaller than E(λ2), we
are in case a). Since the function R(b1) depends on the case and includes τ2 and pi2,
also the first order conditions that determine τ2 and pi2 vary over the cases. Tables
2.1-2.3 summarize the respective expressions.20
In the following analysis, we consider an economy that has a low value of public
good spending in the first period, α1 = αL. In this environment, a social planner
will not want to raise debt. In particular, the social planner’s solution is clearly case
a), since the social planner has λ1 = α1 < (1− φ)αL + φαH = E(λ2).21
19This is because we assume b0 = 0 and that governments cannot accumulate assets. If we
allowed for assets, governments would use their revenue to buy bonds in this case. If we additionally
allowed b0 > 0, revenues would be used to reduce debt (and possibly to buy bonds).
20The FOCs for τ2 and pi2 in case d) have been rearranged by using the FOC for b1. The ≤ in
the FOC for τ2 in case c), d) and e) are due to the constraint τ2 ≥ τ1 which might bind in these
cases (Note that pi2 ≥ pi1 does never bind).
21If we had α1 = αH , we would have λ1 > E(λ2) for both the social planner and for a government
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Table 2.1: Conditions for the cases a)-e)
Case Condition
a) λ1 < E(λ2)
b) λ1 = E(λ2)
c) E(λ2) < λ1 < E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
d) λ1 = E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
e) λ1 > E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
Table 2.2: First order conditions for fiscal capacity
Case FOC for τ2
a) δ {ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2)} (E(λ2)− 1) = λ1 ∂F (τ2−τ1)∂τ2
b) δ {ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))} (E(λ2)− 1) = λ1 ∂F (τ2−τ1)∂τ2
c) δ {ψ[ω¯(pi2)− ω(pi2)](E(λ2)− 1) + ω(pi2)(λ1 − 1)} ≤ λ1 ∂F (τ2−τ1)∂τ2
d) δ {ψ[ω¯(pi2)− ω(pi2)](E(λ2)− 1) + ω(pi2)(λ1 − 1)} ≤ λ1 ∂F (τ2−τ1)∂τ2
e) δ{(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))(λ1 − 1)− (1− ψ) ∂P (∆)∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
(ω¯(pi2)− ω(pi2))} ≤ λ1 ∂F (τ2−τ1)∂τ2
Table 2.3: First order conditions for legal capacity
Case FOC for pi2
a) δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2(E(λ2)− 1)] = λ1 ∂L(pi2−pi1)∂pi2
b) δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2(E(λ2)− 1)] = λ1 ∂L(pi2−pi1)∂pi2
c) δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2(λ1 − 1)] = λ1 ∂L(pi2−pi1)∂pi2
d) δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2(λ1 − 1)] = λ1 ∂L(pi2−pi1)∂pi2
e) δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2(λ1 − 1)] = λ1 ∂L(pi2−pi1)∂pi2
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We want to see whether for such an environment, governments with a preference
for the own group could exhibit a bias towards the present and hence towards ex-
cessive debt. Such a bias would make the political equilibrium differ from the social
planner’s solution in a significant way.
Furthermore, for the following analysis, we define ‘free future revenues’ as the
discounted expected future tax revenues minus debt, δE(τ2ω2(pi2))− b1. Free future
revenues refer to the expected future tax revenues that are not bound by debt and
therefore measure the ‘free’ resources of the future government. We define this
measure in order to measure debt in relation to a state’s fiscal power, which is more
informative than the absolute debt level itself.
So, what is the political equilibrium? Let’s distinguish between countries with high
and low cohesiveness θ. Assume first that cohesiveness is sufficiently high, in the
sense that the cohesiveness condition of Section 2.3 holds: αL > 2(1− θ). Then the
political equilibrium is case a), since we have λ1 = α1 and E(λ2) = (1−φ)αL+φαH ,
as it was the case for the social planner. That is, high enough cohesiveness will make
the political equilibrium coincide with the social planner outcome. The respective
comparative statics are summarized in Part 1 of the following proposition.
Now, consider countries with low cohesiveness, in the sense that θ is sufficiently
below 1/2. These countries can end up in each of the cases a)-e), depending on the
parameters γ, φ and αH summarized in E(λ2).22 Part 2 of the following proposition
summarizes the corresponding results:
with own group bias. Both would have a preference for the present and an incentive to raise debt,
and we would end up in one of the cases c), d) or e).
22For the sake of completeness, further channels of influence are ψ, ω¯(·)− ω(·) and P (·), which
also enter the conditions of Table 2.1.
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Proposition 2.4.1. Suppose an economy in the model with sovereign default starts
in the first period with α1 = αL. Moreover, suppose that the constraint τ2 ≥ τ1 does
not bind.23Then:
1. In the social planner’s solution as well as in the political equilibrium, if αL ≥
2(1− θ)
(a) No debt is raised (case a) holds).
(b) No transfers are paid.
(c) There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
(d) Higher φ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity.
(e) Higher ψ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity.
(f) Neither γ nor θ have an influence on the investment decisions.
(g) Free future revenues are increasing in φ and ψ.
2. In the following, consider the political equilibrium for αL < 2(1− θ). That is,
we have λ1 = 2(1− θ) and E(λ2) = φαH + (1− φ)[(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ].
I. If λ1 < E(λ2)
(a) No debt is raised (case a) holds).
(b) There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
(c) Higher φ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity.
(d) Higher ψ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity.
(e) A lower value of γ unambiguously raises investments, whereas an
increase in θ raises investments if γ is above 1/2.
(f) Free future revenues are increasing in θ if γ > 1/2, and are increasing
in φ, ψ and γ.
II. If E(λ2) < λ1 < E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
(a) If E(λ2) < λ1 < E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
, then b1 = b is the optimal
debt level. That is case c) holds.
i. Higher φ as well as lower γ lead to an increase of both b1 and
free future revenues.
ii. Higher ψ leads to an increase of both b1 and free future revenues
if E(λ2) > 1.
23It turns out that this is not a very restrictive assumption. It would only be violated if the high
income realization ω(·) lied unrealistically high above the low income realization ω(·). A sufficient
condition for this assumption is that ω(·) ≤ 2ω(·).
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(b) If λ1 = E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b˜
, with b < b˜ < b, then b1 = b˜ is the
optimal debt level (i.e. case d) holds), so there is sovereign default in
the second period with probability 1− ψ.
i. Higher ψ leads to an increase of b1 if E(λ2) > 1.
ii. Higher φ as well as lower γ lead to an increase of free future
revenues.
(c) Residual revenues are used to finance transfers.
(d) There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
(e) Higher φ as well as lower γ increase investments in fiscal and legal
capacity.
(f) Higher ψ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity if E(λ2) >
1.
III. If λ1 > E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
(a) Debt is raised maximally, b1 = b (case e) holds).
(b) Neither φ nor γ have an influence on the debt level, but it is increas-
ing in ψ.
(c) Free future revenues are 0 and therefore they are constant with respect
to φ, γ, ψ and θ.
(d) Residual revenues are used to finance transfers.
(e) There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
(f) Neither φ nor γ have an influence on the investment decision.
(g) Higher ψ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity.
As already mentioned, Part 1 of the proposition establishes the social planner
solution, which coincides with the political equilibrium under the cohesiveness con-
dition, αL ≥ 2(1 − θ). To understand the comparative static results, we can look
at the respective first order conditions for fiscal and legal capacity in case a). Re-
call that the left-hand side of these conditions gives the marginal benefit of higher
investments. Since no debt is raised and future tax resources are left in the fu-
ture, investment incentives are driven by the expected value of future public funds,
E(λ2) = φαH + (1 − φ)αL. This explains the comparative static results (d). Fur-
thermore, the benefit of future fiscal capacity depends on the expected income base
to which it can be applied, {ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2)}. Since this is increasing in ψ,
the probability of a high income realization, investment incentives increase in ψ.
Part 2 of Proposition 2.4.1 illustrates the outcome of the political equilibrium
when the cohesiveness condition fails. That is, cohesiveness θ is low enough such
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium outcomes conditional on E(λ2) (holding cohesiveness θ fixed
at a sufficiently low level)
that αL < 2(1−θ). The proposition contains the comparative static results that can
be shown using the techniques of monotone comparative statics. It turns out that it
is hard to get unambiguous comparative static results with respect to cohesiveness
θ, as soon as debt is used. Therefore, we concentrate, for the following illustration,
on parameter changes which do not alter cohesiveness θ. This implies that we keep
the value of present public funds λ1 = 2(1 − θ) constant. Most of the remaining
parameters enter E(λ2), the expected value of future public funds. Therefore, we can
illustrate most comparative static results by considering the reactions to a change
in E(λ2), keeping λ1 constant.
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For a fixed and sufficiently low value of cohesiveness (and α1 = αL as before),
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relation between E(λ2), future fiscal capacity τ2, future
legal capacity pi2, debt b1 and free future revenues.24,25
The letters below the graphs refer to the different cases we identified above. Given
an expected value of future public funds, E(λ2), higher than the present value λ1, we
start on the right of the figure in case a). The corresponding results are summarized
in Part 2.I of Proposition 2.4.1. No debt is raised and the comparative static results
correspond to a model without debt. In particular, all parameter changes that
decrease E(λ2) will decrease investments in fiscal and legal capacity. One important
possibility to lower E(λ2) is an increase in political instability.
Continuing to decrease E(λ2), at some point, we reach the knife-edge case b) with
E(λ2) = λ1.26 The debt level in this case is indeterminate in the range [0, b].
By lowering E(λ2) further, we move to case c). To understand the comparative
static results for case c), it is helpful to consider the respective first order condition
for fiscal capacity τ2. Note that ω(pi2) is the ‘low income part’ of the expected
future tax base. This part will be available for sure in the future. In contrast,
ψ[ω¯(pi2) − ω(pi2)] describes the additional expected value of the (income) tax base
since ω¯(pi2) − ω(pi2) will be additionally available if the high income realizes. We
call ψ[ω¯(pi2)− ω(pi2)] the ‘high income part’.
In case c), it is optimal to exactly raise a debt level of b(τ2, pi2) = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ . Because of
the ensuing penalty, it would be too expensive to raise more debt. This means that
the low income part of the future tax base is fully drawn to the present. For this
part, the marginal benefit of making more of it available to the state through fiscal
24The underlying comparative statics within the different cases are established in proposition
2.4.1. So, we assume that τ2 ≥ τ1 does not bind. However, letting it bind up to some E(λ2) would
not change much. For the relevant values of E(λ2), τ2 and pi2 then would be horizontal lines from
the left, the dashed line for b1 in case d) would be solid and both b1 and free future revenues would
be constant in case c) (as long as τ2 ≥ τ1 binds).
The continuity at the border between two cases can be seen from the first order conditions. Free
future revenues jump in case b) since debt jumps from b to 0. Depending on the functional forms of
F (·), L(·) and ω(·), the upward/downward sloping lines of the diagram are not necessarily linear.
25The corresponding figure derived from the model of Besley and Persson (2011) without debt is
provided in Appendix A.2 (Figure A.8). They main difference is that there is a cutoff at E(λ2) = 1
below which there is no investment in fiscal capacity and therefore τ2 is constant at the level τ1.
In Figure 2.1, E(λ2) = 1 is somewhere to the left of case b (for small ψ or a steep function P (·),
E(λ2) = 1 is close to b).
26This case is not included in the proposition because there are no comparative static results
to derive.
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capacity investments is thus proportional to (λ1 − 1). For case c), E(λ2) < λ1, so
future public funds are more valuable when they can be used in the present through
debt. Therefore, investment incentives are higher than in a world without debt
through the influence of the low income part.27
In contrast, the high income part of expected future tax resources is not drawn
to the present. For this part of the future tax base, the marginal benefit of mak-
ing more of it available through fiscal capacity investments is thus proportional to
(E(λ2)− 1). As far as this part is concerned, we therefore have the same effects as
in a model without debt. For instance, given low cohesiveness, increasing political
instability makes it more likely that the current government’s group gets screwed
over in the future by a rival government. This decreases E(λ2) and, through the
influence of the high income part, decreases incentives to invest in fiscal capacity.
By complementarity between the two forms of state capacity investment, we also
get less investments in legal capacity pi2.28 Lower levels of fiscal and legal capacity
decrease b(τ2, pi2) = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ . The latter is just the present value of the low income
part of future public funds. Since exactly this part is drawn to the present in case
c), the debt level decreases when investments in state capacity decrease.29 This is
illustrated in the third panel of Figure 2.1. For case c), we thus have debt and state
capacity moving in the same direction in response to exogenous parameter changes.
Continuing to decrease the value of future public funds, E(λ2), we enter case d).
In this case, it is optimal to incur some penalty. The optimality condition for debt
implies that the optimal debt level lies a certain amount db above b. Since optimal
debt b1 is still lower than the maximal debt level b, there is still some proportion
of expected future tax resources which is left in the future. In particular, for the
marginal investment in fiscal capacity, the high income part of future tax resources is
not drawn to the present. Therefore, as in case c), the marginal benefit of additional
fiscal capacity contains a term proportional to (E(λ2)−1). Lowering E(λ2) will thus
again decrease incentives to invest in fiscal and legal capacity. Since this decreases
27Note that the proposition does not contain results about this level comparison to a world
without debt.
28These comparative static results are captured in Part 2.II (e) of Proposition 2.4.1. Note that
E(λ2) does not enter the first order condition for legal capacity due to our assumption ω′(pi2) =
ω′(pi2). This implies that the high income part is not altered by investments in legal capacity.
29Part 2.II (a) i. of the proposition.
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b(τ2, pi2) = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ , we have one force that pulls debt down. Specifically, for a fixed
level db of debt which is raised above b, the total amount of debt, b + db, will go
down. The low income part of future public funds decreases and less debt is needed
to draw it to the present. This effect was the only effect at work in case c) and it
was responsible for debt and state capacity moving in the same direction. We call
this effect the low income effect.
In case d), we get a second effect. Specifically, from the first order condition for
debt in case d) we can see the following. If E(λ2) decreases, ∆ will adjust upwards
such that the first order condition holds again with equality. That is, the amount db
of debt which is raised above b will increase and trigger a higher penalty. Given, for
instance, an increasing level of political instability, the danger of getting screwed over
by a rival government in the future gets bigger. Therefore, it becomes optimal to
raise more debt and avoid the rival redistribution for a higher proportion of expected
future tax resources. In particular, for a higher proportion of fiscal capacity, the high
income part is now also drawn to the present.30 The higher penalty implied by this
is justified because the alternative of leaving money to the future also gets more
expensive. We call this the high income effect.
The overall effect on the level of debt is therefore ambiguous. However, if the high
income effect dominates the low income effect, we get an increase in debt if E(λ2)
decreases, as indicated by the dashed line in the third panel of Figure 2.1. In region
d), debt and state capacities can therefore start to move in opposite directions in
response to exogenous parameter changes.31
Decreasing the value of future public funds, E(λ2), further, we finally enter case
e). In this case, debt is raised maximally, so all future public funds are drawn to the
present. However, this comes at the price of a high penalty. Despite the high penalty,
these funds are drawn to the present due to the very low value of future public funds,
since E(λ2) = λ1 − (1−ψ)ψ ∂P (∆)∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
when we enter case e). If E(λ2) drops further,
30Note, however, that as long as we are in case d), the high income part is not drawn to the
present for the marginal investment unit of fiscal capacity. That is why investment incentives are
still driven partly by E(λ2).
31Note that in case d), the absolute level of debt could also decrease if E(λ2) decreases. However,
this is rather an extreme scenario since this implies that b in case e) would be lower than b at the
border between case c) and d), which requires a very steep decrease of state capacities within case
d). In any case, decreasing E(λ2) in case d) will always lead to a decrease in the level of free future
revenues, that is of expected future public funds minus debt.
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investment incentives stay constant at the level implied by λ1 − (1−ψ)ψ ∂P (∆)∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
.
Even in case e), through the influence of the low income part, we still get higher
investment incentives than in a world without debt under realistic restrictions on the
income levels. Nevertheless, especially case d) and e) can reestablish a weak state
situation similar to Besley and Persson (2011), where we get very low investments
in fiscal and legal capacity.32 These low investments arise from a low value of future
public funds, E(λ2). Given the possibility to raise debt and letting E(λ2) be low
enough that debt is chosen, E(λ2) influences investment incentives only through the
high income part. Therefore, state capacity investments will be the lower, the higher
the influence of the high income part, in the sense that the difference between the
income levels, ω(·)−ω(·), is bigger while holding the expected income, ψω¯(·) + (1−
ψ)ω(·), constant.33
Furthermore, the situation of low investments in state capacity is now worsened
by a high debt level. Debt is bad here because in the political equilibrium, λ1 =
2(1 − θ) > αL holds. Therefore, in case e), debt is used to fully tie down future
public funds for clientele politics today. A social planner, on the other hand, would
not draw future public funds to the present but would use them instead for public
good expenditures in the future.
Note that the weak state situation in the preceding analysis arises for similar pa-
rameter values as in a model without debt. In particular, recall that the above
analysis was done for countries with low enough cohesiveness. Furthermore, a low
value of E(λ2) leading to case e) can be driven by high political instability γ. Low co-
hesiveness and high political instability constitute the parameter constellation that
defines a weak state in the basic model without debt (Besley and Persson, 2011).34
The mechanism at work has now already been highlighted several times: When the
incumbent government is afraid that future public funds will be used against its
interest, it will not invest in the additional creation of these public funds. We call
32Note that in Besley and Persson (2011), a weak state did not invest at all in fiscal capacity.
33The easiest way to see this is to look at the FOC for fiscal capacity in case e) (which equals the
FOC of case d) for E(λ2) = λ1− (1−ψ)ψ ∂P (∆)∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
). If ω(·)−ω(·) increases while ψω¯(·)+(1−ψ)ω(·)
remains constant, the left-hand side clearly decreases (note that ∆ increases). So, τ2 decreases.
For very high ω(·)−ω(·), τ2 decreases until τ2 = τ1 is reached, which corresponds to a state which
does not invest at all in fiscal capacity like a weak state in Besley and Persson (2011).
34To be more precise, recall from the discussion of the stability condition in Section 2.3.3 that
the probability φ for a high value of public good spending also has to be low enough.
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this the low-investment-mechanism.
However, the preceding analysis also cautions that the low-investment-mechanism
is only partly at work in the default setup. Specifically, we have just argued that the
size of the difference between low and high income realizations plays a crucial role.
Note in particular that, as this difference goes to zero, we move back to the debt
model without default from Section 2.3. For this model, investment incentives were
driven by the present value of public funds as soon as the future value dropped low
enough. Therefore, the low-investment-mechanism was completely broken by the
mechanism of using debt to bring future public funds at the disposal of the present.
We call the latter the debt-mechanism.
The above analysis presents a first step in analyzing the relative strength of these
two mechanisms. Specifically, we have highlighted how the two effects interact in
a specific framework. The following conclusions and implications drawn from the
above analysis depend on this framework. Therefore, we do not want to stretch
them too far.
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, for countries with low cohesiveness, our model setup
leads to a positive correlation between measures of state capacity and E(λ2), a
negative correlation between debt and E(λ2) and therefore to a negative correlation
of debt and state capacity. Moreover, ‘crisis countries’ with very high public debt
and low fiscal and legal capacity can arise. Greece could be an example of such a
country. In our model, these are countries with low cohesiveness θ and a low value
of future public funds, E(λ2). The latter could be due, for instance, to high political
instability γ.
Since E(λ2) < λ1 defines cases c)-e), only for sufficiently low cohesiveness we can
ever end up in the high debt - low state capacity situation of case e). Therefore, the
lower is cohesiveness, the more likely (i.e. for a larger range of parameter values) a
country will end up in such a situation.
From this analysis, we can already draw some policy implications. A crucial factor
that keeps a country from running into a debt trap, that is a situation with very
high debt and low state capacity, seems to be a sufficient level of cohesiveness. High
cohesiveness entails provisions in a country’s constitution and other institutional
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features which prohibit clientele politics by the political group in power. In a polit-
ically unstable political environment, non-cohesive countries, in which it is easy to
benefit your preferred clientele, will end up in the problematic situation of a debt
trap. As the following quotation from Lyrintzis (2011) shows, Greece seems to have
suffered from exactly such a lack of cohesiveness:
"Patronage and clientele networks have marked Greek politics since the creation of
the modern Greek state [...] The alternation of the two major parties in power led
to political polarization and after each governmental change to massive allocation
of favours to the party’s clientele." (p. 3 et seqq.)
To avoid to get back in such a situation, a reform of cohesiveness seems to be
beneficial. This necessitates deep reforms that go at the core of the functioning of the
state. Examples of such reforms include implementing a functioning system of checks
and balances, establishing an independent press that names and shames clientele
politics, establishing provisions in the constitution that prevent clientele politics, or
strengthening the constitutional court in its power to enforce such provisions.
2.4.2 Cross-country Correlations
In the following, we take a short look at cross-country correlations. Thus, this
subsection is not intended as a convincing test of the model’s predictions. The
aim is just to illustrate the theory and to see whether the presented cross-country
correlations are somehow in line with the results from the model. In more detail, we
like to mimic Figure 2.1 with real world data. Data for state capacities and estimates
for model parameters are taken from Besley and Persson (2011) and debt data is
taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Joining the two datasets results in a sample
of 57 countries. In Figure 2.2 we plot fiscal capacity, measured as the share of taxes
in GDP in 1999 against political stability, which is an index used by Besley and
Persson (2011).35,36 The color of the dots depends on the country’s cohesiveness.
High cohesive countries (green dots) are countries with a cohesiveness above the
35Detailed variable descriptions are provided in Appendix A.2.
36Even though Figure 2.2-2.4 use only data of Besley and Persson (2011), these figures are
interesting since Besley and Persson (2011) do not plot the data in this dimension, i.e. state
capacities conditional on political stability. Due to the theoretical results from our model with
debt as summarized by Figure 2.1, these plots seem desirable.
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Figure 2.2: Cross-country correlations between fiscal capacity and political stability
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Figure 2.3: Cross-country correlations between fiscal capacity and political stability
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Figure 2.4: Cross-country correlations between legal capacity and political stability
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Figure 2.5: Cross-country correlations between public debt and political stability
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66th percentile. Cohesiveness is measured as the average executive constraints from
1800 to 2000. The theory predicts that fiscal capacity should increase with E(λ2) (cf.
Figure 2.1). Since for non-cohesive countries, E(λ2) is increasing in political stability,
the model predicts to observe a positive correlation between political stability and
fiscal capacity for non-cohesive countries. Excluding highly cohesive countries, we
find a positive correlation (+0.3200) as shown in Figure 2.2 b) which is statistically
significant (p-value 0.0502).37 Another measure for fiscal capacity suggested by
Besley and Persson (2011) is the share of the non-shadow economy. Therefore, the
theory predicts to observe a negative correlation between political stability and the
share of the shadow economy for non-cohesive countries. Figure 2.3 provides cross-
country evidence. The correlation shown in Figure 2.3 b) is -0.3488 and statistically
significant (p-value 0.0400).
Turning to legal capacity and following the same reasoning as above, the model
predicts to observe a positive correlation between political stability and legal ca-
pacity for non-cohesive countries. Figure 2.4 provides cross-country evidence, where
we use the property rights protection index from Besley and Persson (2011) as a
measure for legal capacity. Excluding highly cohesive countries, we find a positive
correlation (+0.4115) which is statistically significant (p-value 0.0103).
Finally, the part of Figure 2.1 regarding debt suggests an overall negative cor-
relation between stability and debt for non-cohesive countries. Figure 2.5 shows
the corresponding cross-country data. For medium and low cohesive countries we
observe a slight negative correlation (-0.1405), however, not statistically significant
(p-value 0.4003). On the one hand, this might be due to the different effects working
in opposite directions as explained above (cf. the explanations of case c) and d)).
On the other hand, there are many further determinants of public debt for which
we do not control and the high variation around the regression line strengthens the
point that further variables are necessary to explain public debt more properly.
We also compute correlations between debt and state capacities. The correlations
between debt and the property rights protection index as well as the correlation
between debt and the share of the shadow economy point in the right direction,
37Plots which indicate the country names for this and the following graphs are provided in
Appendix A.2.
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however, they lack statistical significance.38 However, regarding the relationship
between debt and shadow economy there is an empirical study by Elgin and Uras
(2013), who find a positive relation between these variables as well as positive rela-
tion between default risk and shadow economy, which is both in line with the results
of our model.
The cross-country correlations presented here are just a first step of an empirical
analysis and we do not claim to show causal patterns in the data. Nevertheless,
at least these correlations indicate that the determinants of the model seem to be
relevant for explaining some cross-country patterns of state capacities and debt. A
comprehensive empirical analysis to test the theory convincingly and to establish
causality, which would be an own project itself, remains a promising area of future
research.
2.5 Quasi-linear Model
The extension to include ability-to-pay default added an important feature to the
analysis. For a rising debt level, the risk of default makes it more and more expensive
to use debt for drawing future public funds to the present. This can partly break
the incentivizing effect which the possibility to raise debt can have on state capacity
investments. Nevertheless, even with this extension, the linear modeling remains
rather extreme in some of its predictions. For instance, it does not seem realistic
that public good spending would go down to zero in some future instances. To see
if the predictions from the linear model carry over to a more realistic preference
specification, we modify the model from the last section to allow for quasi-linear
preferences.
Specifically, utility of an individual of group J in period s changes from (2.2) to:
uJs = αsV (gs) + (1− ts)ωs(pJs ) + rJs (2.33)
V (·) is increasing and concave and is assumed to fulfill the Inada conditions. The
latter will make sure that there is preference for some positive public good spending
38Moreover, the correlation between debt and the share of taxes in GDP is insignificant and
close to zero.
The corresponding figures and correlations are provided in Appendix A.2.
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in each period. Within a period, a government will now provide public goods until
the marginal benefit of doing so equals the marginal benefit of transfer spending:
αsVg(gˆ) = 2(1− θ) (2.34)
If there is more money than gˆ to spend, then this rest of the money will be spent
on redistributive transfers.
Even this seemingly little modification of changing the public good sub-utility leads
to quite some complications in the analytical solution of the model. In the analysis
below, we therefore focus on a special case of the quasi-linear model environment.
Furthermore, to reduce the number of cases to consider, we make the following
assumption. The high income ω(pis) realizes exactly then when public good spending
has a low value αL. This can be justified by interpreting certain measures to avert an
economic crisis as public good spending. Such a measure could be the nationalization
of a system relevant bank in trouble. In a boom with high income, such public
spending is not necessary and therefore public good spending can be seen as having
a lower general benefit there. The complementary case that corresponds to an
economic crisis has ω(pis) and αH . The probability to end up in a boom time with
a lower value αL of public good spending is given by:
Prob(ω, αL) = (1− φ) (2.35)
The probability of a crisis with a high public good value αH is given by:
Prob(ω, αH) = φ (2.36)
Everything else stays the same compared to the linear model with default, ex-
cept for the specification of the penalty. We now assume that the penalty has the
following form (where ∆ is the amount not repaid):
P =

0 if ∆ = 0 (no default)
P (∆) if ∆ = (1 +R(b1))b1 − (τ2ω(pi2)− g¯) and (α2, ω2(pi2)) = (αH , ω(pi2))
Pmax else.
(2.37)
In particular, there might be now an amount g¯ which is left to the country even
in case of default, without triggering the maximal penalty Pmax. This acknowledges
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the fact that even the maximal penalty Pmax that the international market can
inflict might not be enough to keep the country from defaulting, if full repayment
is required. Therefore, as long as the government repays τ2ω − g¯, the international
market acknowledges that the country does all that it can. When the government
shows this kind of good will, the penalty depends on the amount of debt that is not
repaid in the same way as before.
If the country repays less, that is the government defaults purposely, we assume the
punishment to take its maximal value, Pmax. Given Pmax, the amount g¯ of public
good spending that is ‘left’ to the country is set such that the government does
not want to default purposely. In particular, even with the maximally inflictable
penalty, a country would prefer to default, if honoring the debt commitments to
the demanded degree, τ2ω(pi2) − g¯, would leave it with less welfare. To keep the
analysis simple, we assume that g¯ is such that the country would not want to
default purposely even with the maximal debt b. For lower equilibrium levels of
debt, g¯ could be lower, but we neglect this subtlety here.39,40
Define Γ ≡ (1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ. We make the following Assumptions:41
φαHVg+(g¯) + (1− φ)Γ < φ1− φ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣∣∣
b=b
+ Γ (2.38)
αHVg−(g¯) >
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣∣∣
b=b
(2.39)
Here Vg+ denotes the derivative from the right and Vg− the derivative from the
left.42 Note also that ∂P (∆)
∂∆ is evaluated at b¯ =
τ2ω(pi2)−g
1+ρ in (2.38) and at b =
τ2[(1−φ)ω(pi2)+φω(pi2)]−g
1+ρ in (2.39). Assumption (2.39) therefore says that public good
spending below g¯ is very valuable. Specifically, it is so valuable that even in the face
of penalties the country will not reduce these penalties by lowering its public good
consumption below g¯, the level it is accorded by the international market in the case
of default. Economically, this public good consumption can be interpreted as public
39Moreover, in order to derive the comparative statics results we assume that g¯ is a fixed value
which is constant with respect to changes in the parameters.
40Note that g¯ can be 0 if V (·) is such that Pmax is large enough to ensure that debt commitments
are still honored. However, if some basic public good spending is necessary each period in the
sense of being highly valuable, which seems rather realistic and could be captured for instance by
V (g) = ln(g), g¯ > 0 is necessary.
41Moreover, we assume αHVg−(g¯) > 2(1 − θ) during the analysis, which just says that the
resources which are left to the country in case of default without triggering Pmax are actually
spent on the public good.
42This allows for the theoretical possibility of a kink at g¯.
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expenditures for crucial projects. Examples include maintenance of basic medical
care, security, infrastructure and schools. A reduction of public good spending below
g¯ would go at the core of these projects. Assumption (2.38) implies that the marginal
penalty at b is high enough so that the optimal debt level b∗1 is a continuous function
of the parameters.43
Intra-temporal policies
As in the analysis of the linear model, we first analyze the optimal intra-temporal
policies while taking the inter-temporal policies bs, τs+1, pis+1 (and so ms and ns) as
given. Considering the intra-temporal maximization problem solved by the govern-
ment, we now have to distinguish two scenarios.
Scenario 1: τsωs(pis)−ms − ns + bs − (1 +R(bs−1))bs−1 > g¯
That is, the residual public resources after taking care of the investment expen-
ditures (ms, ns) and debt obligations are larger than the amount of public good
spending which is ‘left’ to the country in any case. In this scenario, the intra-
temporal maximization problem of the incumbent group is analogous to the linear
case:
max{gs}u
I
s = αsV (gs)+(1−τs)ωs(pis)+2(1−θ)[τsωs(pis)−ms−ns+bs−(1+R(bs−1))bs−1−gs]
(2.40)
Given a public good provision of gs by the incumbent government, the utility of
the opposition group will be:
uOs = αsV (gs)+(1−τs)ωs(pis)+2θ[τsωs(pis)−ms−ns+bs−(1+R(bs−1))bs−1−gs] (2.41)
In the following, denote the residual resources left after investment expenditures
and debt obligations as:
T ≡ τsωs(pis)−ms − ns + bs − (1 +R(bs−1))bs−1
43Otherwise, the optimal debt level might jump from b∗1 ≤ b¯ to b∗1 > b¯ at some point. We make
this assumption just for convenience, it is not crucial for our results. If it is violated, the results
stated in proposition 2.5.1 still hold (parts 1-4 and 7 hold without restrictions while parts 5-6 and
8 hold within b∗1 ≤ b¯ and b∗1 > b¯ but not necessarily at the jump).
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The policy function for public good provision then becomes:
G(αs, τs, pis,ms, ns, bs, bs−1) =

T if αsV ′ (T ) ≥ 2(1− θ)
gˆ otherwise.
(2.42)
Plugging (2.42) into (2.40) and (2.41), yields the following ‘indirect’ payoff function
for group J ∈ {I, O} in period s:
W (αs, τs, pis,ms, ns,bs−1, bs, βJ) = αsV (G) + (1− τs)ωs(pis) (2.43)
+ βJ [τsωs(pis)−ms − ns + bs − (1 +R(bs−1))bs−1 −G]
where βI = 2(1− θ) and βO = 2θ.
Scenario 2: τsωs(pis)−ms − ns + bs − (1 +R(bs−1))bs−1 ≤ g¯
In this case, the resources available after honoring the debt commitments and cov-
ering the investment expenditures (again we take the inter-temporal policies ms, ns
and bs as given) would be less than g¯, the spending on public goods which is allowed
without triggering the maximal penalty.
By assumption (2.39) and the convexity of the penalty function, we have αHVg−(g¯) >
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b
for all b ∈ [b, b]. This implies that for Scenario 2 and with αs = αH , the
government will provide the public good level g¯ and incur the resulting penalty from
not being able to fully honor its debt commitments. With αs = αL we would need to
make additional assumptions in order to analyze Scenario 2. However, it turns out
that for the situation we want to focus on below, the government will never end up
in Scenario 2 for αs = αL. This is, we analyze an economy which starts in the first
period with α1 = αL and in which there are enough resources to provide transfers.
In such an environment, Scenario 2 might only be the case for period 2 and α2 = αH
and if so, the corresponding ‘indirect’ payoff function for group J ∈ {I, O} becomes:
W (αH , τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, βJ) =αHV (g¯) + (1− τ2)ω(pi2) (2.44)
− P [(1 +R(b1))b1 − (τ2ω(pi2)− g¯)]
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Inter-temporal policies
The inter-temporal maximization problem of the incumbent group of period s=1 is:
max{τ2,pi2,b1} W (α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, b0, b1, 2(1− θ)) + EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1) (2.45)
s.t. τ2 ≥ τ1,
pi2 ≥ pi1,
b1 ≤ b(τ2, pi2),
In the following, replace W (αs, τs, pis,ms, ns, bs−1, bs, βJ) by W (αs, βJ). Then we
get:
EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1) =δ(1− γ)[φW (αH , 2(1− θ)) + (1− φ)W (αL, 2(1− θ))]
(2.46)
+ δγ[φW (αH , 2θ) + (1− φ)W (αL, 2θ)]
In Appendix A.1, we derive comparative static results for this setup, summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5.1. Suppose an economy in the quasi-linear model with sovereign
default starts in the first period with α1 = αL. Moreover, suppose that there are
enough resources to provide transfers in period 1 and that the constraint τ2 ≥ τ1
does not bind.44 Furthermore, assume that the public good subutility function and
the values of αH and αL are such that the first order condition for debt holds with
equality for b∗1 6= b. For such b∗1 6= b, we get:45
1. If α2 = αL (α2 = αH), transfers (no transfers) will be provided in the second
period.
2. There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
3. Higher φ increases(decreases) investments in fiscal and legal capacity if Γ < 1
(Γ > 1).
4. Lower γ increases investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
44A sufficient but not necessary condition that τ2 ≥ τ1 never binds is Γ > 1. The results when
τ2 ≥ τ1 binds are established in proposition A.1.1 in Appendix A.1.
45The results for b∗1 = b will be shortly discussed in Appendix A.1. They are analogous to the
linear case.
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5. Lower γ leads to an increase of free future revenues.
6. Higher φ leads to a decrease of debt if Γ > 1.
7. For θ → 1/2, the probability that a country will end up in a situation with
sovereign default approaches 0.
Under some further technical assumptions spelled out in Appendix A.1, we get:
8. The higher γ, the more likely it is that debt and state capacity investments
move in opposite rather than the same direction in response to a change in γ.
Regarding Part 1 to Part 7, the analogy to the findings from the linear case is
clear.46 Part 8 is worth an explanation. In order to have debt and state capacity
investments change from moving in the same to moving in opposite directions, we
actually need ambiguity in the way that debt and state capacity investments react to
exogenous parameter changes. This ambiguity shows up clearly for the comparative
statics with respect to political instability γ. In particular, both state capacities τ ∗2
and pi∗2 decrease with a higher value of political instability. The reaction of debt b∗1,
however, is ambiguous. In Appendix A.1, we show that the marginal effect of an
increase of γ on both state capacities τ ∗2 and pi∗2 becomes stronger for higher γ. We
then argue that for higher γ, it becomes more likely that debt and state capacity
investments move in opposite rather than the same direction in response to a change
in γ. Recall that in the linear case, we found that they move in the same direction
for b∗1 = b but are likely to move in opposite directions for b∗1 > b. The latter was
the case for low E(λ2), which can be caused by high γ. In that sense, Part 8 points
in the same direction as our findings in the linear case.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented an integrated analytical framework for analyzing the inter-
action between public debt and state capacity, the power of a state to raise taxes
and to provide market supporting policies. We showed that the possibility to raise
46However, the comparative statics with respect to φ now depend on Γ. The reason for this
difference compared to the comparative statics in the model of Section 2.4 is that a change in φ
captures now also a change in ψ.
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debt can provide a novel incentive to invest in state capacity, because debt allows
to bring future state capacity at the disposal of the current government. As long as
debt can be used to protect the current government from an adverse use of future
public funds, it is no longer necessary to use low investments in state capacity as a
protection device.
However, we also showed how this novel mechanism can be weakened in a world
with income fluctuations and the possibility of default. When high costs of raising
debt make it very expensive to draw all relevant future public funds to the present,
the mechanism of lowering investments resurfaces. Specifically, this mechanism is
more prominent for high income fluctuations, because they increase the proportion
of public funds that can only be drawn to the present at high costs. For such an
environment, we get results that are closest to the original no-debt model by Besley
and Persson (2011). In particular, an unstable political environment combined with
insufficient institutional provisions to prevent clientele politics can then lead to a sit-
uation of low state capacity. Furthermore, this weak state situation is now worsened
by a high built up of debt, increasing the probability of sovereign default.
The results of our model are in principle testable. In cross-country data, we pre-
dict to observe for countries with non-cohesive institutions a positive correlation
between political stability and measures of state capacity, a negative correlation
between political stability and public debt and therefore a negative correlation be-
tween public debt and measures of state capacity. For instance, countries with high
political instability are expected to show high public debt and low fiscal and legal
capacity. There is anecdotal evidence that Greece might be an example of such a
country. Taking a brief look at cross country data, we find positive correlations
between political stability and measures of state capacity but insignificant correla-
tions regarding debt. However, a comprehensive empirical analysis, which would be
necessary in order to convincingly test our theory, is left for future research.
Our model leaves room for several generalizations which should be investigated by
future research. First, to qualify the model results in light of the tax smoothing
literature, it would be interesting to allow for distortionary taxation. Second, the
modeling of default could be extended to a full-fledged model of willingness-to-pay
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default. This would certainly allow to uncover additional interesting channels that
shape the interaction between debt and state capacity. Third, in light of this, it
could make sense to extend the model to more than two periods.
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Chapter 3
Permanent Tax Amnesties, Audit
Information Provision and
Compliance Behavior:
An Experimental Study
3.1 Introduction
Tax amnesties are a popular instrument for governments around the world which
aim to increase both short- and medium-term tax revenue. For instance, in the
US, more than 110 amnesty programs have taken place since 1980. Despite many
different features, all of these amnesties had in common that they lasted less than
one year, they did not forgive the tax owed and they waived criminal prosecution
(Mikesell and Ross, 2012).1
However, several countries have policies in place which resemble a tax amnesty
but are of unlimited duration, which is why they can be seen as a ‘permanent’ tax
amnesty.2 For instance, the German tax law allows for the possibility of a voluntary
1Baer and Le Borgne (2008) provide a more general review of tax amnesties around the world
and define a tax amnesty as a "limited-time offer by the government to a specific group of taxpayers
to pay a defined amount, in exchange for forgiveness of a tax liability (including interest and
penalties), relating to a previous tax period, as well as freedom from legal prosecution." (p. 5)
2Examples for countries with such permanent programs which cover all or particular cases of
tax evasion are inter alia Denmark, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the
US (Baer and Le Borgne, 2008).
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disclosure which grants exemption from criminal prosecution regarding all kinds
of tax evasion. While several empirical studies about the effects of tax amnesties
exist,3 so far, very little is known about such permanent tax amnesties, especially
when it comes to experimental or other empirical investigations. However, studying
permanent tax amnesties seems desirable since its effects on tax compliance are
likely to be different from those of a one-time or repeated tax amnesty. The reason
is that a permanent tax amnesty might reduce tax compliance if people anticipate
that they can choose a voluntary disclosure at any time in the future. This might
lead to an increase in tax evasion since the permanent possibility of a voluntary
disclosure creates a kind of ‘insurance’, for instance against a rise in the audit rate
or the punishment. This chapter is intended to fill this gap in the literature by
examining the effects of a permanent tax amnesty on compliance behavior in an
experimental setting.
In this experiment, all participants earn and declare income in an environment with
a fluctuating audit rate, which mirrors that during the last years, the risk of getting
caught has been subject to exogenous shocks, in particular caused by data leaks
about foreign bank accounts. However, the provided amount of information about
the audit rate differs among three treatments. In one treatment, the current audit
rate is announced (currInf treatment), in a second treatment, the participants are
informed about the audit rate of the previous round (pastInf treatment) while in a
third treatment, the audit rates are completely unknown to the participants (noInf
treatment). Within these treatments, a permanent tax amnesty is introduced which
allows for voluntary disclosures to repay evaded taxes in order to go unpunished in
case of future audits.
Varying audit rate information across treatments has not only been shown to be an
interesting tool in tax compliance experiments (Alm et al., 2009) but it is especially
interesting in light of a permanent tax amnesty. In particular, these treatments allow
exploring three questions. First, they enable me to analyze whether a permanent tax
amnesty lowers compliance by creating an insurance as explained above. Second, the
experimental design allows examining whether this insurance effect decreases with
less information about the audit rate. Third, the treatment without information
3See Baer and Le Borgne (2008) for a review.
3.1. INTRODUCTION 63
enables me to investigate whether or not a permanent tax amnesty has an impact
on tax compliance even beyond the insurance effect, for example by influencing social
norms.
I find that, if the audit rates are announced (currInf treatment), the permanent
tax amnesty lowers compliance by around 9% but that there is no effect on tax
compliance in the absence of information (noInf treatment).4 So, the experimental
results suggest that a permanent tax amnesty lowers tax compliance if the informa-
tional setting allows using a permanent tax amnesty as an ‘insurance’ against an
increase in the detection probability. Furthermore, I investigate when people decide
for a voluntary disclosure and find that, as expected, most voluntary disclosures
take place after a jump in the audit rate becomes public. However, surprisingly, I
also find a large number of time-inconsistent voluntary disclosures in the treatment
without information about the audit rate (noInf treatment).
During the last decades, many tax compliance experiments have been carried out.5
Regarding the experimental setup, my study is related to the study of Alm et al.
(2009) who investigate the effects of different forms of official and unofficial infor-
mation about the audit rate on tax compliance, finding that the information setting
plays an important role. I build on their setup by also allowing for different forms
of information concerning the audit rate but modify it in order to investigate the
effects of a permanent tax amnesty. To my knowledge, there are three tax com-
pliance experiments that deal with tax amnesties, however all with non-permanent
amnesties which take place between two rounds of an experiment. Moreover, they
yielded inconclusive results. Alm et al. (1990) find that the overall level of compli-
ance falls after an amnesty, while Torgler and Schaltegger (2005) and Rechberger
et al. (2010) find that compliance tends to increase after an amnesty.6 In contrast to
these studies, I investigate the effects of a permanent tax amnesty on tax compliance
4The effect of a permanent tax amnesty in the pastInf treatment lies in between.
5Fonseca and Myles (2011) provide a detailed survey.
6There are also a few non-experimental attempts to examine the effects of (non-permanent) tax
amnesties on tax compliance. Luitel and Sobel (2007) analyze tax amnesties from 1980 to 2004 in 37
states of the US and find evidence that a tax amnesty comes along with a decrease in future revenue
and that this effect is even larger for a repeated tax amnesty. However, such studies with macro
data have difficulties to establish causality. There is also a study with individual taxpayer-level
data by Christian et al. (2002) who evaluate subsequent filing behavior of tax amnesty participants
from Michigan, finding little if any positive impact on revenues. However, due to data availability,
their results are conditional on amnesty participation and no inference is possible regarding overall
compliance after the tax amnesty.
64 CHAPTER 3. PERMANENT TAX AMNESTIES
which has not been done so far.
On the theory side, as all tax compliance experiments, this chapter is related to
the seminal tax compliance model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), as discussed in
more detail in Section 3.3. Concerning tax amnesties, there is a theoretical paper
by Andreoni (1991) which discusses the desirability of a permanent tax amnesty. In
his model, a permanent tax amnesty increases tax evasion but still might increase
total revenue since the reason for additional tax evasion lies in agents expecting to
potentially participate in the amnesty, in which case the government recaptures both
the new and the pre-existing tax evasion. The model of Andreoni (1991), however,
only mirrors my experiment to some extent since, in his model, the audit rate is
fixed and the uncertainty arises from consumption shocks while in my experiment,
the fluctuating audit rate is the main driving force which is intended to reflect reality
more closely.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses a
current example of a permanent tax amnesty which is in force in Germany. Section
3.3 gives some theoretical background while section 3.4 explains the experimental
design. In Section 3.5, I derive some hypotheses which will be examined in Section
3.6 in which the results are discussed. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Example: The Voluntary Disclosure in Ger-
many
The German tax law allows for the possibility of a voluntary disclosure regarding
tax evasion which grants exemption from criminal prosecution under certain condi-
tions.7 This rule can be seen as some kind of permanent tax amnesty, as argued in
the introduction. After 8079 voluntary disclosures occured in 2012 (Handelsblatt,
2013), there have been more than 26000 voluntary disclosures in 2013 (Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 2014).8 Moreover, the revenue due to voluntary disclosures since 2010 is
7In particular, the voluntary disclosure has to be complete, i.e. it has to cover all tax evasion
which has not yet lapsed (5 to 10 years), the evaded tax including interest have to be paid (plus 5%
of evaded taxes if tax evasion is greater than 50000 Euro) and the subject must not be informed
about an ongoing investigation. Cf. Abgabenordung §371 and §398a
8The explanations for this jump are manifold (Handelsblatt (2013)): First, many tax evaders
might have speculated on a bilateral tax treaty with Switzerland, however, the proposal failed
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estimated to be greater than or equal to 3 billion Euro (Handelsblatt, 2013). Since
the voluntary disclosure of the president of FC Bayern München, Uli Hoeneß, has be-
come public in spring 2013, there is an ongoing political debate in Germany whether
this rule should be abolished.
However, except from mentioning the revenue due to voluntary disclosures, the
arguments in this debate are mainly driven by justice considerations, i.e. whether
the possibility of a voluntary disclosure is a fair appreciation of active repentance
or whether it is unjust to let tax evaders off the hook because they should get what
they deserve.
For example, the spokesman on financial policy of SPD-Bundestagsfraktion, Lothar
Binding, states in a newspaper interview: "In all other fields of law, this easy pos-
sibility to evade punishment does not exist. If our sensitivity against the theft of a
yoghurt is higher than against tax evasion of 100000 Euro, something got mixed up.
[...] Under the aspect of justice, there is only one possible answer: abolition."9
By contrast, the spokeswoman on financial policy of CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion,
Antje Tillmann, answers the question whether the principle of the voluntary disclo-
sure regarding tax evasion is just compared to other offenses in the following way:
"This is comparable to the case that someone starts a little fire to harm someone.
But then, when he goes away, he is beset by his conscience, goes back and extin-
guishes the flame. So, he backs out of his deed. [...] I regard it as useful to allow
for the possibility to come back to tax honesty here and now."10
One issue, which is neglected in the current debate in my eyes, are the potential
effects of a permanent tax amnesty on compliance behavior, i.e. whether people
increase or decrease their compliance if they anticipate that they will be able to go
for a voluntary disclosure at any time in the future. In particular, a permanent tax
amnesty might decrease tax compliance if it can be used as an ‘insurance’ against
an increase in the audit rate, as explained in further detail in the next section.
Therefore, this study contributes to this debate by experimentally investigating
in January 2013 in the Federal Council of Germany. Second, Swiss banks increased pressure on
German clients in order to ensure they pay taxes. Third, the voluntary disclosure of Uli Hoeneß
which became public might have caused copycats. Fourth, new CDs with data regarding foreign
banking accounts have been bought by German tax authorities.
9Quote translated from Mannheimer Morgen (2014).
10Quote translated from Thüringer Allgemeine (2014).
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whether and under what circumstances this concern is justified.
3.3 Theoretical Background
In the following, I want to use some simple theoretical framework to formulate two
ideas how a permanent tax amnesty might influence compliance behavior. The
first idea builds on the basic tax evasion model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
Consider an individual with true income I in each round and who declares income
D to the tax authorities in a given round. If the individual is not audited, her net
income of this round will be INA = I−τD. However, if the individual is audited, the
true income is detected and therefore her net income will be IA = (1−τ)I−fτ(I−D)
where τ is the tax rate and f is the penalty rate on evaded taxes. Let the probability
of an audit fluctuate between pH and pL with pH > pL and Prob(p = pH) = γ in
each round. Without a permanent tax amnesty, each round consists of three stages:
In the first stage, the individuals declare their income. In the second stage, the
audit rate is drawn and publicly announced and in the last stage, the potential
audits take place and the payoffs are determined. Therefore, an individual in the
first stage solves the following problem:
maxD E(p)U(IA) + (1− E(p))U(INA) (3.1)
with:
E(p) = γpH + (1− γ)pL (3.2)
Denote the solution to this maximization problem D∗noAmn. With a permanent tax
amnesty, there will be an additional stage compared to the previous setup: In the
first stage, the individuals declare their income and in the second stage, the audit
rate is drawn and publicly announced as before. Now introduce a new stage in which
the individual has the possibility of a voluntary disclosure. If the individual decides
to voluntarily disclose her income, she has to pay taxes on her true income, but no
penalty. So, the net income after a voluntary disclosure is IV = (1− τ)I. In the last
stage, the potential audits take place and the payoffs are determined. In this setup,
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an individual in the first stage solves the following problem:
maxD γmax{U(IV ), pHU(IA) + (1− pH)U(INA)} (3.3)
+ (1− γ)max{U(IV ), pLU(IA) + (1− pL)U(INA)}
Generally, for people who never use the voluntary disclosure, either because they
are completely honest or because they prefer cheating in both situations pL and
pH , nothing changes. Moreover, for individuals who use a voluntary disclosure
conditional on both audit probabilities, pL and pH , nothing changes since this is
equivalent to being honest from the beginning on. However, for individuals who
prefer a voluntary disclosure conditional on pH but who prefer cheating conditional
on pL, I get
maxD γU(IV ) + (1− γ)(pLU(IA) + (1− pL)U(INA)) (3.4)
which is equivalent to:
maxD pLU(IA) + (1− pL)U(INA) (3.5)
Denote the solution to this maximization problem D∗Amn. Since pL < E(p), I
get D∗Amn < D∗noAmn. This is, declared income is lower with a permanent tax
amnesty since, in this case, the lower audit rate pL and not the expected audit
rate E(p) is relevant for the tax evasion decision. The intuition is straightforward:
tax compliance is lower under a permanent tax amnesty since it can be used as an
‘insurance’ against a surprisingly high audit rate.
The second and less obvious idea how a permanent tax amnesty might influence
tax compliance comes from a different perspective and incorporates social norms.
Alm et al. (2009) define social norms as follows: "A social norm represents a pattern
of behavior that is judged in a similar way by others and that is sustained in part
by social approval or disapproval. This suggests an individual will comply as long
as he or she believes that compliance is the social norm." (p. 394) Moreover, this
suggests that a policy such as a permanent tax amnesty might influence the believes
about the social norm. One way to introduce a social norm is via a reference point,
which means that an individual incurs a loss in utility if she does not achieve her
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reference point.11 Following Alm et al. (2009), the reference point might be full
compliance. If this is the case, an individual incurs a cognitive cost (or psychic cost)
β(τ(I −D)) proportional to tax evasion which reduces INA. The stronger the social
norm of tax compliance, the higher is β. So, the question is whether the existence
of a permanent tax amnesty influences the social norm of tax compliance, and if
so, in which direction. On the one hand, a permanent tax amnesty could reduce
tax compliance since tax evasion might become regarded as a trivial offense since it
offers the possibility to return to legality without punishment. On the other hand,
a permanent tax amnesty could increase tax compliance since getting caught might
become less socially acceptable because it reveals that the tax evader wanted to
evade until the point of getting caught and she cannot persuade others (and herself)
that she wanted to become legal but there was no way. So, from a theoretical
perspective, the effect of a permanent tax amnesty on social norms is unclear. After
explaining the experimental design in the next section, I will come back to these
considerations by formulating hypotheses in Section 3.5.
3.4 Experimental Design
120 subjects participated in the experiment which took place at the mLab at Mann-
heim University in Fall 2013. The experiment consisted of 60 rounds which were
predetermined but unknown to the subjects.12 In one half (round 1-30 or round
31-60), subjects faced a permanent tax amnesty while in the other half, the game
was a standard tax compliance game. An AB/BA-design was used to control for
order effects. The sequence of actions within a round with and without a permanent
tax amnesty is summarized by Figure 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. At the beginning of
each round, the round income is displayed to the subjects. The income is randomly
drawn from the values 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 which are all equally likely.13 In the
11Reference points have become very important in the recent literature in behavioral economics.
See Hart and Moore (2008) for an overview of applications in behavioral economics (p. 7, Footnote
12) and for an application of reference points to contract theory.
12The instructions say that "the number of rounds of the experiment is unknown to you, the
duration of the experiment is, however, at most 1.5 hours" (cf. the instructions in Appendix B.2).
13Income is random for several reasons: First, voluntary disclosures are mostly used regarding
tax evasion in the context of capital income, which fluctuate over time and which shall be mirrored
in this experiment. Second, playing sixty rounds with a constant income might bore the subjects.
Third, fluctuating income is also common in the experimental tax compliance literature, e.g. Alm
et al. (2009).
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rounds without a permanent tax amnesty (i.e. without the possibility of a voluntary
disclosure), the subjects are then asked to fill in their tax declaration,14 i.e. to state
their income of the current round which is then taxed at the rate of 25% (which
mirrors capital income taxation in Germany).15 Thereafter, the computer randomly
determines who is audited. If there is an audit, the subject has to pay taxes on the
declared income, the evaded taxes of the current and the previous three rounds plus
an additional penalty on top which is 100% of the evaded taxes (in other words, the
subject has to pay evaded taxes of the current and the previous three rounds twice).
If there is no audit, the subject pays only taxes on the declared income. The last
stage of the round is the profit display in which the subjects are informed about
whether or not they have been selected for an audit and which includes a round
summary.
Figure 3.1: Experimental design: Rounds without permanent tax amnesty
In the rounds with a permanent tax amnesty, subjects can choose at the beginning
14Screenshots are provided in Appendix B.3.
15In Germany, the capital income tax rate is 25%. However, due to the "Solidaritätszuschlag",
the true rate is 26.375% plus church tax if applicable.
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Figure 3.2: Experimental design: Rounds with permanent tax amnesty
of each round, after they have learned their current income, whether or not they
want to undertake a voluntary disclosure. If they do so, they have to pay taxes on
their current income plus the evaded taxes of the previous three rounds, however, no
penalty. In case of a future audit, these evaded taxes will be treated as if they were
regularly paid, i.e. there is no future penalty.16 The audit rate fluctuates between
2.5%, to which I will refer to in the following as the ‘low’ level, and 25% (the ‘high’
level) which is independent of the subjects’ decisions. In a round in which the audit
rate is at the low level, the probability of an upward jump at the beginning of the
next round is 15%. In case of a jump, the audit rate remains at the high level for
1 to 5 rounds (each equally likely, i.e. on average 3 rounds) and then falls back to
16The decision regarding the voluntary disclosure is modeled as a binary choice (complete dis-
closure or no disclosure) since partial disclosures in real life are void and therefore even counter-
productive. In reality, partial disclosures also exist (e.g. the case of Uli Hoeneß), most likely done
by accident due to the complexity of a comprehensive voluntary disclosure, which is ruled out in
this experiment.
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the low level.17,18 The information regarding the random process of the audit rate
is known to the subjects, however the information regarding the actual audit rate
differs among the three treatments. In the noInf treatment, the subjects have no
information regarding the level of the audit rate.19 On the other extreme, in the
currInf treatment, the subjects are informed about the value of the audit rate in
the current round. The third treatment, pastInf, is in between these two extreme
information settings and provides the subjects with the value of the audit rate of
the previous round.
Each treatment comprises 40 subjects, with 20 subjects facing the permanent tax
amnesty in the first half and 20 subjects facing the permanent tax amnesty in the
second half of the experiment. After the experiment, measures of risk aversion
have been collected as in Holt and Laury (2002)20. The entire experiment was
programmed with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruitment was done with ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). The 120 subjects split up into 12 laboratory sessions with 8-12
participants each. The average duration is 75 minutes and the participants earned
11.85 Euro on average, ranging from 10.00 to 16.00 Euro.21 All tax revenue and
penalties have been converted into Euro using the same exchange rate as the profits22
and were transferred to Bundeskasse, flowing into the German federal budget. All
subjects were informed about this in the instructions, and, to ensure credibility, they
were provided with a copy of the proof of payment by email after the experiment.23
17During the last years, from time to time tax authorities around the world gained access
to information about tax evaders, for instance through the offshore leaks scandal in 2013 which
revealed data about 130000 offshore accounts of people from 170 countries, or through CDs with
stolen data about Swiss banking accounts of German citizens, which were sold to German tax
authorities a couple of times since 2006. The fluctuating audit rate in the experiment is intended
to mimic such shocks in the detection probability which last for some time until the data is
exploited. Regarding the overall audit rate, a tenfold increase seems somewhat unrealistic, however,
conditional on evading taxes (i.e. for the detection probability) a tenfold increase might be realistic.
18Note that my experimental design differs mainly in two ways from the theoretical framework
introduced in Section 3.3. The draws of the audit rates are not i.i.d. and the voluntary disclosure
takes place at the beginning of each round. However, the explained ‘insurance’ mechanism is
qualitatively the same in my setup for the following two reasons. First, in my experimental design,
in which the audit rate is not i.i.d. drawn in each round but depends on the previous round’s
audit rate, the mentioned "surprisingly high audit rate" corresponds to an upward jump of the
audit rate. Second, although the voluntary disclosure takes place at the beginning of each round,
the ‘insurance’ effect is present because the previous rounds’ tax declarations are examined in
case of an audit in the experiment. These two details are deliberately omitted in the theoretical
considerations of Section 3.3 to keep the reasoning as simple as possible.
19Note that the instructions do not state the values of the two levels.
20After the tax evasion game, the subjects had to choose from a series of two lotteries with one
of them being played by the computer. The lottery payoff, ranging from 0.05 to 1.90 Euro, was
added to the final payoff
21All subjects have been paid individually and confidentially.
223.5 points = 1 eurocent.
23In the experimental literature, there is no consent about what to do with tax revenue. Some
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An English translation of the instructions of all treatments, which were originally
written in German, is provided in Appendix B.2.
An objection against my experiment and tax compliance experiments in general
is that students might behave differently than actual taxpayers. However, there is
little evidence for this argument. Alm et al. (2011) compare reporting behavior of
students and non-students in tax compliance experiments and find that compliance
levels might differ (however without a clear sign24), but that changes in the com-
pliance rates due to treatment effects are similar. Moreover, in my experiment, a
substantial part of the subject pool (34 out of 120 subjects, i.e. 28.3%) stated in
a post-experimental survey to have already prepared their own tax return in real
life at least once.25 I control for this by including a corresponding dummy in my
estimations later on, without finding a significant effect, which suggests that it is
appropriate to have students included in the subject pool.
3.5 Hypotheses
As argued in Section 3.3, tax compliance should fall under a permanent tax amnesty
if the permanent tax amnesty can be used as an ‘insurance’ against a jump in
the audit rate. In the currInf treatment, the current audit rate is announced and
therefore the ‘insurance’ mechanism is expected to reduce compliance:
Hypothesis 1: In the currInf treatment, a permanent tax amnesty
lowers tax compliance.
In the pastInf treatment, there is only information about the previous round’s
audit rate. Therefore, the permanent tax amnesty is not a perfect insurance against
a jump in the audit rate and therefore tax compliance should fall less than in the
currInf treatment, if at all:
studies implement a public good structure (e.g. Gerxhani and Schram (2006)), in some studies the
money goes back to the experimenter (e.g. Alm et al. (2009)) and a few studies donate the money
e.g. to the red cross (Doerrenberg and Duncan (2013)). However, in my eyes, the most realistic
thing is to do the same with the money that is being done in reality with tax revenue, i.e. that it
goes to the government budget. To my knowledge, this is the first study which implements this
feature.
24Depending on the information treatment, Alm et al. (2011) find differences in either direction.
25Moreover, 62 out of 120 subjects stated that they have already paid taxes on income.
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Hypothesis 2: In the pastInf treatment, if there is a negative effect of
a permanent tax amnesty on tax compliance, its magnitude is smaller
than in the currInf treatment.
In the noInf treatment, the ‘insurance’ effect is completely eliminated. If there is
still an effect, this would be evidence for the impact of a permanent tax amnesty
on social norms. As argued in Section 3.3, this impact might go in either direction,
therefore leading to the following open question:
Open Question 1:
In the noInf treatment, is there an effect of a permanent tax amnesty on
tax compliance and if so, in which direction?
An additional way to examine the theoretical considerations is to analyze the de-
cisions whether to participate in the permanent tax amnesty, i.e. whether to decide
for a voluntary disclosure. Following the ‘insurance’ reasoning as above, I expect to
observe the following patterns in the data:
Hypothesis 3: In the currInf treatment, there is a positive number of
voluntary disclosures and they are triggered by an upward jump of the
audit rate.
Hypothesis 4: In the pastInf treatment, there are less voluntary disclo-
sures than in the currInf treatment and they are triggered by an upward
jump of the previous round’s audit rate.
Moreover, in the noInf treatment, there is no information about current or past
audit rates and therefore I expect to observe no voluntary disclosures:
Hypothesis 5: In the noInf treatment, there are no voluntary disclo-
sures.
Lastly, an empirically interesting question is whether and how a permanent tax
amnesty influences total government revenue, i.e. tax revenue including amnesty
payments and penalties. Therefore, another open question arises:
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Open Question 2: Does a permanent tax amnesty have an effect on
total government revenue?
Since lower tax compliance reduces but amnesty payments increase total govern-
ment revenue, the total effect is not clear.26 Despite empirically important, I put
this question at the end. The reason is, that the answer to this question is probably
highly depending on the parameters (e.g. the frequency of jumps) and therefore my
findings regarding this question cannot be generalized. Nevertheless, I will briefly
discuss my experimental data in light of this question in Section 3.6.3.
3.6 Experimental Results
3.6.1 Tax Compliance
The focus of this analysis is on the compliance behavior of the subjects. Treatment
averages are reported in Table 3.1. The mean compliance rate is declared income
summed over the respective subjects and rounds divided by the sum of true income.
It is important to note that due to the random process of the audit rate, the mean
audit rates differ across treatments. Therefore, comparing compliance rates across
treatments should be done with care. Since t-tests or nonparametric tests (e.g.
Wilcoxon rank-sum test) do not control for the audit rate, we have to rely on the
regression analysis presented in the following. Nevertheless, a brief look at the
averages seems worthwhile. The mean compliance rate in the currInf treatment is
0.545 while 0.702 in the pastInf treatment under an almost identical mean audit rate.
In the noInf treatment, the mean compliance rate is even higher (0.765) despite a
slightly lower mean audit rate. This ranking of compliance rates seems intuitive:
The more information about the particular audit rate in force is available, the better
the rounds with low audit rate can be identified which lead to higher tax evasion
and lower overall compliance. In the currInf and pastInf treatments, the mean of
the perceived average audit rate by the individuals, collected in the survey after
the experiment, is slightly above 0.1 and therefore close to the actual mean audit
26See Andreoni (1991) for a theoretical analysis.
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rates which are slightly below 0.1. In the noInf treatment, the subjects somewhat
overestimate the mean audit rate (0.126), however still within a reasonable range.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics by treatment
Treat- Design Total With amnesty Without amnesty
ment (60 rounds) (30 rounds) (30 rounds)
currInf show Subjects = 40 Subjects = 40 Subjects = 40
current Mean compliance rate = 0.545 Mean compliance rate = 0.530 Mean compliance rate = 0.560
audit rate Mean audit rate = 0.094 Mean audit rate = 0.101 Mean audit rate = 0.087
Mean perceived audit rate Voluntary disclosures = 65
= 0.103 (median =0.1)
pastInf show Subjects=40 Subjects=40 Subjects=40
previous Mean compliance rate = 0.702 Mean compliance rate = 0.686 Mean compliance rate = 0.718
round’s Mean audit rate = 0.095 Mean audit rate = 0.096 Mean audit rate = 0.094
audit rate Mean perceived audit rate Voluntary disclosures = 36
= 0.109 (median =0.1)
noInf audit rates Subjects=40 Subjects=40 Subjects=40
unknown Mean compliance rate = 0.765 Mean compliance rate = 0.769 Mean compliance rate = 0.761
Mean audit rate = 0.088 Mean audit rate = 0.084 Mean audit rate = 0.092
Mean perceived audit rate Voluntary disclosures = 45
= 0.126 (median =0.1)
The main question, whether and in which information treatments a permanent
tax amnesty lowers compliance cannot be clearly answered based on this table due
to the differences in the mean audit rates. In both, the pastInf and the currInf
treatment the mean compliance rate is slightly higher without a permanent tax
amnesty, while there is almost no difference in the noInf treatment. However, in the
currInf treatment, the rounds without amnesty show a lower audit rate and therefore
the difference in the compliance rate is expected to be larger when controlling for
the audit rate. In order to do so and to check for statistical significance, I move on
to a regression analysis.
The data constitutes a panel since the subjects make compliance decisions in every
round, amounting to 7200 observations (120 subjects * 60 rounds). The distribution
of values for Compliance rate, which is the declared income divided by the true
income per subject and round, is shown in Figure 3.3. A large fraction of observa-
tions are 0 (22.8 %) or 1 (52.6 %). Moreover, a few observations (7, i.e. less than
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0.1 %) are above 1 which corresponds to overreporting of income.27,28 The pattern
of high proportions of 0 and 1 in the data is a common finding in tax compliance
experiments. However, there is no consensus in the literature how to deal with it
when using the compliance rate as the dependent variable in regressions. As the
benchmark, I use a generalized least squares panel random effects estimator as e.g.
Alm et al. (2009), leading to the estimates of Table 3.3, and discuss alternative
estimation approaches thereafter.
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of Compliance rate
In all regressions, I include a set of explanatory variables. Tax compliance is ex-
pected to depend on the variables which vary over the rounds, i.e. round income and
the audit rate, at least if known. Therefore, Income and treatment specific variables
for the current and past audit rate are included. My main variables of interest are
Amnesty, which is 1 if the respective round falls into the half of the experiment
in which the permanent tax amnesty takes place, and the corresponding dummies
Amnesty∗currInf , Amnesty∗pastInf and Amnesty∗noInf . Amnesty first half
is a dummy variable which indicates whether the permanent tax amnesty took place
in the first half of the experiment. To control for subject characteristics, I include
variables which control for age, gender and risk aversion. Since compliance behavior
of subjects who already prepared their own tax return in real life at least once might
27These 7 observations lie between 1 and 2. Note that there is no rational reason for overre-
porting.
28The distribution of values for the overall compliance rate per subject, i.e. the average compli-
ance rate across all rounds per subject, is shown in Figure B.1 in Appendix B.1. The values range
from 0.013 (1 subject) to 1 (9 subjects), i.e. 9 subjects chose full compliance in every round.
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differ from subjects who did not yet, I include a dummy which controls for this. In
my sample, 34 out of 120 subjects stated that they have already prepared their own
tax return at least once. I control for the experience of the previous round by includ-
ing treatment-specific dummy variables which account for voluntary disclosures and
audits in the previous round. Moreover, general learning over the rounds is captured
by treatment specific Round variables. Treatment-specific intercepts completes the
set of regressors. Summary statistics for the variables are provided in Table 3.2.
The benchmark estimation is Specification 1 in Table 3.3. Specification 3 is iden-
tical to Specification 1 except that they differ regarding which Amnesty*treatment
dummy is left out.29 Income is negatively correlated with compliance, in line
with previous studies (e.g. Alm et al. (2009)). High audit rate has a significantly
positive effect on compliance when being announced (currInf) while else being in-
significant, both as expected. Similarly, a high audit rate in the previous round
(Lag high audit rate) has a positive impact in the pastInf treatment, since the an-
nouncement of a high audit rate in the previous round is a signal that the audit rate
might also be high in the current round. In the noInf treatment, there is no impact,
as expected. However, in the currInf treatment, Lag high audit rate exhibits a neg-
ative coefficient which indicates that the large jump in tax compliance associated
with an upward or downward jump in the audit rate is somewhat adjusted in the
other direction one round later.
Regarding my primary variables of interest, I observe that the existence of a per-
manent tax amnesty has no effect (coefficient close to 0 and not significant) on
compliance in the noInf treatment. This answers Open Question 1. So, at least
in this experiment, there is no evidence for a unidirectional impact of a permanent
tax amnesty on social norms.30 In the currInf treatment, a permanent tax amnesty
has a statistically significantly negative effect. On average, the compliance rate
decreases under a permanent tax amnesty by about 5 percentage points (or even
more when just exploring the between subjects dimension i.e. the first 30 rounds as
29The reason is to make the magnitude and significance of the effect of the permanent tax
amnesty in the currInf treatment more easily visible (which is the sum of two coefficients in
Spec.1).
30This might be due to the fact that either there is no such effect or there are several effects
which go in different directions as discussed in Section 3.3.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Definition Mean Standard
deviation
Compliance rate Declared income over true income 0.6765 0.4209
Full compliance Dummy variable equal to 1 if
Compliance rate ≥ 1
0.5271 0.4993
Voluntary disclo-
sure
Dummy variable equal to 1 for subjects
who decided for a voluntary disclosure in
the current round
0.0325 0.1773
Income Income at the beginning of the round,
ranging from 60 to 100
80.0806 14.1154
High audit rate Dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit rate
is at the high level in the current round
0.3013 0.4588
Lag high audit
rate
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit rate
was at the high level in the previous round
0.3006 0.4585
Amnesty Dummy variable equal to 1 for rounds dur-
ing the permanent tax amnesty
0.5000 0.5000
Amnesty first half Dummy variable equal to 1 if the perma-
nent tax amnesty takes place in the first
half of the experiment
0.5000 0.5000
Age Age of the subject 22.1083 4.5073
Male Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject
is male
0.4583 0.4983
Prepared own tax
return
Dummy variable equal to 1 for subjects
who prepared already their own tax return
in real life
0.2833 0.4506
Risk aversion Measure of risk aversion, ranging from 0 to
10 and collected following Holt and Laury
(2002)
5.7917 1.7838
Lag vol. disclo-
sure
Dummy variable equal to 1 for subjects
who decided for a voluntary disclosure in
the previous round
0.0326 0.1777
Lag audit Dummy variable equal to 1 for subjects
who have been audited in the previous
round
0.0888 0.2845
Tax debt Evaded taxes of the previous three rounds 15.6065 19.6490
Round Round of the experiment (1-60) 30.5000 17.3193
Amnesty round Round of the permanent tax amnesty 15.5000 8.6560
currInf Dummy variable equal to 1 for subjects in
the currInf treatment
0.3333 0.4714
pastInf Dummy variable equal to 1 for subjects in
the pastInf treatment
0.3333 0.4714
noInf Dummy variable equal to 1 for subjects in
the noInf treatment
0.3333 0.4714
For all variables, N=7200 (120 subjects * 60 rounds)
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Table 3.3: Estimation results for Compliance rate
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
GLS OLS-FE GLS GLS 1-30
Income -0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0023∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
High audit rate -0.0160 -0.0160 -0.0160 -0.0287∗
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0170)
High audit rate * currInf 0.4149∗∗∗ 0.4146∗∗∗ 0.4149∗∗∗ 0.4333∗∗∗
(0.0429) (0.0430) (0.0429) (0.0463)
Lag high audit rate -0.0240 -0.0241 -0.0240 -0.0182
(0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0309)
Lag high audit rate * pastInf 0.2382∗∗∗ 0.2385∗∗∗ 0.2382∗∗∗ 0.1725∗∗∗
(0.0470) (0.0470) (0.0470) (0.0572)
Lag high audit rate * currInf -0.0727∗∗∗ -0.0729∗∗∗ -0.0727∗∗∗ -0.0728∗
(0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0421)
Amnesty 0.0132 0.0133 -0.0498∗∗ -0.1583∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0249) (0.0737)
Amnesty * currInf -0.0630∗∗ -0.0632∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0309)
Amnesty * pastInf -0.0470 -0.0469 0.0160 0.1143
(0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0352) (0.1035)
Amnesty * noInf 0.0630∗∗ 0.1007
(0.0309) (0.0916)
Amnesty first half -0.0761∗ -0.0761∗
(0.0417) (0.0417)
Age 0.0070 0.0070 0.0072
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0050)
Male -0.0874∗∗ -0.0874∗∗ -0.0821∗∗
(0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0405)
Prepared own tax return -0.0157 -0.0157 -0.0068
(0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0523)
Risk aversion 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0239∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0110)
Lag vol. disclosure -0.1576∗∗ -0.1599∗∗ -0.1576∗∗ -0.2252∗∗
(0.0792) (0.0792) (0.0792) (0.1102)
Lag vol. disclosure * currInf 0.1664∗ 0.1695∗ 0.1664∗ 0.2087
(0.0963) (0.0961) (0.0963) (0.1381)
Lag vol. disclosure * pastInf 0.1665 0.1650 0.1665 0.0555
(0.1024) (0.1032) (0.1024) (0.1794)
Lag audit -0.1379∗∗∗ -0.1387∗∗∗ -0.1379∗∗∗ -0.0839∗
(0.0452) (0.0451) (0.0452) (0.0460)
Lag audit * currInf 0.0925∗ 0.0931∗ 0.0925∗ 0.0508
(0.0550) (0.0549) (0.0550) (0.0608)
Lag audit * pastInf 0.0258 0.0264 0.0258 0.0149
(0.0548) (0.0547) (0.0548) (0.0545)
Round -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0045∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0019)
Round * currInf 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0018
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0024)
Round * pastInf -0.0021∗∗ -0.0021∗∗ -0.0021∗∗ 0.0012
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0026)
currInf -0.3474∗∗∗ -0.3474∗∗∗ -0.3435∗∗∗
(0.0551) (0.0551) (0.0595)
pastInf -0.0717 -0.0717 -0.1234∗
(0.0564) (0.0564) (0.0682)
Constant 0.7499∗∗∗ 0.8886∗∗∗ 0.7499∗∗∗ 0.8395∗∗∗
(0.1333) (0.0393) (0.1333) (0.1232)
N 7080 7080 7080 3480
Subjects 120 120 120 120
R2 overall (FE: within) 0.1889 0.1355 0.1889 0.1844
The dependent variable is the compliance rate (declared income over true
income) per subject and round. Cluster-robust standard errors (subject level)
are provided in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
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in Spec. 431). In relation to the mean compliance rate in the currInf treatment of
0.545, this corresponds to a decrease in compliance of about 9%. So, there is strong
evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1. Regarding the pastInf treatment, we see that the
effect of the permanent tax amnesty is neither statistically different from the effect
in the currInf treatment (see Spec.3) nor from the effect in the noInf treatment (see
Spec.1). In terms of its magnitude, it lies in between the two other treatments and
is negative (-0.0338) but not significantly different from zero.32 This finding is in
line with Hypothesis 2.
The coefficients and standard errors obtained from the GLS random effects esti-
mation (Spec. 1) are almost identical to the ones obtained from the fixed effects
estimation reported as Specification 2. Moreover, a Hausman test suggests that
using a random effects estimator is appropriate. Concerning the individual charac-
teristics, I find that high risk aversion increases tax compliance, as expected. Male
subjects evade more taxes than female subjects, which is in line with previous stud-
ies (e.g. Alm et al. (2009)). Age and the preparation of own tax returns in real
life do not exhibit statistically significant effects on tax compliance. I also conduct
separate estimations for each treatment based on Specification 1 of Table 3.3. The
results are qualitatively similar to Specification 1 and are provided in Appendix B.1
(Table B.6).
As already mentioned, due to the high proportions of 0 and 1 in tax compliance
experiments, alternative estimation techniques might be of interest. For example,
some authors also use a Tobit estimator (e.g. Alm et al. (2010)), treating the data
on one or both sides as censored. However, it is questionable whether the strong
assumptions of the Tobit model (e.g. normal distribution of the error terms) are
fulfilled. Concerning my dataset, the observations might only be left-censored, i.e.
censored at 0 (since subjects cannot declare negative income) but not right-censored,
i.e. not censored at 1 (since subjects can declare more than their true income). How-
31Specification 4 is identical to Specification 3 but just includes the first 30 rounds of the
experiment, i.e. explores just the between subjects dimension. However, due to very small sample
sizes per treatment in this between subject analysis (6 treatments with 20 subjects each), this and
all similar estimations (Spec. 4 in Table B.1 and Spec. 3 in Table B.2 to B.5) should be interpreted
with care and conclusions had better be drawn from the estimations which employ the full data,
i.e. the within and between subjects dimension as in Specification 1-3.
32I.e. in a specification in which Amnesty*pastInf is the dummy which is left out (not reported),
the coefficient of Amnesty is not significantly different from zero.
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ever, a Tobit model specified to allow for censoring at 0 seems unlikely to have nor-
mally distributed error terms (due to the spike at 1). Nevertheless, for the sake of
completeness, I also conduct some Tobit estimations. The results are qualitatively
similar to the ones of the benchmark estimations and are provided in Appendix B.1
(Table B.1).
Moreover, some authors (e.g. Gerxhani and Schram (2006)) do not use the compli-
ance rate but the binary variable whether people fully comply with taxes or not as
the dependent variable and estimate the effects of the variables of interest on the
probability that people evade (at least some) taxes. I also do so by using probit, logit
and linear probability models.33 Since the results are qualitatively similar to each
other and to the benchmark estimations, I provide them in Appendix B.1 (Table
B.2 to B.4).
In addition to these commonly used approaches, I use an additional estimation
technique to check for robustness. Since Compliance rate is a fraction, one could
also think of using estimation methods for fractional data. However, a fractional
logit regression (Wooldridge (2002), p.661 et seqq.) cannot handle 0 and 1 and is
therefore inappropriate. Thus, following Baum (2008) it is better to use an adequate
generalized linear model (e.g. glm in stata specified with the logit link function
and a binomial distribution as argued by Baum (2008)). Again, the results are
qualitatively similar to the benchmark estimations and are provided in Appendix
B.1 (Table B.5).
3.6.2 Voluntary Disclosures
Next, I want to evaluate Hypotheses 3 and 4. Table 3.4 shows descriptive evidence.
In the currInf treatment, I observe 65 voluntary disclosures among 40 subjects which
is clearly above zero. Moreover, 46 out of 65 voluntary disclosures take place directly
after an upward jump which is in line with Hypothesis 3.34 Moreover, in the pastInf
treatment, I observe 36 voluntary disclosures, among which 21 occurred if there was
33These estimations use the same independent variables as the benchmark estimations of Table
3.3 but the dependent variable is no longer Compliance rate but Full compliance, which is 0 for
Compliance rate < 1 and 1 for Compliance rate ≥ 1.
34Among the remaining 19 voluntary disclosures, 11 take place in rounds with a high audit rate
while 8 occur in rounds with a low audit rate.
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Table 3.4: Voluntary disclosures by treatment
Treatment Audit rate properties Voluntary disclosures
(amnesty rounds)
currInf Mean audit rate = 0.101 Total = 65
Number of upward jumps = 143 At upward jump = 46
During high audit rate = 57
During low audit rate = 8
(= time-inconsistent)
pastInf Mean audit rate = 0.096 Total = 36
Number of upward jumps = 131 At upward jump (t-1) = 21
During high audit rate (t-1) = 27
During low audit rate (t-1)= 9
(= time-inconsistent)
noInf Mean audit rate = 0.084 Total = 45
Number of upward jumps = 119 (= time-inconsistent)
an upward jump in the previous round which is in line with Hypothesis 4.35 However,
due to the differences in the audit rate process (due to its randomness), one should
control for these when comparing treatments and drawing conclusions. Therefore,
a regression analysis is required in order to control for these differences. The results
of logit, probit and linear probability estimations are presented in Table 3.5, where
the dependent variable is 1 or 0, i.e. whether or not a subject decides for a voluntary
disclosure in a given round. The coefficients indicate that in the currInf treatment,
the probability of a voluntary disclosure increases by about 20 percentage points
(according to Spec. 3)36 when the audit rate jumps to the high level and slightly
decreases afterwards. Regarding the pastInf treatment, the coefficients indicate
that the probability of a voluntary disclosure increases by about 5 percentage points
(according to Spec. 3 from Table 3.5)37 after an upward jump in the audit rate in the
previous round. These results provide evidence for the second parts of Hypotheses
3 and 4. Moreover, Table 3.5 indicates that the income level has no significant
effect on the disclosure decision but that the amount of evaded taxes (Tax debt) is
positively correlated with the likelihood of a diclosure.
Table 3.6 provides additional evidence in favor of the first part of Hypothesis 4,
i.e. that there are fewer voluntary disclosures in the pastInf treatment than in the
35Among the remaining 15 voluntary disclosures, 6 take place in rounds which follow a round
with a high audit rate while 9 occur in rounds which follow a round with a low audit rate.
360.0146+0.1836=0.1982
37-0.0207+0.0752=0.0545
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Table 3.5: Estimation results for V oluntary disclosure
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Logit Probit Linear probability
Income -0.0097 -0.0043 -0.0005
(0.0065) (0.0034) (0.0003)
Tax debt 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0178∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0037) (0.0004)
High audit rate 0.3638 0.1737 0.0146
(0.2792) (0.1387) (0.0124)
High audit rate * currInf 3.5864∗∗∗ 1.8085∗∗∗ 0.1836∗∗∗
(0.8245) (0.3784) (0.0399)
Lag high audit rate -0.3806 -0.2377 -0.0207
(0.3643) (0.1860) (0.0177)
Lag high audit rate * pastInf 2.0751∗∗∗ 1.0532∗∗∗ 0.0752∗∗∗
(0.6460) (0.3023) (0.0250)
Lag high audit rate * currInf -1.1585∗ -0.6333∗ -0.0719∗∗
(0.6364) (0.3353) (0.0323)
Amnesty round -0.0345∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗ -0.0021∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0076) (0.0007)
Amnesty round * currInf 0.0260 0.0188 0.0022
(0.0350) (0.0177) (0.0014)
Amnesty round * pastInf 0.0232 0.0121 0.0016∗
(0.0231) (0.0117) (0.0009)
Amnesty first half -0.0956 -0.0486 0.0124
(0.4390) (0.2190) (0.0203)
Age -0.0154 -0.0055 0.0005
(0.0689) (0.0346) (0.0027)
Male 0.0496 -0.0113 -0.0111
(0.4581) (0.2261) (0.0220)
Prepared own tax return -0.2849 -0.1791 -0.0216
(0.4773) (0.2371) (0.0157)
Risk aversion -0.0939 -0.0491 -0.0025
(0.1104) (0.0551) (0.0044)
currInf -2.5174∗∗ -1.3010∗∗∗ -0.1006∗∗∗
(1.0508) (0.4849) (0.0360)
pastInf -1.9281∗∗ -0.9548∗∗ -0.0764∗∗
(0.8363) (0.3923) (0.0361)
Constant -1.9931 -1.1010 0.1374∗∗
(1.6501) (0.8339) (0.0673)
N 3540 3540 3540
Subjects 120 120 120
R2 overall 0.0492
Log-Likelihood -590.4554 -591.9021
The dependent variable is Voluntary disclosure (0 or 1) per subject and round.
Cluster-robust standard errors (subject level) are provided in parentheses.
***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table 3.6: Estimation results for Number of voluntary disclosures
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Poisson Poisson Poisson
currInf 0.5423∗ 0.5279∗ 0.4994∗
(0.2963) (0.2948) (0.2916)
Mean auditrate 11.9649∗∗∗
(4.2843)
Log mean auditrate 1.2841∗∗∗
(0.4512)
Log jumps 1.0575∗∗∗
(0.4043)
Constant -1.3174∗∗∗ 2.8820∗∗∗ -1.3649∗∗
(0.4777) (1.0925) (0.5419)
N 80 80 79
Subjects 80 80 79
pseudo R2 0.0666 0.0718 0.0784
Log-Likelihood -128.676 -127.9486 -125.8682
The dependent variable are the number of voluntary disclosures per subject. The
sample comprises the treatments currInf and pastInf. Robust standard errors are
provided in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level.
currInf treatment, while controlling for differences in the audit rate process.38 The
dependent variable is the number of voluntary disclosures by subject. In order
to test the difference between pastInf and currInf appropriately, only these two
treatments are included in the regressions. The interpretation of the coefficients is
that when moving from the pastInf to the currInf treatment, the number of voluntary
disclosures increases by 65 to 72 percent, ceteris paribus.39
It remains to comment on Hypothesis 5, which states that in the noInf treatment,
there should be no voluntary disclosures. Surprisingly, this is clearly not the case
since 45 voluntary disclosures can be observed, as Table 3.4 shows. Figure 3.4 shows
how the numbers of voluntary disclosures are distributed among the subjects. As
shown in Figure 3.4 c), 16 out of 40 subjects in the noInf treatment decide at least
once for a voluntary disclosure, including two outliers who exhibit 8 and 9 voluntary
disclosures. This is surprising since people do not get any new information in any
round which might trigger the voluntary disclosure. Moreover, if the decision for a
future voluntary disclosure was made not in the current round but one or several
rounds in advance, the subjects should not evade taxes in the meantime because
38Due to the small N in these estimations, I include as few regressors as possible. However,
estimations including all usual controls lead to similar results and are provided in Table B.7 in
Appendix B.1.
39exp(0.5423) = 1.7200; exp(0.4994) = 1.6477
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Figure 3.4: Voluntary disclosures by treatment
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this means unnecessarily taking a risk. However, every voluntary disclosure follows
previous tax evasion.40 So, since I have no time-consistent explanation, I call these
voluntary disclosures time-inconsistent.
One might think about whether subjects playing mixed strategies might provide
an alternative explanation instead of time inconsistency. However, a mixed strategy
as an explanation requires indifference between a voluntary disclosure and the al-
ternatives, which are continuing with tax evasion or being honest from now on. But
if I know that in the next round my expected future utility equals the utility from
a voluntary disclosure (due to indifference), I will not evade taxes today because I
otherwise could increase my expected utility by being honest (since the payoff from
being honest is the same as the payoff from successfully evading taxes and choosing
the voluntary disclosure one round later, however there is no risk of getting caught
if being honest). Therefore, a mixed strategy cannot be an appropriate explanation.
Another idea would be that the voluntary disclosures are driven by the shocks in
the income. However, Table B.8 in Appendix B.1 shows the voluntary disclosures
by income in the noInf treatment without suggesting any relationship.
So, these voluntary disclosures seem indeed to be time-inconsistent. Similar ar-
guments can be applied to the voluntary disclosures during rounds with low audit
rate in the currInf treatment (which amount to 8) and during rounds with past low
audit rates in the pastInf treatment (which amount to 9). Figure 3.5 shows how
the numbers of time-inconsistent voluntary disclosures in the currInf and pastInf
treatment are distributed among the subjects.
In the literature, there are two common explanations for time-inconsistent behavior.
The first explanation is hyperbolic discounting, i.e. using different discount rates
for the near and more distant future (e.g. Laibson (1997), Rabin and O’Donoghue
(1999)). However, this cannot be the explanation in my case since there is only one
payment at the end and therefore nothing to discount in the experiment.
The second explanation is formulated by Loewenstein et al. (2003) and is based on
the idea of a projection bias. In their model, people’s tastes change over time and so
time-inconsistent behavior arises as a result of misprediction of future utilities. In
40Note that I count only ‘real’ voluntary disclosures, i.e. voluntary disclosures which include a
repayment of evaded taxes.
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Figure 3.5: Time-inconsistent voluntary disclosures (currInf and pastInf)
my eyes, this cannot be an explanation for my findings for two reasons. First, utility
functions might change over a human life cycle but it does not seem very likely that
they change within seconds as the behavior in the experiment does. Second, in the
experiment, most subjects who exhibit time-inconsistent voluntary disclosures do so
more than once (14 out of 26), i.e. many subjects go back and forth between evading
taxes and deciding for a voluntary disclosure. In my eyes, it is quite unrealistic that
utility functions change so often. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the argument of
Loewenstein et al. (2003) explains my results.
In conclusion, both common explanations for time inconsistency do not fit. Since
the comparison of my treatments suggest that time-inconsistent behavior is strong
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if information is low and therefore uncertainty is high, my hunch is that the expla-
nation for my results should be related to uncertainty.41 As, to my knowledge, there
is no theory about the connection between uncertainty and time inconsistency, this
remains a topic for future research.42
3.6.3 Total Revenue
Finally, I want to address Open Question 2, i.e. to investigate the effect of the per-
manent tax amnesty on total government revenue. Table 3.7 shows some evidence.
The dependent variable is the revenue share, i.e. the sum of total taxes, penalties
and amnesty payments over total income, calculated separately for every subject
and each half of the experiment. Table 3.7 shows treatment specific estimations
which regress the dependent variable on the mean audit rate per subject and half,
the amnesty dummy (which is 1 for the half with the permanent tax amnesty and
0 else) and a constant.43,44
As can be seen, I find no significant effect of the tax amnesty on total government
revenue in any of the treatments. For the pastInf and noInf treatment, this is not
surprising since there was no significant impact on the compliance rate. However, in
the currInf treatment, there was a negative effect on the compliance rate. Therefore,
the insignificant and even slightly positive coefficients in Specification 1 and 2 of
Table 3.7 are the result of two countervailing effects. This is, the negative effect due
to the fall in the compliance rate is compensated by a positive effect which arises
from the high number of voluntary disclosures and the associated amnesty payments
through which the government recaptures both the additional tax evasion due to the
41One potential explanation could be that the uncertainty of getting caught might create stress
which increases over time while evading taxes and finally leads to a voluntary disclosure. This
might not be correctly anticipated by the subjects. However, the question remains why several
subjects do not seem to learn from their experience but go back and forth between evading taxes
and deciding for a voluntary disclosure.
42There is one study by Grenadier and Wang (2007) which incorporates uncertainty and time
inconsistency in the context of hyperbolic discounting. However, as argued, this cannot be an
explanation for my results.
43Table B.9 in Appendix B.1 provides estimations analogously to Table 3.7 but which exclude
round 30 to 33 for the computation of the variables. The reasons are, on the one hand, that in the
treatments having the amnesty take place in the first half, the abolition is announced after round
29, so round 30 might be special. On the other hand, in round 31 to 33, amnesty payments and
payments in case of an audit are influenced by actions of the first half (since the 3 previous rounds
are relevant), so I exclude them to have the two halves clearly separated. However, the results do
not change.
44Due to the small N in the estimations, I include as few regressors as possible. To check
robustness when controlling for subject characteristics, I also show fixed effects estimates (FE).
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Table 3.7: Estimation results for Revenue share
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6
currInf currInf pastInf pastInf noInf noInf
(GLS) (OLS-FE) (GLS) (OLS-FE) (GLS) (OLS-FE)
Mean auditrate 0.7781∗∗∗ 0.5754 0.5194∗∗∗ 0.5629∗∗∗ 0.2729∗ 0.1596
(0.2774) (0.3430) (0.1551) (0.1988) (0.1576) (0.1644)
Amnesty 0.0118 0.0147 -0.0020 -0.0020 0.0076 0.0066
(0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0061) (0.0060)
Constant 0.1235∗∗∗ 0.1412∗∗∗ 0.1743∗∗∗ 0.1702∗∗∗ 0.2038∗∗∗ 0.2143∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0312) (0.0134) (0.0161) (0.0168) (0.0153)
N 80 80 80 80 80 80
Subjects 40 40 40 40 40 40
R2 overall (FE: within) 0.1971 0.2085 0.0936 0.1493 0.0670 0.0440
The dependent variable is the revenue share (total taxes, penalties and amnesty payments over to-
tal income) per subject, separately calculated for rounds with and without permanent tax amnesty.
Cluster-robust standard errors (subject level) are provided in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
permanent tax amnesty and the tax evasion which also occurs in the absence of a
permanent tax amnesty. These two effects of a permanent tax amnesty are formally
shown by Andreoni (1991) in a theoretical model. In his model, the total effect can
be positive or negative, depending on the parameters. Since, in my experiment, the
total effect is also very likely to depend on the parameters (e.g. the frequency of
jumps probably plays an important role), my findings regarding Open Question 2
should not be generalized.
3.7 Conclusion
Does a permanent tax amnesty reduce tax compliance? And when do people decide
for a voluntary disclosure? In my experiment, I investigate these questions using
three different treatments. All participants earn and declare income in an envi-
ronment with a fluctuating audit rate. In one treatment, the current audit rate is
announced, in a second treatment, the participants are informed about the audit
rate of the previous round while in a third treatment, the audit rates are completely
unknown to the participants. Within these treatments, a permanent tax amnesty is
introduced which allows for voluntary disclosures to repay evaded taxes in order to
go unpunished in case of future audits.
My main findings are the following: In the treatment in which the current audit rate
is announced, the permanent tax amnesty lowers tax compliance by around 9%. This
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suggests that if the informational setting allows using a permanent tax amnesty as an
‘insurance’ against an increase in the detection probability, a permanent tax amnesty
lowers tax compliance. Otherwise (i.e. in the treatments with past or no information
regarding the audit rate), I find no statistically significant effect on tax compliance.
As expected, most voluntary disclosures take place after a jump in the audit rate
becomes public. However, surprisingly, there is a large number of time-inconsistent
voluntary disclosures in the treatment without information about the audit rate
which cannot be explained by common explanations for time inconsistency.
One limitation of the experiment is that in reality, voluntary disclosures often take
place in the context of tax evasion regarding capital income, which often comes along
with an accumulated stock of capital that is hidden in a foreign country. To keep
the experiment manageable, the accumulation of a capital stock and the decision
to hide it in a foreign country is not included in this experiment. Instead, in every
round the income is i.i.d. drawn and the subjects have to decide in every round how
much they want to hide, i.e. to evade.45
There are several topics for future research. First, since my study is the only ex-
periment so far which investigates a permanent tax amnesty, further studies should
replicate my experiment and should moreover check whether my findings are robust
to changes in the parameters and the experimental design. Second, I observe pat-
terns of time-inconsistent behavior which I cannot explain so far. Therefore, the
question of such an explanation remains open.
45Although it would be interesting, to my knowledge, there is no tax compliance experiment
in the literature which incorporates the accumulation of a foreign capital stock in the experiment,
probably due to its complexity.
Chapter 4
Tax Complexity and Foreign
Direct Investment
4.1 Introduction
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is determined by numerous factors. In addition
to economic factors such as market size, factor endowments or exchange rates, one
could also argue that institutional aspects such as political stability, property rights
or differences in tax systems matter. This chapter focuses on the latter aspect
by paying particular attention to one specific characteristic of a tax system: Its
complexity.
The complexity of a tax system, to be called tax complexity in the following, "is
usually associated with the numbers of tax rates, tax bases and special provisions
it includes" (p. 123, Warskett et al. (1998)). There are several potential reasons for
the existence of tax complexity regarding corporate taxation. On the one hand, one
could argue that it has no purpose and just constitutes a sort of transaction cost.
Under this perspective, tax complexity differs across countries since the governments
exhibit different technologies to collect taxes (or differ in the investment in the
development of their technology). On the other hand, tax complexity could have a
purpose in allowing for discrimination between firms or industries, which may have
several reasons.1 Lastly, one could argue that tax complexity is used as a tool to
1First, discrimination might be used to implement a fair tax system driven by the citizens’
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blur the true effective tax rate.2
However, in this chapter we do not analyze the different sources of tax complex-
ity but instead focus on its effect. In particular, tax complexity is costly since it
creates a transaction cost for firms, also called compliance cost. The awareness
that taxation creates compliance costs is quite old. Already Adam Smith observed
that "by subjecting the people to the frequent visits and the odious examination of
the tax-gatherers, it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and
oppression; and though vexation is not, strictly speaking, expence, it is certainly
equivalent to the expence at which every man would be willing to redeem himself
from it"(p. 500, Smith (1776)).3 Nowadays, compliance costs are primarily not any-
more driven by "frequent visits and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers" but
by all actions to fulfill the requirements which are necessary to remain in compli-
ance (such as studying the tax law, "calculating tax liabilities, completing requisite
forms, maintaining records and providing documentation" (p. 343, Edmiston et al.
(2003))).
There is anecdotal evidence that the compliance cost due to tax complexity is
not negligible. For instance, in 2010, the tax return of General Electric in the US
amounted to 57000 pages (Weekly Standard, 2011). There is also literature that
estimates the compliance cost of taxation and relates it to the total tax revenue.
For example, Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) investigate corporations in the US
and find that the compliance costs for the US federal and state corporate income
preferences for fairness. Second, discrimination might be motivated by the desire to achieve a
system of optimal taxation (or considered to be optimal by the government) that requires a different
treatment of firms with respect to size, mobility, labor intensity, multinational structure or R&D
activities. Different treatments, however, need some sorting, which can be done by exemptions
and special regulations in the tax law, which in turn increase its complexity. (A similar argument
is developed by Davies (2013) for the case of subsidies. He shows in a theoretical model that if
the benefits of targeting subsidies outweigh the associated cost of bureaucracy, bureaucracy will be
used as a sorting mechanism.) Third, discrimination in the tax system might be driven by political
economy considerations. Analogous to political economy models that describe the political outcome
in other policy fields as the result of a lobbying game between governments and industries (e.g.
as in the Protection for Sale model in Grossman and Helpman (1994) for trade policy), one could
also think of the structure of a tax system as being governed by lobbying activities of firms or
industries.
2This argument requires the assumption that tax complexity is not due to special provisions
and tax reliefs that reduce the taxation for some firms or industries. Instead, it might be caused
by hidden additional taxes in order to create some kind of illusion by blurring the effective level
of taxation that is higher than the corporate tax rate.
3Moreover, Adam Smith was already aware of further inefficiencies which come along with
taxation such as distortions or administrative costs for the state. His general advice is: "Every tax
ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little
as possible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state."(p. 499, Smith
(1776))
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tax come to more than 3 percent of the tax revenues. Evans (2003) provides an
detailed overview of studies which measure compliance costs and finds that such
estimates typically range from 2% to 10% of tax revenue.4 The National Taxpayers
Union (NTU) even estimates that in 2009 the compliance costs of US firms sum up
to 159.4 billion US Dollar which corresponds to 54 percent of corporate income tax
revenue (National Review, 2010).
These numbers strongly indicate that tax complexity is indeed an important issue.
The existence of high compliance costs suggests that tax complexity suppresses
economic activity.5 However, on the firm or industry level this is not that clear. It
might foster the activities of those firms or industries privileged by special regulations
that cause the complexity. However, since the increase of tax complexity due to
privileges places a sort of externality on all other firms and industries, it appears
likely that the negative effect is dominant.
It might also be the case that the magnitude of the effect of tax complexity depends
on the level of the corporate income tax rate. Dividing the effect of tax complexity
for the firms into a negative effect (compliance cost) and a positive effect that lies in
the possibility of tax optimization,6 one could argue that the latter effect becomes
more important if the statutory tax rate increases, resulting in the negative effect
of tax complexity becoming weaker if taxation is high.
The question whether tax complexity indeed suppresses economic activity and, if so,
to what extent, is highly relevant for policy making. If it is the case that a complex
tax system suppresses economic activity in terms of inward FDI,7 simplifying the
4Moreover he finds that in contrast to compliance costs, the administrative costs for the state
are typically estimated to lie below 1% of tax revenue.
5Apart from the compliance cost, there is an additional issue related to why tax complexity
might suppress investment, namely an informational problem. High tax complexity might lead to
incomplete information in terms of a misperception of the effective level of taxation (or uncertainty
about it) which might reduce investments.
6For instance, General Electric paid no taxes after having filed the 57,000-page federal tax
return despite $14 billions in profits (Weekly Standard, 2011).
7Existing economic models can be used to argue that high compliance costs will reduce FDI.
For example, treating the compliance cost due to tax complexity partly as a fixed cost allows us
to think in the spirit of heterogeneous firms models. In such models like the one of Helpman et al.
(2004), firms face fixed costs when they want to invest in a foreign country. In a setting where firms
differ in their productivities, Helpman et al. (2004) show that there is a productivity cutoff such
that only firms with a productivity above this level invest abroad while firms with a productivity
below this level do not. Increasing fixed costs of investing in a specific foreign country lead to an
increase of the productivity cutoff beyond that firms start to invest abroad and therefore result in
less FDI-projects in that country. Treating tax complexity partly as a fixed cost the argument is
straightforward.
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tax system will be a source for stimulating economic activity without decreasing
the tax revenue. In other words, if firms take into account their total costs of
taxation consisting of the tax that is actually paid plus the compliance cost that
is increasing in the complexity of a tax system, simplifying the tax system will
be an alternative measure to reducing tax rates in order to increase a country’s
international competitiveness. Moreover, viewing tax complexity as a property of
the government’s technology to generate tax revenue, it is desirable for governments
to know the benefits of reducing tax complexity to know whether and how much it
is worth investing in technology improvement.
It is obvious that the effect of tax complexity is not restricted to FDI but affects an
economy as a whole. However, it is reasonable to analyze its influence on economic
activity by using FDI data since, if there is a suppressing effect at all, one should see
it in FDI data more strongly. This is because these investment decisions are more
or less subject to a worldwide choice set whereas big parts of the domestic economy
are not, as many firms are immobile.
We use the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) of Deutsche Bundesbank and
analyze the location choice of 4474 new German FDI projects in OECD countries
from 2005 to 2009. In order to measure tax complexity, we use the Doing Business
data published by the World Bank. The topic Paying Taxes of this database includes
variables which have been constructed by defining a fictive, standardized firm for
which tax experts calculated taxes and answered some survey questions for a large
set of countries. We use the variable which captures the time it takes to comply
with taxes, i.e. to prepare, file and pay taxes in the respective country, as a measure
for tax complexity.
The contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is twofold. First, we
evaluate the impact of tax complexity on FDI using firm-level data to analyze the
issue on the economic level where the decision process regarding FDI actually takes
place. This allows us to test a wide range of firm-level hypotheses. Second, we
analyze the effects of tax complexity on FDI employing a panel dataset. This allows
us to estimate the effect of within-country changes in tax complexity on FDI. This
is more appropriate than purely cross sectional studies for evaluating the potential
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gains from reforms that lead to a cut-back of tax complexity.
Our main findings are the following: First, our estimates suggest that a higher level
of tax complexity significantly decreases the probability to locate an FDI project in
that country. Second, we find a positive coefficient of the interaction term of the
corporate tax rate and tax complexity. This indicates that the negative effect of
tax complexity is weaker the higher the corporate tax rate is. This finding is in line
with the argument that there might also be a positive effect of tax complexity that
lies in the possibility of tax optimization which becomes more important if the tax
rates are high.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In the next section we discuss how
this chapter is related to the existing literature. Section 4.3 presents the data. Sec-
tion 4.4 explains the econometric specification, estimates the impact of tax complex-
ity on the location choice of FDI projects and calculates country-specific elasticities.
The last section concludes.
4.2 Relation to the Literature
There is a large branch of literature examining the potential determinants of FDI,8
starting in the early 1960s.9 Since then, empirical studies have focused on many
different aspects that influence FDI, especially economic but also institutional and
political factors. A large strand of literature examines the effect of taxation on
FDI.10 To get an overview regarding the magnitude of the effect the different studies
find, it is good to look at De Mooij and Ederveen (2003). They analyze 25 studies
comprising 371 elasticities of FDI with respect to corporate taxation and find a
median tax-elasticity of FDI of -3.2. But their sample of 371 elasticities is highly
dispersed, exhibiting a standard deviation of 9.0 and just 300 of the 371 elasticities
having a negative sign.11
8Blonigen (2005) and Faeth (2009) provide comprehensive reviews.
9This early work has been done by Robinson (1961), Behrman (1962), Basi (1966) and Kolde
(1968).
10Reviews of the literature on taxation and FDI can be found by Hines (1999) and Devereux
and Griffith (2002).
11The standard deviation of their sample after excluding outliers (resulting in 351 elasticities)
unfortunately is not given in this paper. However, De Mooij and Ederveen (2008) add 76 elasticities
from six further studies to their previous sample excluding outliers, obtaining a total number of
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A subpart of the literature on taxation and FDI focuses on the location choice of
multinational firms and their affiliates. Among these studies, Devereux and Grif-
fith (1998) investigate the effect of taxation on the decisions of US multinationals
regarding the question whether to serve the European market and how, i.e. through
export or FDI, in three European countries. Buettner and Ruf (2007) analyze the
role of tax incentives with regard to German FDI, also using Deutsche Bundesbank
data. Arulampalam et al. (2012) study the location of M&As and explore whether
taxation has an impact on the decision in which country to acquire a target firm.
Barrios et al. (2012) examine the impact of host and parent country taxation on the
location choice of both foreign affiliates and parent firms, and Voget (2011) analyzes
the relocation of headquarters of multinational firms in the context of corporate
taxation.
Contrasting this comprehensive literature on the relation between tax rates and
FDI, very little research has examined the effect of tax complexity on FDI. Edmiston
et al. (2003) look at the effect of tax complexity and tax uncertainty on FDI for
25 transition countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, finding a
negative correlation of both with total FDI inflow. They use the Central and East
European Tax Directory, an annual publication of the International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation (IBFD), to calculate their own tax complexity measures, which are
the number of tax rates and number of lines that are used for describing the tax
base therein. Since this publication was issued only from 1993-1998, Edmiston et al.
(2003) restrict their analysis to this time period. Though having panel-like data,
they focus on the effect of tax complexity across countries by just using a random
effects model for their estimation.
A more recent study has been done by Djankov et al. (2010). They examine the
effect of corporate taxation on investment and entrepreneurship and, among other
things, they lightly touch on the relationship between tax complexity and FDI.
They use data that has been generated by defining a notional business and asking
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) accountants and tax lawyers to fill out its tax return
and to answer questions related to the procedure, corresponding to the fiscal year
2004. Parts of this data are published in the World Bank Doing Business database
427 elasticities that exhibit a standard deviation of 4.4 (a mean of -3.3 and a median of -2.9).
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that we will use, too.12 Besides other questions, they ask for the time to comply
with taxes which can be interpreted as a proxy for the complexity of the tax system.
Using this variable as a control in regressions of total FDI inflow (averaged from
2002-2004) on the corporate income tax rate and some additional controls in a cross
section of 85 countries, they do not find any significant effect of tax complexity on
FDI.
Lawless (2013) uses the World Bank Doing Business data and analyzes the effect of
tax complexity on bilateral FDI flows from 16 OECD countries to 57 host countries.
In this cross-sectional study (using FDI data from 2002), she distinguishes between
the extensive and intensive margin, that is the probability of the existence and
the magnitude of bilateral FDI flows, finding a significantly negative effect of tax
complexity on FDI through the extensive but not through the intensive margin. In
some regressions, she also includes the interaction term of tax complexity and the
corporate income tax rate, however without finding a significant interaction effect.
As already mentioned, we contribute to this existing literature in two ways. First,
we examine the effect of tax complexity on FDI using firm-level data. This is a useful
investigation as this is the level where FDI decisions are actually made. So, a better
understanding of how tax systems influence individual firms’ decisions, especially
the effect of tax complexity on the probability of investing in a specific country, can
be gained.
Second, we analyze the effect of tax complexity on FDI employing not a cross sec-
tion but a panel dataset. This allows us to examine the effect of tax complexity
not only across countries – as previous work does – but also changes within coun-
tries. Examining the effect of tax complexity within countries is desirable since the
motivation for estimating the effect of tax complexity on FDI is to provide some
policy recommendation and to predict the potential effect of reforms that change
tax complexity. To be able to address this point properly, it is necessary to evaluate
existing changes in tax complexity within countries.
12For a more detailed description of the Doing Business data, see Section 4.3.
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4.3 Data
In this study, we use a database governed by Deutsche Bundesbank that provides
FDI data on firm level.13 This database, the Microdatabase Direct Investment
(MiDi), is the result of the German Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG) and the Außen-
wirtschaftsverordnung (AWV) that force all German firms to report all foreign af-
filiates on annual basis if the affiliate’s balance sheet total exceeds 3 million Euro
and the German parent firm holds at least 10% of the shares or voting rights.14 The
MiDi entails some basic data (such as balance sheet total, annual turnover and num-
ber of employees) about the parent firm that is reporting and the foreign affiliate
as well as quite detailed information about the latter one, like balance sheet data,
economic sector, country, the share of equity and the share of voting rights hold by
the German parent firm. Moreover, since 2005, for every foreign affiliate it has to be
stated whether it is reported the first time and if so, whether it is a new investment
project or just an overshooting of the reporting threshold (i.e. the foreign affiliate
existed already in the previous year but this year is the first time that the reporting
requirements are met).15 We will use this information to filter out only new FDI
projects. Moreover, we restrict our sample to investments with a participation rate
of the German mother above or equal 50%.
The firm-level FDI data is collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank since 1976. The
MiDi comprises all data after 1989, available as a panel for observations after 1996.
However, the reporting requirements and the variables collected changed from time
to time so that the data reported before 2005 is useless for our needs.16 In the
relevant time period (2005-2009) 4577 new investments (with German participation
above or equal 50%) have been reported in OECD countries.17 Table 4.1 lists the
number of new investments by country. The highest portion of new investments
took place in the US (17%) followed by UK (11%) and France (9%). Our estimation
13For detailed information about the database see Lipponer (2009) or Hügelschäffer et al. (2009).
14The MiDi comprises also data of FDI in Germany hold by foreign firms since there is a
reporting duty as well. However this data will not be used in this study.
15For a complete listing of the requested information see the reporting forms for the firms
(reporting form K3), available at http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Standardartikel/
Service/Reporting_systems/reports_k3_and_k4.html?nn=6520.
16I.e. the current reporting requirements are in force since 2002, but the variables that allow us
to filter out new FDI projects are collected since 2005.
17Note that the data comprises both legally independent enterprises as well as branches and
permanent establishments.
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sample comprises 4474 investments in 27 countries.18 These investments are hold
by 1346 German parent firms.
We choose the Bundesbank database instead of other firm-level FDI databases for
several reasons. First, as already mentioned, it allows to filter out new FDI projects.
Second, it provides detailed information about both the FDI project (e.g. M&A vs.
greenfield investment, the economic sector, etc.) and the German parent firm (e.g.
the international firm structure) that we use in our analysis. Third, due to the
reporting duty, the database is very comprehensive and of high quality.
The description of all variables used later on and their sources are reported in Ta-
ble 4.2. Regarding the measures of tax complexity, we use the same data source as
Djankov et al. (2010), i.e. the World Bank Doing Business data regarding the topic
Paying Taxes. This data, annually published since 200619 has been constructed by
defining a fictive, standardized business, called "TaxpayerCo". For this business,
country specific balance sheets as well as profit and loss statements have been cal-
culated (all financial data as a multiple of the country’s income per capita). The
financial statements have been handed to tax experts from a number of firms in each
economy (mainly including PwC) who computed the taxes and mandatory contri-
butions for the standardized business in their respective country and answered some
survey questions. This results in the following variable that we use:
"Time" (results in our variable Tax complexj) 20
"Time is recorded in hours per year. The indicator measures the time taken to pre-
pare, file and pay 3 major types of taxes and contributions: the corporate income
tax, value added or sales tax and labor taxes, including payroll taxes and social
contributions. Preparation time includes the time to collect all information neces-
sary to compute the tax payable and to calculate the amount payable. If separate
18The difference to the number of 29 OECD countries at that time in addition to Germany is
due to the fact that there are no investments in Iceland (so it drops out in a logit estimation) and
missing data for Turkey. The number of 4474 investments is also due to this issue as well as to
missing controls for investments in Luxembourg in 2005 and 2006.
19However, the data published in 2006 has to be dated back to 2004 since it corresponds to
that year. The same is the case for all other years, resulting in a time span of 2004-2009 obtained
from the Doing Business reports 2006-2011. For a detailed description of the methodology, see
http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/paying-taxes and Djankov et al. (2010).
20Using survey data regarding time which taxpayers need to comply with taxes in order to
measure tax complexity is quite common in the literature. See Gale and Holtzblatt (2002) for a
review of past surveys.
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Table 4.1: Foreign direct investment of German multinationals by country
Country New Investments Total Investments Tax complex.j Corp. taxj
2005-2009 reported 2009
Australia 75 333 4.67 30.00
(1.64%) (1.80%)
Austria 281 1213 5.14 26.80
(6.14%) (6.54%)
Belgium 149 624 4.67 33.99
(3.26%) (3.37%)
Canada 130 377 4.78 33.98
(2.84%) (2.03%)
Czech Republic 163 855 6.70 24.60
(3.56%) (4.61%)
Denmark 48 285 4.91 27.20
(1.05%) (1.54%)
Finland 70 207 5.57 26.60
(1.53%) (1.12%)
France 408 1776 4.88 33.62
(8.91%) (9.58%)
Greece 25 124 5.51 29.20
(0.55%) (0.67%)
Hungary 93 554 5.82 16.00
(2.03%) (2.99%)
Iceland 0 0 - -
(0%) (0%)
Ireland 56 203 4.33 12.50
(1.22%) (1.09%)
Italy 222 1092 5.80 36.12
(4.85%) (5.89%)
Japan 85 349 5.84 41.32
(1.86%) (1.88%)
Korea (South) 38 162 5.61 27.50
(0.83%) (0.87%)
Luxembourg 141 322 4.07 29.63
(3.08%) (1.74%)
Mexico 83 315 6.27 30.00
(1.81%) (1.70%)
Netherlands 307 1167 5.31 29.32
(6.71%) (6.29%)
New Zealand 9 58 5.26 32.40
(0.20%) (0.31%)
Norway 52 170 4.47 28.00
(1.14%) (0.92%)
Poland 182 1004 6.02 19.00
(3.98%) (5.41%)
Portugal 44 250 5.79 27.10
(0.96%) (1.35%)
Slovakia 48 271 5.74 19.00
(1.05%) (1.46%)
Spain 203 1022 5.58 33.50
(4.44%) (5.51%)
Sweden 125 481 4.80 28.00
(2.73%) (2.59%)
Switzerland 183 1,037 4.14 21.90
(4.00%) (5.59%)
Turkey 63 264 - -
(1.38%) (1.42%)
United Kingdom 503 1,510 4.66 29.60
(10.99%) (8.14%)
United States 791 2,518 5.56 39.40
(17.28%) (13.58%)
Total 4577 18543 5.27 28.36
(100.00%) (100.00%)
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank: MiDi. Only investments included with German participation above
or equal 50%. Variable descriptions and data sources for Tax complex.j and Corp. taxj are provided
in Table 4.2. The reported numbers for these variables are mean values over the years 2004-2008
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accounting books must be kept for tax purposes -or separate calculations made- the
time associated with these processes is included. This extra time is included only if
the regular accounting work is not enough to fulfill the tax accounting requirements.
Filing time includes the time to complete all necessary tax return forms and file the
relevant returns at the tax authority. Payment time considers the hours needed to
make the payment online or at the tax authorities."21
In our sample of 27 countries, we observe a decrease in tax complexity within 12
countries and an increase within 4 countries (in 11 countries tax complexity re-
mains constant). In absolute values, the within country variation from 2004 to 2008
amounts to 14.8% on average. Examples of reforms leading to a decrease in tax
complexity are simplifications of reporting and payment requirements and the in-
troduction of electronic filing systems.22 Figure 4.1 shows the values of the variable
Tax complex.j within the 27 countries for the first and the last year of our estimation
sample.23 In our estimations, we use a large set of control variables, all described
in Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations of these variables are shown in
Table C.4 in Appendix C.2.
21The description of this variable is taken from http://www.doingbusiness.org/
methodology/paying-taxes.
22A detailed list of reforms which have influenced the Doing Business Indicators is available at
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms/overview/topic/paying-taxes
23Note that the variable Tax complex.j is the logarithm of the variable Time of the Doing
Business data.
Country labels are 3 digit ISO codes. For Luxembourg, data for 2005 and 2008 is taken due to
missing data in 2004.
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Table 4.2: Variable descriptions and data sources
Variable Data Source Description
ykj Deutsche Bundesbank:
MiDi
Takes the value 1 if an investment k takes place in coun-
try j. For all other countries the value is 0. This is the
dependent variable for all estimations except of Specifi-
cation 5 in Table 4.3.
Total assetsj Deutsche Bundesbank:
MiDi
Sum of total assets of all new investments (of German
parent firms) in country j in year t. This is the dependent
variable for Specification 5 in Table 4.3.
Prev. presencekj Deutsche Bundesbank:
MiDi
Previous Presence; Dummy variable which takes the
value 1 if the parent firm holds already an affiliate in
country j in the year before the investment k takes place.
Otherwise the value is 0.
Small parentk Deutsche Bundesbank:
MiDi
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the investment
k belongs to a parent firm with total assets below the
median. Otherwise the value is 0.
Small affiliatek Deutsche Bundesbank:
MiDi
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the total assets
of the investment k are below the median. Otherwise the
value is 0.
M&Ak Deutsche Bundesbank:
MiDi
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the invest-
ment k is an M&A project. Otherwise (i.e. for greenfield
investments) the value is 0.
Manufk Deutsche Bundesbank:
MiDi
Manufacturing; Dummy variable which takes the value 1
if the investment k belongs to the manufacturing sector.
Otherwise the value is 0.
Holdingk Deutsche Bundesbank:
MiDi
Holding company; Dummy variable which takes the value
1 if the investment k is a holding company. Otherwise
the value is 0.
HTk Deutsche Bundesbank:
MiDi
High-tech; Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if
the investment k belongs to the high-technology industry.
Otherwise the value is 0.
Tax complexj World Bank: Doing
Business data
"The time it takes to prepare, file and pay (or withhold)
the corporate income tax, the value added tax and social
security contributions (in hours per year)."a *
Corp taxj IBFD Statutory corporate income tax rate in %.
V ATj OECD, own search Value added tax rate in %.
EATRj Oxford University Cen-
ter for Business Taxa-
tion
Effective average tax rate in %.
GDPj World Bank: World De-
velopment Indicators
GDP in (current year) US $.*
Bureaucracyj World Bank: Doing
Business data
"The total number of days required to register a firm.
The measure captures the median duration that incorpo-
ration lawyers indicate is necessary to complete a proce-
dure with minimum follow-up with government agencies
and no extra payments."a *
Labor costsj Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, Eurostat
Hourly wages in the manufacturing sector in US $.*
Corruptionj Transparency Interna-
tional
Corruption Perceptions Index 2010. A low value means
high corruption.
Inflationj World Bank: World De-
velopment Indicators
Inflation (consumer prices) in %.
Exch. ratej IMF: International Fi-
nancial Statistics
Real effective exchange rate (Index, 2005=100).
Country riskj OECD Country risk classification.
Lending ratej IMF: International
Financial Statistics,
OECD
Lending rate in %.
Trade freedomj ,
Invest. freedomj
Heritage Foundation:
Index of economic
freedom
Indices measuring economic freedom regarding foreign
trade and investments, respectively.
All Data is for the years 2004-2009.
a Description taken from http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology.
* For these variables the natural logarithm of the data is used, ln(...).
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Figure 4.1: Tax complex.j in 2004 and 2008
4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Econometric Specification
FDI decisions are made by individual firms. Therefore, it is desirable to analyze the
effect of properties of the tax system on the attractiveness of FDI with firm-level
data. The approach we pursue in this section is related to multinomial location
choice problems of FDI projects as considered in Arulampalam et al. (2012), Buet-
tner and Ruf (2007), Hebous et al. (2011) and Herger et al. (2010).24
Let the latent surplus of an FDI project k in a potential host country j be
Π∗kj = Π(Tax complex.j, Corp. taxj, ...; zkj), (4.1)
where zkj are variables that are specific not only to the country j but also to the
affiliate k.
24In more detail, we employ a mixed logit model similar to Arulampalam et al. (2012) and use
partially some notation similar to Herger et al. (2010), Buettner and Ruf (2007) and Hebous et al.
(2011).
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We assume the latent surplus to follow the linearized equation25
Π∗kj = Xkjβk + aj + at(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Πkj
+ekj , (4.2)
where aj and at(k) are unobserved effects depending on the host country j and the
year t(k) in which the investment took place. ekj is the error term that is assumed
to be an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) draw from a Gumbel dis-
tribution (i.e. a type-1 extreme value distribution).26 We will treat the unobserved
effects as fixed effects to account for correlation between the unobserved effects and
the regressors.27 Xkj includes variables listed in Table 4.2.28
In addition, Xkj includes the interaction term between tax complexity and the cor-
porate income tax rate as a regressor. The reason is that the effect of tax complexity
on firms might consist of two effects, a negative effect due to compliance costs and
a positive effect that lies in the possibility of tax optimization (due to loopholes,
special rules and exemptions), the value of which depends on the tax rate. If the
tax rate is low, gains from tax optimization will only be small meaning the posi-
tive effect of tax complexity is expected to be minimal so that the negative effect
is dominant. If the tax rate increases, the possibility of tax optimization becomes
more and more important, which is expected to partly offset the negative effect of
tax complexity. In order to capture these two potential effects appropriately, the
inclusion of the interaction term between tax complexity and the corporate income
tax rate is required.
To focus ideas, we briefly want to theoretically formulate this argument. Let us
rewrite the net profits of an investment k in country j as Π∗kj = Pkj − T (tj, tcj, ...)
where Pkj would be the profits in the absence of taxation and T (tj, tcj, ...) are the
cost associated with taxation, i.e. tax payments plus compliance cost, which depends
amongst others on the tax rate tj and tax complexity tcj. In more detail, let T (·)
have the following form: T (tj, tcj, ...) = g(tcj, firm sizek, ...) + tjPkj(1 − h(tcj))
25Actually, since the latent surplus is not observed and therefore not included as a variable in
the estimations, it does not make a difference whether we assume the latent surplus Π∗kj or its
logarithm pi∗kj = ln(Π∗kj) to follow the linearized equation.
26Later on, we allow for correlated errors via cluster-robust standard errors.
27As one will see later on, the time-depending unobserved effect at(k) will cancel out in the
estimation procedure (cf. equation (4.4)). So, only aj are left as fixed effects to be estimated.
28For all country variables, we use data for the year t(k)− 1, the year before the investment k
took place. This captures the fact that investment decisions are based on past information.
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where the first term is the compliance cost (which is a function of tax complexity,
firm size, etc. and which is assumed to be increasing in tax complexity, i.e. ∂g(·)
∂tcj
> 0)
while the second term is the actual tax payment.29 The function h(·) shall capture
the extent to which tax payments can be avoided due to loopholes, special rules
and exemptions associated with a complex tax system. We make the following
assumptions regarding the function h(·): 0 ≤ h(·) < 1, h(0) = 0 and ∂h(tcj)
∂tcj
> 0.
So, if tax complexity is 0, (1 − h(tcj)) = 1, i.e. in the absence of tax complexity,
the actual tax payment is simply profits times tax rate. If tax complexity increases,
h(·) increases and constitutes the share of profits which can be prevented from being
taxed due to tax complexity. Taking the derivative with respect to tax complexity,
we obtain ∂Π
∗
kj
∂tcj
= −∂g(·)
∂tcj︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+tjPkj ∂h(tcj)∂tcj and
∂2Π∗kj
∂tcj∂tj
= Pkj ∂h(tcj)∂tcj > 0.
From this considerations, we can derive the following hypotheses for our estima-
tions in which we include tax complexity, the corporate income tax rate and their
interaction:
1. The coefficient of tax complexity is negative (this corresponds to −∂g(·)
∂tcj
< 0).
2. The coefficient of the interaction term between tax complexity and the corporate
income tax rate is positive (this corresponds to Pkj ∂h(tcj)∂tcj > 0).
In some specifications, we allow the vector of coefficients βk to vary across the
investment projects k with a density f(β), the mixing distribution. In order to make
this possible, we have to use a mixed logit estimation in addition to a conditional
logit estimation. The latter one, formulated by McFadden (1974), assumes that βk =
β for all k, i.e. the estimated coefficients are the same for all investment projects.30
However, due to limited computational power, we only estimate selected equations
with the mixed logit model and rely on the conditional logit model otherwise.31 In
the following, we still explain the mixed logit approach since everything holds also
29Assume that the actual tax payment consists of the tax rate tj times (gross) profits Pkj times
(1− h(tcj)). In reality, compliance costs might often be at least partially deductible from the tax
base, however, we neglect this here for the sake of convenience.
30The mixed logit model improves upon the conditional logit model not only by allowing for
random variation in the coefficients but also by not exhibiting independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives and its restrictive substitution patterns (Train, 2009). Another model with such properties
would be a multinomial probit model with random coefficients (Train, 2009). However, the esti-
mation of such a multinomial probit model is not feasible with our large dataset due to limited
computational power.
31Note that all estimations have to be run inside the research center of Deutsche Bundesbank.
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for the conditional logit model, which can be regarded as a special case.32
By using the mixed logit model, we allow βk not only to depend on the multinational
firm that makes the investment, but also on the individual investment itself. This is
desirable since it mirrors the fact that the importance of factors that influence the
attractiveness of a location depends on the specific investment. The value of the
own βk and the ekj for all j are known by the decision maker. So, the investment k
takes place in country j if the latent surplus of investment k in country j is higher
than in all other countries.33 This is
ykj =
 1 if Π
∗
kj > Π∗kl ∀ l 6= j and
0 else ,
(4.3)
where ykj is observed, but Π∗kj cannot be observed. Conditional on βk, the proba-
bility that a given investment k takes place in country j can be written as:
P (Investmentk in countryj︸ ︷︷ ︸
ykj=1
|βk) = exp(Πkj)∑
l exp(Πkl)
(4.4)
However, one only observes Xkj but neither βk nor ekj. So, one cannot condition
on βk and hence the unconditional choice probability
P (ykj = 1) =
∫ exp(Πkj)∑
l exp(Πkl)
f(β)dβ , (4.5)
that is the mixed logit probability, has to be used. The mixing distribution f(β) is
the probability density function of a normal distribution for the coefficients that we
allow to be random. The mixed logit estimator estimates the parameters of f(β),
in particular the means µm and standard deviations σm of the coefficients βmk that
we allow to be random. The conditional logit model equals the case in which the
mixing distribution is degenerate at a fixed value β, i.e. the vector of coefficients βk
is assumed to be the same for all investments k, say β with f(β) = 1 and 0 else.
32The following explanation of the mixed logit approach is based on Chapter 6 of Train (2009).
33Note that this setup is adequate in our study since we only look on new FDI projects.
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We allow clustered error terms ekj with regard to the economic sector of the invest-
ment k.34 This captures the fact that, for some sectors, certain countries might be
particularly attractive or unattractive, and so the errors are not i.i.d. for investments
within the same sector.
4.4.2 Estimation Results
The estimation results are shown in Table 4.3. Specification 1 is the benchmark
specification and shows that the coefficient of Tax Complexj is significantly negative
while the coefficient of the interaction term between Corp. taxj and Tax Complexj
is significantly positive. Both findings confirm the hypotheses derived in Section
4.4.1. So, we find evidence which is in line with the argument that the effect of
tax complexity on firms consists of a negative effect due to compliance costs and
a positive effect that lies in the possibility of tax optimization, the value of which
depends on the tax rate. However, in order to be able to draw conclusions about the
‘total’ effect of a marginal increase of tax complexity, we have to compute the ‘total’
coefficient of tax complexity, i.e. the coefficient of tax complexity conditional on the
level of the statutory corporate income tax rate,35 which is shown in Figure 4.2.
The lines for the coefficient and confidence intervals are plotted within the range of
corporate income tax rates in our sample, ranging from 12.5% to 42.1%. The median
tax rate is 28% and the first and third quartile is 25% and 33.33%, respectively. Our
key findings are twofold. First, the ‘total’ coefficient of tax complexity is negative
in the range of our sample, which suggests that a higher level of tax complexity
decreases the probability to locate an FDI project in the respective country. Second,
however, the repressive effect of tax complexity becomes weaker when the tax rate
increases. Following the theoretical considerations behind the interaction effect in
Section 4.4.1, this is evidence that there is also a positive effect of tax complexity
but that the negative effect outweighs the positive effect for all tax rates in the range
of our sample.
In addition to the explanation with the two effects working in opposite directions,
34Sectoral coding follows the NACE Rev.1 categories (3/4 digit) and results in 71 clusters in
our estimation sample.
35I.e. -2.3448+ Corp. taxj*0.0547, according to Spec. 1 of Table 4.3
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Table 4.3: Estimation results
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5
Tax complex.j -2.3448∗∗ -2.5917∗∗ -2.4493∗∗∗ -1.6866∗ -10.9158∗∗∗
(0.9442) (1.1069) (0.8048) (0.9686) (3.4993)
Corp. taxj -0.2855∗∗ -0.3319∗∗ -0.2115∗ -1.5418∗∗∗
(0.1270) (0.1658) (0.1186) (0.4889)
Corp. tax ∗ Tax complex.j 0.0547∗∗ 0.0623∗ 0.0414∗ 0.2955∗∗∗
(0.0247) (0.0318) (0.0232) (0.0963)
V ATj -0.0632∗ -0.1366∗∗ -0.0576 0.0336 0.0232
(0.0383) (0.0560) (0.0394) (0.1484) (0.2725)
V AT ∗ Tax complex.j -0.0150
(0.0194)
EATRj -0.3428∗∗∗
(0.1283)
EATR ∗ Tax complex.j 0.0666∗∗∗
(0.0247)
GDPj 2.8965∗∗ 3.1151∗∗ 3.1247∗∗ 2.7121∗∗ 12.5072∗∗
(1.3902) (1.5006) (1.4687) (1.3692) (5.0858)
Bureaucracyj -0.1031∗ -0.1638∗∗ -0.1052∗ -0.1089∗ -0.2450
(0.0617) (0.0827) (0.0591) (0.0661) (0.4566)
Labor costsj -1.2877 1.3692 -1.5860 -1.2740 -0.1716
(1.7375) (2.6673) (1.7171) (1.7399) (5.7967)
Trade freedomj -0.0109 -0.0074 -0.0139 -0.0108 -0.0101
(0.0089) (0.0094) (0.0092) (0.0089) (0.0479)
Corruptionj -0.0088 -0.0308 -0.0226 -0.0067 -0.3363
(0.0730) (0.0827) (0.0744) (0.0736) (0.4143)
Inflationj -0.0092 -0.0003 -0.0172 -0.0142 -0.0696
(0.0505) (0.0575) (0.0506) (0.0534) (0.2288)
Exch. ratej -0.0123 -0.0354 -0.0121 -0.0122 -0.1170∗
(0.0239) (0.0313) (0.0236) (0.0239) (0.0648)
Country riskj -0.2077 -0.3467 -0.2429 -0.1877 -0.0413
(0.2245) (0.2579) (0.2408) (0.2377) (0.3580)
Lending ratej 0.0245 0.0137 0.0243 0.0236 -0.0592
(0.0180) (0.0186) (0.0177) (0.0183) (0.0510)
Invest. freedomj -0.0017 -0.0036 -0.0018 -0.0009 0.0431
(0.0044) (0.0056) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0301)
N 118992 118992 118992 118992 133
Affiliates 4474 4474 4474 4474
Countries 27 27 27 27 27
pseudo R2 0.1223 0.1224 0.1223
Log-Likelihood -12882.42 -12879.41 -12881.47 -12881.87 -1.22e+08
Clusters 71 71 71 71 27
Country FE X X X X X
The dependent variable is ykj (i.e. 0 or 1) except for Specification 5. All independent variables
correspond to the year t(k)−1 before the investment k takes place. Cluster-robust standard
errors (regarding affiliate sector except for Specification 5) are provided in parentheses.
***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All specifications except
of Spec. 2 and 5 are conditional logit estimations. Spec. 2 is a mixed logit estimation
(using 200 Halton draws) with random coefficients for Tax complex.j , Corp. taxj , V ATj
and GDPj (the reported parameters are the µ of their distributions). The σ are -0.5895
(0.3842), 0.1171∗∗∗ (0.0405), 0.1678∗∗∗ (0.0518) and 1.4833∗∗ (0.5752), respectively (standard
errors in parantheses). Specification 5 is a Poisson estimation inlcuding year dummies, with
Total assetsj as the dependent variable and cluster-robust standard errors regarding country.
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Figure 4.2: The coefficient of tax complexity conditional on the corporate income
tax rate (based on Table 4.3, Spec. 1)
there might also be another explanation for our results. This second explanation
concerns the mobility of FDI projects, i.e. whether a foreign affiliate could be in
any country (e.g. a holding company) or whether it is tied to a specific host country
(e.g. a mining company due to local mineral resources). It seems reasonable that
the higher the corporate income tax rate in a country, the lower is the share of
investments which are mobile, i.e. not tied to the specific country. Combined with
the argument that the cost associated with a complex tax system should be more
deterrent for mobile investments than for immobile ones, this reasoning provides an
additional explanation for the positive coefficient of the interaction term.36
Concerning the further variables in the estimation, Corp. taxj shows a negative sign
while the coefficient of GDPj is positive, both as expected. Moreover, an increase
in V ATj exhibits a negative effect on the location choice, which can be explained by
tax incidence considerations.37 Moreover, we include a number of further controls,
which are commonly used in the empirical literature on FDI, to prevent omitted
36As we will show later (Table 4.5, Spec. 2), holding companies indeed react stronger to higher
tax complexity than other firms.
37This is in line with the findings of Desai et al. (2004) who investigate the effect of direct
and indirect taxes on FDI. They find that higher local indirect tax rates have a negative effect on
affiliate assets of American multinational firms.
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variable bias. Interestingly, most coefficients are statistically insignificant which is
probably due to little within-country variation.
So far, we have just interpreted the sign of the coefficients, but not yet their
magnitude. We will do this in Section 4.4.3 in which country-specific elasticities
are computed based on the benchmark estimation (Spec. 1).
As mentioned previously, the conditional logit estimation requires the IIA assump-
tion. A Hausman test does not reject this assumption. Nevertheless, in order to see
whether the results remain the same when we relax this assumption, we run a mixed
logit estimation (Spec. 2). The results are very similar, both qualitatively and quan-
titatively.38 This validates our findings from the conditional logit estimations (Spec.
1). Therefore, following Occam’s razor we stick to conditional logit estimations for
further specifications.39
In Specification 3 we use effective average tax rates instead of statutory tax rates.40
The results are almost identical which is not surprising since due to the country fixed
effects, only changes in the effective average tax rate matter and these are mainly
driven by changes in the statutory tax rate.41,42
Specification 4 examines the interaction between the value added tax rate (VAT)
and tax complexity. This seems interesting since our tax complexity measure also
includes the time to deal with VAT. However, as Specification 4 shows, there is
no significant interaction effect regarding VAT. Specification 5 corresponds to the
benchmark estimation (Spec. 1), however, we use an alternative measure of FDI as
the dependent variable and employ another estimation technique in this specifica-
tion. The dependent variable is no longer the binary variable ykj which indicates
the location choice but the sum of total assets of the new investments, aggregated
per year and country. The estimation is done with a Poisson panel estimator which
38The estimated µ of our variables of interest are very close to the coefficients of Specification
1. Only the negative effect of V ATj is on average about twice as large as in Specification 1. The
kernel density estimates for the random coefficients are provided in Appendix C.2 (Figure C.5 and
C.6).
39Moreover, this is necessary due to limited computational capacity since all estimations have
to be run inside the research center of Deutsche Bundesbank and the mixed logit estimations are
very time-consuming.
40A specification which employs effective marginal tax rates instead is provided in Appendix
C.1, Table C.1
41The correlation between these variables demeaned by country is 0.93, as shown in Table C.4
in Appendix C.2.
42The analogous figure to Figure 4.2 for the ‘total’ coefficient of tax complexity conditional on
the level of the effective average tax rate is provided in Appendix C.2, Figure C.4.
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includes country fixed effects and year dummies. Regarding our variables of interest,
the estimates qualitatively confirm our findings so far, i.e. the negative coefficient of
Corp. taxj and Tax Complexj as well as the positive coefficient of their interaction
term, and show even stronger significance. We conduct several further robustness
checks which confirm our findings and which are provided and explained in Ap-
pendix C.1 (Table C.1-C.3). In order to be able to investigate firm-specific variables
in our estimations, we stick to conditional logit estimations at the firm level in the
following.
Table 4.4 shows estimations which include firm-specific characteristics. In Speci-
fication 1, we test whether the probability of an (additional) investment in a spe-
cific country increases if the parent firm already holds an affiliate there. Moreover,
if the burden due to tax complexity is a fixed cost per country and not a cost
per affiliate, the negative impact of tax complexity should be smaller in this case.
Regarding our estimation equation, this means that in this case the coefficient of
Tax complex. ∗ Prev. Pres.kj should be positive. The results from Specification 1
suggest that German parent firms indeed prefer to invest in countries in which they
have already been before, but that the effect of tax complexity is not significantly
different in such cases. This suggests that the burden due to tax complexity cannot
be seen as a cost paid by the parent firm only once per host country but has to be
paid for every single investment project.
Specification 2-4 of Table 4.4 include the interactions of dummies for firm-specific
characteristics with Corp. taxj, Tax Complexj and the interaction term of the lat-
ter two variables. In Specification 2, this dummy is Small parentk which is 1 if
an investment belongs to a parent firm with total assets below the median and 0
else. In Specification 3, this dummy is Small affiliatek which is 1 if the total
assets of an investment are below the median and 0 else. The interactions of our
tax variables with these dummies lead to significant coefficients. However, regarding
the interpretation, we have to be careful and should rely on figures which indicate
the ‘total’ coefficient of Tax Complexj and its confidence intervals conditional on
Corp. taxj, as in Figure 4.2. These figures are provided in Appendix C.2 (Figure
C.1 and C.2). They show that, despite the significant coefficients of the dummy
interactions in our regression, the ‘total’ coefficient of tax complexity conditional
112 CHAPTER 4. TAX COMPLEXITY AND FDI
Table 4.4: Estimation results
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
Tax complex.j -2.8849∗∗∗ -2.6581∗∗∗ -2.7756∗∗∗ -2.3641∗∗
(1.0563) (0.9456) (1.0077) (0.9646)
Corp. taxj -0.3578∗∗ -0.3304∗∗ -0.3427∗∗ -0.3214∗∗
(0.1436) (0.1307) (0.1399) (0.1338)
Corp. tax ∗ Tax complex.j 0.0692∗∗ 0.0637∗∗ 0.0683∗∗ 0.0633∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0252) (0.0269) (0.0257)
Prev. Presencekj 1.2400∗∗∗
(0.3550)
Tax complex. ∗ Prev. Pres.kj 0.0327
(0.0610)
Tax complex.j∗ 0.8988∗∗∗
Small parentk (0.3274)
Corp. taxj∗ 0.1292∗∗
Small parentk (0.0625)
Corp. tax ∗ Tax complex.j∗ -0.0260∗∗
Small parentk (0.0122)
Tax complex.j∗ 0.8807∗∗
Small affiliatek (0.4149)
Corp. taxj∗ 0.1192∗
Small affiliatek (0.0684)
Corp. tax ∗ Tax complex.j∗ -0.0280∗∗
Small affiliatek (0.0131)
Tax complex.j ∗M&Ak 0.1586
(0.3587)
Corp. taxj ∗M&Ak 0.0746
(0.0538)
Corp. tax ∗ Tax complex.j∗ -0.0168
M&Ak (0.0110)
V ATj -0.0489 -0.0591 -0.0629 -0.0634
(0.0397) (0.0383) (0.0385) (0.0386)
GDPj 2.5128∗∗ 2.8706∗∗ 2.8688∗∗ 2.8825∗∗
(1.2625) (1.3780) (1.3831) (1.3818)
N 118992 118992 118992 118992
Affiliates 4474 4474 4474 4474
Countries 27 27 27 27
pseudo R2 0.1549 0.1232 0.1246 0.1244
Log-Likelihood -12403.96 -12868.98 -12848.64 -12852.07
Clusters 71 71 71 71
Country FE X X X X
Country controls X X X X
The dependent variable is ykj (i.e. 0 or 1). All independent variables cor-
respond to the year t(k) − 1 before the investment k takes place. Cluster-
robust standard errors (regarding affiliate sector) are provided in parenthe-
ses. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All
specifications are conditional logit estimations. Country controls are the vari-
ables Bureaucracyj , Labor costsj , Trade freedomj , Corruptionj , Inflationj ,
Exch. ratej , Country riskj , Lending ratej and Invest. freedomj .
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on the corporate income tax rate is neither statistically different between large and
small investments nor between investments of large or small parent firms (the ‘total’
coefficient for one lies always within the 90% confidence interval of the other). Con-
sequently, our results indicate that the location choice of large and small firms is
similarly affected by tax complexity. This suggests that the ‘cost’ of tax complexity
is not solely a fixed cost but entails a substantial variable component which depends
on firm size, because otherwise, the location choice of large investments should have
been observed to be less affected.
FDI can either be an M&A project or a greenfield investment. In our sample,
almost 65% of all investments are due to M&A (cf. Table 4.6). One might expect
that the investment decision for these two forms of FDI are differently affected by
tax complexity. Specification 4 investigates whether this is the case by including
interactions of an M&A-dummy with our tax variables. Interestingly, we find no
significant difference between M&As and greenfield investments. This suggests that
the ‘cost’ of tax complexity is not a one-time cost either because otherwise this
cost would have already been carried (at least partially) by an existing firm and
therefore, M&As should have been observed to be less affected.
Both findings, i.e. that the cost of tax complexity is neither solely a fixed cost
regarding firm size nor a one-time cost, are intuitive. As argued before, the com-
pliance cost due to tax complexity comprises all tasks that are necessary in order
to understand the tax law and to fulfill the requirements. The cost associated with
understanding the tax law might be seen as a fixed cost with respect to firm size
and time (i.e. paid only once). The cost associated with fulfilling the requirements
occurs annually and can be divided into two parts, one that is variable and another
one that is fixed with respect to firm size. So, our findings suggest that the recur-
ring cost (e.g. cost associated with annually fulfilling the requirements) is crucial
and that its variable part is dominant.
Table 4.5 provides estimations with dummy interactions regarding the industry of
foreign investments. The absolute and relative share of these industries is shown
in Table 4.6. For manufacturing firms (Spec. 1), we find no differences. For high-
tech firms (Spec. 3), we estimate significantly different coefficients, however, a graph
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Table 4.5: Estimation results
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Tax complex.j -2.6386∗∗ -2.1985∗∗ -2.2666∗∗
(1.0985) (0.9518) (0.9566)
Corp. taxj -0.3174∗∗ -0.2745∗∗ -0.2733∗∗
(0.1486) (0.1280) (0.1295)
Corp. tax ∗ Tax complex.j 0.0610∗∗ 0.0522∗∗ 0.0522∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0248) (0.0252)
Tax complex.j ∗Manufk 0.7430
(0.6306)
Corp. taxj ∗Manufk 0.0648
(0.0971)
Corp. tax ∗ Tax complex.j ∗Manufk -0.0126
(0.0190)
Tax complex.j ∗Holdingk -1.1134∗∗∗
(0.3143)
Corp. taxj ∗Holdingk -0.0834∗
(0.0486)
Corp. tax ∗ Tax complex.j ∗Holdingk 0.0201∗∗
(0.0097)
Tax complex.j ∗HTk -1.7935∗∗∗
(0.4201)
Corp. taxj ∗HTk -0.2767∗∗∗
(0.0820)
Corp. tax ∗ Tax complex.j ∗HTk 0.0595∗∗∗
(0.0144)
V ATj -0.0618 -0.0649∗ -0.0637∗
(0.0386) (0.0380) (0.0383)
GDPj 2.8581∗∗ 2.9357∗∗ 2.8785∗∗
(1.3891) (1.3825) (1.3879)
N 118992 118992 118992
Affiliates 4474 4474 4474
Countries 27 27 27
pseudo R2 0.1242 0.1242 0.1229
Log-Likelihood -12854.84 -12854.94 -12873.22
Clusters 71 71 71
Country FE X X X
Country controls X X X
The dependent variable is ykj (i.e. 0 or 1). All independent variables
correspond to the year t(k) − 1 before the investment k takes place.
Cluster-robust standard errors (regarding affiliate sector) are provided
in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level. All specifications are conditional logit estimations. Country
controls are the variables Bureaucracyj , Labor costsj , Trade freedomj ,
Corruptionj , Inflationj , Exch. ratej , Country riskj , Lending ratej and
Invest. freedomj .
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Table 4.6: Foreign direct investment of German multinationals 2005-2009
Number of new investments in %
Total 4577 100.00
Greenfield 1620 35.39
M&A 2957 64.61
Holding Companies 579 12.65
Manufacturing 1241 27.11
High-Tech (HT) 148 3.23
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank: MiDi. Only investments included with
German participation above or equal 50%.
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Figure 4.3: The coefficient of tax complexity conditional on the corporate income
tax rate (based on Table 4.5, Spec. 2)
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which shows the ‘total’ coefficient of tax complexity conditional on the corporate
income tax rate shows that they do not differ, except for extremely high tax rates
(cf. Figure C.3 in Appendix C.2). By contrast, for holding companies (Spec. 2),
we estimate significantly different coefficients which lead to different ‘total’ coeffi-
cients for tax complexity conditional on the corporate income tax rate, at least for
a substantial range of corporate income tax rates as shown in Figure 4.3.43 For
corporate tax rates approximately between 25% and 40%, the total coeffient of tax
complexity for non-holding companies lies above the 90% confidence interval of the
‘total’ coefficient for holding companies. This means that within this interval, the
deterrent effect of tax complexity is stronger for holding companies. Since holding
companies are very mobile and might be placed in any country, it seems intuitive
that the location choice of such investments is stronger influenced by the ‘cost’ of
tax complexity.
4.4.3 Elasticities
So far, we have just interpreted the signs of coefficients and their relation to each
other but not yet their magnitude. The best way to get a sense of the magnitude of
the effect a marginal change in tax complexity has is to compute elasticities regarding
the number of new investments in a country. In the following, we do so by relying on
the estimates of the benchmark specification (Table 4.3, Spec. 1). However, in order
to compute elasticities, one has to make an assumption whether the total number of
investments is fixed or not. In other words, one has to make an assumption whether
reducing tax complexity is a zero-sum game (the reducing country wins while all
others lose (‘fixed pie’ scenario)) or not (there is no externality on other countries,
additional investments arise in the reducing country (‘no externality’ scenario)).
Following Schmidheiny and Brülhart (2011), it is best practice to compute both
types of elasticities as the truth will probably lie in between. Since we estimate
country-specific elasticities, we cannot use investment-specific variables and we can
rewrite equation (4.4) as
P (Investmentk in countryj) =
exp(Πkj)∑
l exp(Πkl)
= exp(Xt−1,jβ + aj)∑
l exp(Xt−1,lβ + al)
= Pt,j , (4.6)
43Recall that the median tax rate is 28% and the first and third quartile is 25% and 33.33%,
respectively.
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where t− 1 = t(k)− 1 is the year before investment k takes place (cf. the notes on
Table 4.3). Since k drops out, Pt,j is the probability that an arbitrary investment
takes place in country j in year t.44
With nt,j being the total number of new investments in country j in year t and
Xt−1,jβ = x1,t−1,j · β1 + x2,t−1,j · β2 + x1,t−1,j · x2,t−1,j · β3 + ... , (4.7)
we obtain, under the assumption that the total number of investments per year nt
is fixed (‘fixed pie’ scenario), the own-elasticity
∂lnE(nt,j)
∂x1,t−1,j
= (β1 + x2,t−1,j · β3) · (1− Pt,j) (4.8)
and the cross-elasticity
∂lnE(nt,i)
∂x1,t−1,j
= −(β1 + x2,t−1,j · β3) · Pt,j (4.9)
which is the expected percentage change in the number of new investments in a
country i due to a marginal change in the variable x1 in country j.
Under the assumption that the total number of investments is not fixed, we obtain
the own-elasticity
∂lnE(nt,j)
∂x1,t−1,j
= (β1 + x2,t−1,j · β3) (4.10)
and the cross-elasticity
∂lnE(nt,i)
∂x1,t−1,j
= 0 , (4.11)
i.e. there is no externality on other countries in this scenario (‘no externality’ sce-
nario). Table 4.7 shows the elasticities of tax complexity (using the above formulas
with x1,j = Tax complex.j and x2,j = Corp. taxj) for the year t=2009, computed
using Specification 1 of Table 4.3.
44Note that this is the probability of a conditional logit model. We rely on the conditional logit
estimations instead of mixed logit estimations for the calculation of the elasticities due to limited
computational power since the standard errors of the elasticities are calculated via bootstrapping.
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Table 4.7: Estimated elasticities
Country Own-elasticities Cross-elasticities Own-elasticities Cross-elasticities
‘fixed pie’ scenario ‘no externality’ scenario
Australia -0.6896∗∗ 0.0139∗∗ -0.7035 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.2773) (0.0063) (0.2567)
Austria -0.9145∗∗ 0.0626∗∗ -0.9771 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.3622) (0.0247) (0.3569)
Belgium -0.4716∗∗ 0.0136∗∗ -0.4852 ∗∗ 0
(0.2142) (0.0056) (0.1968)
Canada -0.4980∗∗ 0.0140∗∗ -0.512 ∗∗ 0
(0.2199) (0.0068) (0.2025 )
Czech Republic -1.1354∗∗ 0.0605∗∗ -1.1959 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.4639) (0.0262) (0.4455)
Denmark -0.9684∗∗ 0.0087∗∗ -0.9771 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.3824) (0.0037) (0.3569)
Finland -0.9091∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ -0.9224 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.3615) (0.0042) (0.3356)
France -0.4704∗∗ 0.0509∗∗ -0.5213 ∗∗ 0
(0.2065) (0.0236) (0.2046)
Greece -0.9709∗∗ 0.0062 -0.9771 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.3831) (0.0042) (0.3569)
Hungary -1.4387∗∗ 0.0307∗ -1.4695 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.5771) (0.0177) (0.561)
Ireland -1.6447∗∗ 0.0162∗ -1.6609 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.6699) (0.0085) (0.6436)
Italy -0.6020∗∗ 0.0249∗∗ -0.6269 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.2499) (0.0097) (0.2327)
Japan -0.1111 0.0016 -0.1126 0
(0.1977) (0.0027) (0.1925)
Korea (South) -0.8335∗∗ 0.0068∗∗ -0.8403 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.3295) (0.0033) (0.3047)
Luxembourg -0.6934∗∗ 0.0304∗∗ -0.7238 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.2792) (0.0134) (0.2635)
Mexico -0.8000∗∗ 0.0130∗∗ -0.8129 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.3174) (0.0053) (0.2947)
Netherlands -0.8725∗∗∗ 0.0772∗ -0.9497 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.3369) (0.0397) (0.3462)
New Zealand -0.7024∗∗ 0.0011 -0.7035 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.2827) (0.0007) (0.2567)
Norway -0.8017∗∗ 0.0112∗∗ -0.8129 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.3179) (0.0051) (0.2947)
Poland -1.2434∗∗ 0.0619∗∗ -1.3053 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.4953) (0.0313) (0.4913)
Portugal -0.8864∗∗ 0.0086∗∗ -0.895 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.3496) (0.0039) (0.3252)
Slovakia -1.2887∗∗ 0.0166∗ -1.3053 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.5145) (0.0085) (0.4913)
Spain -0.6692∗∗ 0.0344∗ -0.7035 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.2653) (0.0189) (0.2567)
Sweden -0.7913∗∗ 0.0217∗∗∗ -0.8129 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.3155) (0.0079) (0.2947)
Switzerland -1.1346∗∗ 0.0520∗∗ -1.1866 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.4500) (0.0227) (0.4417)
United Kingdom -0.7362∗∗ 0.0767∗∗ -0.8129 ∗∗∗ 0
(0.2883) (0.0355) (0.2947)
United States -0.1604 0.0288 -0.1892 0
(0.1615) (0.0316) (0.1811)
The reported elasticities show the expected effect of a change in Tax complex.j on the number of new
investments in a country, based on Spec. 1 in Table 4.3 and the year t=2009. Cluster-robust standard
errors (regarding affiliate sector (71 clusters), estimated via bootstrapping (199 replications) in the
fixed pie scenario) are provided in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
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The own-elasticities are widely significantly negative with a mean elasticity of
−0.7586 (median of −0.7344) in the ‘fixed pie’ scenario and −0.7844 (median of
−0.7446) in the ‘no externality’ scenario. This means that, on average, reducing
tax complexity by one percent leads to an increase of the expected number of new
investments (at least new German investments) of 0.7586 percent and 0.7844 per-
cent, respectively. The highest elasticities are found for Ireland, Hungary, Slovakia,
Poland, Czech Republic and Switzerland, which are the countries with the lowest
corporate income tax rates in our sample (cf. Table 4.1). In these countries, reducing
tax complexity by one percent leads to an increase of the expected number of new
investments (at least new German investments) of 1.1 to 1.6 percent.
4.5 Conclusion
The question whether and how much the complexity of tax systems has an impact on
economic activity is highly relevant for policy-making. In this chapter, we investigate
this question by focusing on one part of economic activity that is FDI. We use the
Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) of Deutsche Bundesbank and analyze the
location choice of new German FDI projects in OECD countries from 2005 to 2009.
As a measure for tax complexity, we us the time it takes for a standardized firm
to comply with taxes, i.e. to prepare, file and pay taxes, published in the Doing
Business data of the World Bank.
We find two main results. First, our estimates suggest that a higher level of tax
complexity significantly decreases the probability to locate an FDI project in that
country. Second, we find a positive coefficient of the interaction term of the corporate
tax rate and tax complexity. This indicates that the negative effect of tax complexity
is weaker, the higher the corporate tax rate is. Concerning policy implications, our
results suggest that reducing tax complexity is a powerful instrument for increasing
a country’s attractiveness for new FDI projects. Moreover, the effect of a reduction
of tax complexity will be particularly powerful for countries with a low statutory
corporate income tax rate.
However, our results need to be validated by future research. In particular, fur-
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ther firm-level studies are desirable which use FDI data not restricted to German
multinationals, alternative tax complexity measures and a larger time span.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs
Proof of proposition 2.3.1:
Part 1 a) follows from (2.17) and Part b) follows from (2.8). Part c) follows from
the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity (i.e. (2.20) and (2.21)). Part 1 d): We first
want to show that fiscal and legal capacity are both monotone nondecreasing in
E(λ2). Since φ enters the model only through E(λ2) and E(λ2) is increasing in φ,
this suffices. Let us rewrite equation (2.15):
f(b1, τ2, pi2) = EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1)− λ1(F (τ2 − τ1) + L(pi2 − pi1)− b1) (A.1)
As stated in Part 1 a), b1 = 0 is the debt level that maximizes (A.1). Define
g(τ2, pi2) ≡ f(0, τ2, pi2). Following Corollary 3 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), it
remains to show that g(τ2, pi2) is quasisupermodular in (τ2, pi2) and satisfies the single
crossing property in (τ2, pi2, E(λ2)). We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂τ2
= δω′(pi2)(E(λ2)− 1) > 0 (A.2)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂E(λ2)
= δω′(pi2)τ2 > 0 (A.3)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂E(λ2)
= δω(pi2) > 0 (A.4)
131
132 APPENDIX A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
By Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), g(τ2, pi2) has increasing differences
in (τ2, pi2, E(λ2)) and is supermodular in (τ2, pi2). It follows that g(τ2, pi2) satisfies
the single crossing property in (τ2, pi2, E(λ2)) and is quasisupermodular in (τ2, pi2).
So, fiscal and legal capacity are both monotone nondecreasing in E(λ2).
It remains to show that fiscal and legal capacity are both strictly increasing in
E(λ2). Since we have shown that both are monotone nondecreasing, there are three
other potential possibilities: Fiscal capacity is strictly increasing while legal capacity
remains constant, legal capacity is strictly increasing while fiscal capacity remains
constant, both are constant. However, all of them lead to a contradiction regarding
the FOC (2.20) and (2.21), so they can be ruled out.
Part 2 a) follows from (2.17) and b) follows from (2.8). Part c): The positive
investments follow from the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity (i.e. (2.20) and (2.21)).
The comparison to the model without debt is due to the fact that when no debt
can be raised, max{λ1, E(λ2)} has to be replaced by E(λ2) which is smaller (the
comparison can be shown rigorously using monotone comparative statics similar to
the proof of Part 1 d) of proposition 2.3.1).
Proof of proposition 2.3.2:
If the cohesiveness condition holds, λ1 = α1 and E(λ2) = φαH + (1− φ)αL. These
are the same terms as for a social planner. Therefore, the results of proposition 2.3.1
hold.
Proof of proposition 2.3.3:
Part 1 a) follows from (2.17) and Part b) follows from (2.8). Part c) follows
from the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity (i.e. (2.20) and (2.21)). For Part 1 d)
and e) we apply again monotone comparative statics as in Part 1 d) of proposition
2.3.1. As stated in Part a), b1 = 0 is the debt level that maximizes (2.15). Define
g(τ2, pi2) ≡ f(0, τ2, pi2), with f(b1, τ2, pi2) denoting the objective function of (2.15).
We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂τ2
= δω′(pi2)(E(λ2)− 1) > 0 (A.5)
since the stability condition holds.
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂E(λ2)
= δω′(pi2)τ2 > 0 (A.6)
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∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂E(λ2)
= δω(pi2) > 0 (A.7)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂θ
= δω′(pi2)τ2(1− φ)2(2γ − 1) + 2∂L(·)
∂pi2
> 0 for γ > 1/2 (A.8)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂θ
= δω(pi2)(1− φ)2(2γ − 1) + 2∂F (·)
∂τ2
> 0 for γ > 1/2 (A.9)
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Part 1 d) of proposition 2.3.1, we
are done.
Part 2 a) follows from (2.17). Part 2 b): The positive investments follow from
the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity (i.e. (2.20) and (2.21)). The comparison
to the model without debt is due to the fact that when no debt can be raised,
max{λ1, E(λ2)} has to be replaced by E(λ2) which is smaller (the comparison can
be shown rigorously using monotone comparative statics similar to the proof of Part
1 d) of proposition 2.3.1). Part 2 c) and e) follow from the FOC for fiscal and
legal capacity (i.e. (2.20) and (2.21)) and the definitions of λ1 and E(λ2). Part 2 d)
follows from (2.8).
Proof of proposition 2.3.4:
Part 1: The positive investments follow from the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity
(i.e. (2.20) and (2.21)). The comparison to the model without debt is due to the fact
that when no debt can be raised, max{λ1, E(λ2)} has to be replaced by E(λ2) which
is smaller (the comparison can be shown rigorously using monotone comparative
statics similar to the proof of Part 1 d) of proposition 2.3.1). Part 2 follows from
the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity (i.e. (2.20) and (2.21)) and the definitions of
λ1 and E(λ2). Part 3 follows from (2.17) and Part 4 follows from (2.8).
Proof of proposition 2.4.1:
Part 1 a) follows from λ1 < E(λ2) and Part b) follows from αL ≥ 2(1− θ). Part
c) follows from the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity. Part 1 d) and e): We first
want to show that fiscal and legal capacity are both monotone nondecreasing in ψ
and E(λ2). Since φ enters the model only through E(λ2) and E(λ2) is increasing in
φ, this suffices.
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Let us rewrite equation (2.29):
f(b1, τ2, pi2) = EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1)− λ1(F (τ2 − τ1) + L(pi2 − pi1)− b1) (A.10)
Since we are in case a), b1 = 0 is the debt level that maximizes (A.10). Define
g(τ2, pi2) ≡ f(0, τ2, pi2). Following Corollary 3 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), it
remains to show that g(τ2, pi2) is quasisupermodular in (τ2, pi2) and satisfies the single
crossing property in (τ2, pi2, E(λ2), ψ). We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂τ2
= δω′(pi2)(E(λ2)− 1) > 0 (A.11)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂E(λ2)
= δω′(pi2)τ2 > 0 (A.12)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂ψ
= 0 (A.13)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂E(λ2)
= δ(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2)) > 0 (A.14)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂ψ
= δ(ω¯(pi2)−ω(pi2))(E(λ2)−1) > 0 since we have E(λ2) > λ1 > 1 (A.15)
By Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), g(τ2, pi2) has increasing differences
in (τ2, pi2, E(λ2), ψ) and is supermodular in (τ2, pi2). It follows that g(τ2, pi2) satisfies
the single crossing property in (τ2, pi2, E(λ2), ψ) and is quasisupermodular in (τ2, pi2).
So, fiscal and legal capacity are both monotone nondecreasing in E(λ2) and ψ.
It remains to show that fiscal and legal capacity are both strictly increasing in
E(λ2) and ψ. Since we have shown that both are monotone nondecreasing, there are
three other possibilities which we have to check: Fiscal capacity is strictly increasing
while legal capacity remains constant, legal capacity is strictly increasing while fiscal
capacity remains constant, both are constant. All of these can be shown to lead to a
contradiction as demonstrated for the following case. Consider an increase in E(λ2).
Assume fiscal capacity is strictly increasing while legal capacity remains constant.
From (A.11) and (A.12) it follows that the left-hand side (LHS) of the FOC for pi is
increasing, so the right-hand side (RHS) has to increase as well. Since L(·) is convex,
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pi has to increase. This is a contradiction. In an analogous way, all other cases can
be handled. The same can be done for an increase in ψ. In total, we conclude that
fiscal and legal capacity must be strictly increasing in E(λ2) as well as ψ.
Part 1 f) follows from the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity and the definitions of
λ1 and E(λ2). Part 1 g) follows from the definition of free future revenues and the
comparative statics for τ2 and pi2.
Part 2.I a) follows from λ1 < E(λ2) and Part b) follows from the FOC for fiscal
and legal capacity. Part 2.I c)-e): We want to show that fiscal and legal capacity
are both strictly increasing in ψ, θ (for γ > 1/2) and E(λ2). Since φ and γ enter
the model only through E(λ2) and E(λ2) is increasing in φ and decreasing in γ, this
suffices. For ψ and E(λ2), the proof is exactly as in Part 1. It remains to show that
fiscal and legal capacity are both increasing in θ (for γ > 1/2).
As stated in Part a), b1 = 0 is the debt level that maximizes (2.29). Define
g(τ2, pi2) ≡ f(0, τ2, pi2), with f(b1, τ2, pi2) denoting the objective function of (2.29).
We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂τ2
= δω′(pi2)(E(λ2)− 1) > 0 (A.16)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂θ
= δω′(pi2)τ22(1−φ)(2γ− 1) + 2∂L(pi2 − pi1)
∂pi2
> 0 if γ > 12 (A.17)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂θ
= δ(ψω¯(pi2)+(1−ψ)ω(pi2))2(1−φ)(2γ−1)+2∂F (τ2 − τ1)
∂τ2
> 0 if γ > 12
(A.18)
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Part 1, we are done.
Part 2.I f) follows from the definition of free future revenues and the comparative
statics for τ2 and pi2.
Part 2.II:
Part 2.II a): b1 = b follows from the FOC for debt, as argued at the beginning of
Section 2.4.1. The comparative statics for b1 follow from the definition of b1 = b
and the comparative statics for τ2 and pi2 in Part 2.II e) and f). Note that the
formula for free future revenues becomes δτ2ψ(v − v), since ω¯(·) and ω(·) can be
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written as ω¯(·) = w(·) + v and ω(·) = w(·) + v as argued in Section 2.4. This term
is increasing in τ2. The comparative statics for free future revenues w.r.t φ and γ
follow immediately from the comparative statics for τ2 stated in Part 2.II e) and g).
The comparative statics w.r.t ψ follow from ∂δτ2ψ(v−v)
∂ψ
= δτ2(v − v) + δψ(v − v) ∂τ∂ψ
and the comparative statics for τ2 stated in Part 2.II f).
Part 2.II b): b < b1 < b follows from the FOC for debt, as argued at the beginning
of Section 2.4.1.
i: If ψ increases, the FOC for debt says that ∆ has to increase. Since τ2 and pi2
increase as stated by Part 2.II f), b1 has to increase. ii: Since φ and γ enter the
model only through E(λ2) and E(λ2) is increasing in φ and decreasing in γ, we have
to show that free future revenues (FR) are increasing in E(λ2).
We have ∂FR
∂E(λ2) =
∂δτ2(ψω¯(pi2)+(1−ψ)ω(pi2))
∂E(λ2) − ∂b1∂E(λ2) and
∂δτ2(ψω¯(pi2)+(1−ψ)ω(pi2))
∂E(λ2) = δ(ψω¯(pi2)+
(1−ψ)ω(pi2)) ∂τ2∂E(λ2) + δτ2ω′(pi2) ∂pi2∂E(λ2) . We cannot solve for b1 explicitly, still we can
say something about ∂b1
∂E(λ2) . Taking the total differential w.r.t. E(λ2) of the FOC
for b1 we obtain 0 = 1 + (1−ψ)ψ
∂2P (∆)
∂∆2
∂∆
∂E(λ2) .
Since P (∆) is convex, ∂∆
∂E(λ2) < 0. Since we are in case d), ∆ = (1 + R(b))b −
(τ2ω(pi2)) = 1ψ ((1 + ρ)b1 − τ2ω(pi2)) so ∂∆∂E(λ2) = 1ψ ((1 + ρ) ∂b1∂E(λ2) − ω(pi2) ∂τ2∂E(λ2) −
τ2ω
′(pi2) ∂pi2∂E(λ2)).
This leads to ∂b1
∂E(λ2) < δ(ω(pi2)
∂τ2
∂E(λ2) + τ2ω
′(pi2) ∂pi2∂E(λ2)).
Therefore, ∂δτ2(ψω¯(pi2)+(1−ψ)ω(pi2))
∂E(λ2) >
∂b1
∂E(λ2) . So, free future revenues are increasing in
E(λ2).
Part 2.II c) is due to αL < 2(1− θ). Part 2.II d) follows from the FOCs for τ2 and
pi2 in case c) and d). For Part 2.II e) and f) we apply again monotone comparative
statics.
We want to show that fiscal and legal capacity are both strictly increasing in ψ and
E(λ2) (since φ and γ enter the model only through E(λ2) and E(λ2) is increasing
in φ and decreasing in γ, this suffices). We proceed in two stages, first we consider
an economy in case c) (i.e. E(λ2) < λ1 < E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
) and than in case
d) (i.e. λ1 = E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆ ).
In case c), b1 = b is the debt level that maximizes (2.29). Define g(τ2, pi2) ≡
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f(b, τ2, pi2), with f(b1, τ2, pi2) denoting the objective function of (2.29). We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂τ2
= δ(ω′(pi2)(λ1 − 1)) > 0 (A.19)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂E(λ2)
= 0 (A.20)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂E(λ2)
= δψ(ω¯(pi2)− ω(pi2)) > 0 (A.21)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂ψ
= 0 (A.22)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂ψ
= δ(ω¯(pi2)− ω(pi2))(E(λ2)− 1) > 0 if E(λ2) > 1 (A.23)
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Part 1, we are done.
In case d), the debt level b∗ ∈ (b, b) that maximizes (2.29) is implicitly defined by
the FOC of b1, λ1 = E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆ . Define g(τ2, pi2) ≡ f(b∗, τ2, pi2). By the
Envelope Theorem and plugging in the first order condition for debt, we obtain the
same derivatives and cross-derivatives as in case c). Following the same reasoning
as in case c), we are done.
Part 2.III a) follows from the FOC for debt, as argued at the beginning of Section
2.4.1. Part b) from the definition of b and Part c) from the definitions of b and free
future revenues. Part d) is due to αL < 2(1 − θ). Part e) and f) follow from the
FOC for τ2 and pi2 in case e). For g) we apply again monotone comparative statics.
As stated in Part a), b1 = b is the debt level that maximizes (2.29). Define
g(τ2, pi2) ≡ f(b, τ2, pi2), with f(b1, τ2, pi2) denoting the objective function of (2.29).
We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂τ2
= δω′(pi2)(λ1 − 1) > 0 (A.24)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂ψ
= 0 (A.25)
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∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂ψ
= δ(ω¯(pi2)−ω(pi2))(λ1−1)+ψ ∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣∣∣
b=b
(ω¯(pi2)−ω(pi2)) > 0 (A.26)
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Part 1, we are done. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2.5.1:
In order to derive the relevant FOC, we will consider the two cases b∗1 < b¯ and
b∗1 > b¯. The case b∗1 = b¯ is a corner solution in terms of the optimal choice of debt
where the first order condition for debt is given by inequalities. In the following, we
will not present the derivation of the results for the case b∗1 = b¯, but only mention
how they differ from the other cases.
First, suppose that given the optimal τ ∗2 and pi∗2, the optimal debt fulfills b∗1 < b¯.
For this constellation, we will never end up in Scenario 2 in the second period.
Therefore, using (2.42) and (2.43) in (2.45), we arrive at the following first order
condition for debt b1:
max {2(1− θ), Vg[τ1ω1(pi1)− F (τ2 − τ1)− L(pi2 − pi1) + b1]} = −∂EV
I1(τ2, pi2, b1)
∂b1
(A.27)
The right-hand side of this equation gives the marginal benefit of public funds in
the present seen from the perspective of the first-period incumbent. Since we assume
that, at the solution (τ ∗2 , pi∗2, b∗1), it is optimal in the first period to provide transfers,
the first term in the above equation evaluates to 2(1 − θ). We will now argue that
the only possible configuration such that the first order condition for debt holds with
equality is the following:1 In the second period, for the boom situation (αL, ω¯(pi2))
we get transfers, while for the crisis situation (αH , ω(pi2)) no transfers are provided.
The resulting first order condition for debt then is:
2(1− θ) = φαHVg(τ2ω(pi2)− (1 + ρ)b1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>2(1−θ)
+(1− φ)[(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γ<2(1−θ)
] (A.28)
If the amount of resources available in a future crisis, τ2ω(pi2) − (1 + ρ)b1, were
so big that αHVg[τ2ω(pi2) − (1 + ρ)b1] < 2(1 − θ) then transfer spending would
also be optimal for (αH , ω(pi2)). The right-hand side of (A.28) would then be Γ =
1Recall that by assumption we want to focus on this equality case in the analysis.
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(1 − γ)2(1 − θ) + γ2θ, and it would be smaller than the left-hand side, 2(1 − θ).
Intuitively, due to political instability, the benefit of future transfer spending, Γ, is
lower than the benefit of current transfer spending, 2(1 − θ). Therefore, we need
to have low enough future resources in the crisis situation such that the resulting
marginal benefit of public good spending is higher than 2(1− θ). This compensates
for having transfer spending with a marginal benefit lower than 2(1 − θ) in the
boom situation. However, less available resources in a future crisis, will also imply
less available resources in a future boom, τ2ω(pi2) − (1 + ρ)b1. Our assumption
to have (A.28) holding with equality, rules out the following: When we increase
debt in order to leave low enough resources to a future crisis to make the marginal
value of public good spending there high enough, the implied resources in a future
boom, τ2ω(pi2)− (1 + ρ)b1, become so small that αLVg[τ2ω(pi2)− (1 + ρ)b1] surpasses
2(1− θ) before (A.28) holds with equality. In that case, the term in square brackets
of (A.28) would jump from Γ to the marginal value of public good spending which is
at least 2(1− θ), which means that public goods would also be provided in a boom
and therefore the left-hand side would become smaller than the right-hand side of
(A.28). This corner case is ruled out in the following analysis.
Let us denote the objective function to be maximized (see equation (2.45)) as:
f(b1, τ2, pi2) = W (α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, b0, b1, 2(1− θ)) + EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1) (A.29)
The debt level b∗1 that maximizes (A.29) is implicitly defined by the FOC for debt
(A.28). Define g(τ2, pi2) ≡ f(b∗1, τ2, pi2). By the Envelope Theorem and plugging
in the first order condition for debt (A.28), we arrive at the following first order
conditions for future state capacities:
∂g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2
=δ {(1− φ)(ω(pi2)− ω(pi2))(Γ− 1) + ω(pi2) [2(1− θ)− 1]} (A.30)
− 2(1− θ)∂F (τ2 − τ1)
∂τ2
= 0
∂g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2
=δω′(pi2) [1 + τ2(2(1− θ)− 1)]− 2(1− θ)∂L(pi2 − pi1)
∂pi2
= 0 (A.31)
Now, suppose that given the optimal τ ∗2 and pi∗2, the optimal debt fulfills b∗1 > b¯.
For this constellation, we will end up in Scenario 2 in the second period if α2 = αH .
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Therefore, in EV I1 , i.e in equation (2.46), the terms W (αH , . . . ) are now given by
(2.44) while the terms W (αL, . . . ) are still given by (2.43). The first order condition
for debt b1 is:
max {2(1− θ), Vg[τ1ω1(pi1)− F (τ2 − τ1)− L(pi2 − pi1) + b1]} = −∂EV
I1(τ2, pi2, b1)
∂b1
(A.32)
It has the same structure as before, but EV I1 differs in the just described way. In
particular, since we assume that at the solution (τ ∗2 , pi∗2, b∗1), it is optimal in the first
period to provide transfers, the first term in the above equation evaluates to 2(1−θ).
Analogously to the case b∗1 < b¯, one can argue that the only possible configuration
such that the first order condition for debt holds with equality is the following: In
the second period, for the situation (αL, ω¯) we get transfers, while for (αH , ω) no
transfers are provided. The resulting first order condition for debt is:
φ
1− φ
∂P (∆)
∂∆ = 2(1− θ)− [(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γ<2(1−θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡N
(A.33)
As before, write equation (2.45) as:
f(b1, τ2, pi2) = W (α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, b0, b1, 2(1− θ)) + EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1) (A.34)
The debt level b∗1 that maximizes (A.34) is implicitly defined by (A.33), the FOC
with respect to debt. Define g(τ2, pi2) ≡ f(b∗1, τ2, pi2). By the Envelope Function
Theorem and plugging in the first order condition for debt (A.33), we obtain:
∂g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2
=δ {(1− φ)(ω(pi2)− ω(pi2))(Γ− 1) + ω(pi2) [2(1− θ)− 1]} (A.35)
− 2(1− θ)∂F (τ2 − τ1)
∂τ2
∂g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2
=δω′(pi2) [1 + τ2(2(1− θ)− 1)]− 2(1− θ)∂L(pi2 − pi1)
∂pi2
(A.36)
Note that (A.35) and (A.36) are exactly the same derivatives as in (A.30) and
(A.31), the first order conditions in the case b∗1 < b¯. So, the FOCs for state capacity
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investments are the same for b∗1 < b¯ and b∗1 > b¯.2
Having derived these relevant FOCs, we now turn to the proof:
Part 1: has been shown in the reasoning above.
Part 2: follows from the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity and the assumption
that τ2 ≥ τ1 does not bind.
Part 3: We have
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂pi2
= δ {ω′(pi2) [2(1− θ)− 1]} > 0 (A.37)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂φ
= −δ(ω(pi2)− ω(pi2))(Γ− 1)

> 0 if Γ < 1
< 0 if Γ > 1
(A.38)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂φ
= 0 (A.39)
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Part 1 of proposition 2.4.1, we are
done.
Part 4: We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂γ
= 2δ {(1− φ)(ω¯ − ω)[2θ − 1]} < 0 (A.40)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂γ
= 0 (A.41)
and ∂2g(τ2,pi2)
∂τ2∂pi2
as above. Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Part 1 of
proposition 2.4.1, we are done.
Part 5: From the FOCs for debt for both cases b∗1 > b¯ and b∗1 < b¯ it follows that
τ2ω(pi2)− (1 + ρ)b1 is decreasing in γ (note that ∆ = (1 +R(b))b− (τ2ω(pi2)− g¯) =
1
1−φ((1 + ρ)b1− (τ2ω(pi2)− g¯))), so δτ2(ω(pi2) + v)− b1 is decreasing in γ. Free future
revenues are given by FR = δE(τ2ω(pi2))− b1 = δτ2(φω(pi2) + (1− φ)ω(pi2))− b1 =
δτ2(ω(pi2) + v)− b1 + δτ2(1−φ)(v− v). Since τ2 is also decreasing in γ, we are done.
2The resulting FOCs for state capacity investments are the same for b∗1 = b¯. This is similar to
case (c) in the linear model and yields no new insights. In terms of the results in the proposition,
Part 7 becomes superfluous and only Part 8 has to be modified when including the case b∗1 = b¯. In
particular, the result for b∗1 = b¯ is analogous to the linear case: Debt and state capacity investments
move in the same direction in response to a change in γ.
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Part 6: From the FOCs for debt for both cases b∗1 > b¯ and b∗1 < b¯ it follows that
τ2ω(pi2) − (1 + ρ)b1 is increasing in φ. Part 6 follows form the comparative statics
for τ2 and pi2.
Part 7: We want to show that for θ → 1/2, b∗1 < b¯ is the case. For the FOCs for
debt, we had (A.28) for b∗1 < b¯:
2(1− θ) = φαHVg[τ2ω(pi2)− (1 + ρ)b1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>2(1−θ)
+(1− φ)[(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γ<2(1−θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS1
(A.42)
and (A.33) for b∗1 > b¯:
2(1− θ) = φ1− φ
∂P (∆)
∂∆ + [(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γ<2(1−θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS2
(A.43)
Since 2(1 − θ) θ→1/2→ 1 and RHS2 θ→1/2→ x ≥ φ1−φ ∂P (∆)∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
+ 1 > 1, we have that
2(1− θ) < RHS2 for θ → 1/2. So we cannot be in case b∗1 > b¯ and therefore have to
be in case b∗1 < b¯. 3
Part 8: From the FOCs for debt for both cases b∗1 > b¯ and b∗1 < b¯ it follows that
τ2ω(pi2)− (1 + ρ)b1 is decreasing in γ (note that ∆ = (1 +R(b))b− (τ2ω(pi2)− g¯) =
1
1−φ((1 + ρ)b1 − (τ2ω(pi2)− g¯))).
As we know, τ ∗2 and pi∗2 decrease with an increase in γ, thereby moving down
τ2ω(pi2) − (1 + ρ)b1. This implies that τ2ω(pi2) − (1 + ρ)b1 is adjusted in the right
direction, which makes it unclear if b∗1 also has to decrease or should increase in
order to make τ2ω(pi2)− (1 +ρ)b1 move down by the required amount. However, the
stronger τ ∗2 and pi∗2 decrease, the more likely that the induced decrease in τ2ω(pi2)−
(1 + ρ)b1 is already enough. Even more, if they decrease a lot, they could induce a
decrease in τ2ω(pi2)− (1 + ρ)b1 that is too high and b∗1 would then have to decrease.
Therefore, in the following, we investigate if the optimal values for the state capac-
ities react stronger to an increase in γ for higher γ. If this is the case, then we get
debt and state capacity investments to move in opposite directions in response to a
change in γ for high γ.
3This can also be directly shown: By assumption (2.38), we have that for each constellation
of parameters and optimal policies, RHS1 < RHS2. Moreover, for every θ = 1/2 −  with
 → 1/2 there exist optimal policies such that (A.42) holds with equality since Γ θ→1/2→ 1 and
αHVg[τ∗2ω(pi2)− (1 + ρ)b∗1] ∈ (2(1− θ), αHVg(g)].
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By the implicit function theorem, we get:
∂τ ∗2
∂γ
= 1
det(J)
−∂
2g(τ ∗2 , pi∗2)
∂pi22︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· ∂
2g(τ ∗2 , pi∗2)
∂τ2∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂
2g(τ ∗2 , pi∗2)
∂τ2∂pi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· ∂
2g(τ ∗2 , pi∗2)
∂pi2∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
 < 0 (A.44)
∂pi∗2
∂γ
= 1
det(J)
−∂
2g(τ ∗2 , pi∗2)
∂τ 22︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· ∂
2g(τ ∗2 , pi∗2)
∂pi2∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ ∂
2g(τ ∗2 , pi∗2)
∂τ2∂pi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· ∂
2g(τ ∗2 , pi∗2)
∂τ2∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 < 0 (A.45)
where det(J) denotes the determinant of the Hessian of g(τ ∗2 , pi∗2). By assuming
enough curvature in the cost functions (Fττ , Lpipi big enough), we can ensure that
det(J) > 0 and that the function g(τ2, pi2) is strictly concave.
Preferably, we would like to derive ∂
2τ∗2
∂γ2 and
∂2pi∗2
∂γ2 . However, the resulting formu-
las are intractable without additional assumptions. Therefore, we opt here for the
approach of considering first the individual terms in the equations and then deter-
mining if their interaction is likely to move ∂τ
∗
2
∂γ
and ∂pi
∗
2
∂γ
up. In the following, we
keep all other parameters except for γ constant.
1. ∂
2g(τ∗2 ,pi∗2)
∂τ22
= −2(1− θ)Fττ (τ ∗2 − τ1)
Assuming that ∂Fττ (·)
∂τ
is constant, this term does not change with γ.
2. ∂
2g(τ∗2 ,pi∗2)
∂pi22
= δω′′(pi∗2) {1 + τ ∗2 (2(1− θ)− 1)} − 2(1− θ)Lpipi(pi∗2 − pi1)
Assume that ∂Lpipi(·)
∂pi
and ∂ω′′(·)
∂pi
are constant. 4 Then we get:
∂2g(τ∗2 ,pi∗2)
∂pi22
∂γ
= δ
{
ω′′︸︷︷︸
<0
[2(1− θ)− 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂τ ∗2
∂γ︸︷︷︸
<0
}
> 0
3. ∂
2g(τ∗2 ,pi∗2)
∂τ2∂pi2
= δ {ω′(pi∗2) [2(1− θ)− 1]}
This expression increases with γ, since pi∗2 is decreasing with γ and ω(·) is
concave.
4. det(J) =
∣∣∣∣∣∂2g∂pi22
∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
↓
·
∣∣∣∣∣∂2g∂τ 22
∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
+
− [ ∂2g
∂τ2∂pi2
]2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
↓
The directional indicators refer to the reaction of the respective term to an
4Note that ω′′(pi2) = ω′′(pi2) = ω′′(pi2) follows from ω′(pi2) = ω′(pi2) = ω′(pi2). ω′′(pi2) < 0
follows from the concavity of ω(·).
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increase in γ. As can be seen, det(J) moves down in reaction to an increase
in γ.
With all these results, we can now go back to (A.44) and (A.45):
∂pi∗2
∂γ
= 1
det(J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
↑
(
∂2g(τ ∗2 , pi∗2)
∂τ2∂pi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
↑
· ∂
2g(τ ∗2 , pi∗2)
∂τ2∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
)
Thus, the reaction of legal capacity pi∗2 to an increase in γ unambiguously gets
stronger under the assumptions used in the preceding derivations. This is because
∂2g(τ∗2 ,pi∗2)
∂τ2∂γ
< 0 and therefore the increase in the first two (positive) factors makes the
whole (negative) expression ∂pi
∗
2
∂γ
more negative. Stated differently, ∂pi
∗
2
∂γ
goes up in
absolute value.
The reaction of fiscal capacity τ ∗2 to an increase in γ also unambiguously gets
stronger, as can be seen from the following:
∂
(
∂τ∗2
∂γ
)
∂γ
= − 1[∣∣∣ ∂2g
∂pi22
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣ ∂2g
∂τ22
∣∣∣− ( ∂2g∂τ2∂pi2)2
]2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
·
(
2
∣∣∣∣∣∂2g∂pi22
∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂2g∂τ2∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂2g
∂τ2∂pi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂
(
∂2g
∂τ2∂pi2
)
∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
[
−
∂
∣∣∣ ∂2g
∂pi22
∣∣∣
∂γ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂2g∂τ2∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
∂2g
∂τ2∂pi2
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)
< 0
Again, the whole (negative) expression ∂τ
∗
2
∂γ
gets more negative or stated differently
∂τ∗2
∂γ
goes up in absolute value. The reaction is stronger.
Therefore, we get indeed that for rising political instability γ, it is more likely that
debt and state capacity investments move in opposite directions in response to a
change in γ.
Q.E.D.
Proposition A.1.1. Suppose an economy in the quasi-linear model with sovereign
default starts in the first period with α1 = αL. Moreover, suppose that there are
enough resources to provide transfers in period 1 and that the constraint τ2 ≥ τ1 does
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bind. Furthermore, assume that the public good subutility function and the values
of αH and αL are such that the first order condition for debt holds with equality for
b∗1 6= b. For such b∗1 6= b, we get:5
1. If α2 = αL (α2 = αH), transfers (no transfers) will be provided in the second
period.
2. There is positive investment in legal capacity and zero investment in fiscal
capacity.
3. Investment in legal capacity is constant w.r.t. φ.
4. Investment in legal capacity is constant w.r.t. γ.
5. Lower γ leads to an increase of free future revenues.
6. Lower γ leads to a decrease of debt.
7. Higher φ leads to a decrease of debt.
8. For θ → 1/2, the probability that a country will end up in a situation with
sovereign default approaches 0.
Proof of proposition A.1.1:
Part 1: This proof is equivalent to the proof of Part 1 of proposition 2.5.1. Part
2, 3 and 4 follow from the FOC for legal capacity and the assumption that τ2 ≥ τ1
binds. Part 5 follows from the definition of free future revenues and the comparative
statics for b1, pi2 and the assumption that τ2 ≥ τ1 binds. Part 6 and 7 follow from
the FOC for debt, the comparative statics for pi2 and the assumption that τ2 ≥ τ1
binds. Part 8: This proof is equivalent to the proof of Part 7 of proposition 2.5.1.
Q.E.D.
5For b∗1 = b, parts 1-4 are the same, free future revenues are constant w.r.t. γ (cf. Part 5), debt
is constant w.r.t. γ and φ (cf. Part 6 and 7) and Part 8 becomes superfluous.
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A.2 Variable Descriptions and Additional Figures
A. Variable Descriptions
Share of taxes in GDP is the variable "taxrevenuegdp99" of Besley and Persson
(2011): "The ratio of total tax revenue to GDP in 1999. This is directly taken from
Baunsgaard and Keen (2005)."6
Shadow economy is the variabel "minform" of Besley and Persson (2011): "This
is the original variable (Informal Economy in % of GNP 1999/2000) from Schneider
(2002)."7
Property Rights Protection Index is the variable "mgadp97" of Besley and
Persson (2011): "This variable tries to measure the extent of government antidiver-
sion policies. It is calculated as an average of indexes of ‘law and order’, ‘bureau-
cratic quality’, ‘corruption’, ‘risk of expropriation’ and ‘government repudiation of
contracts’ from ICRG dataset in 1997 (International Country Risk Guide, The PRS
Group (1980-present))."8
Cohesiveness is the variable "mxconst00" of Besley and Persson (2011): "Average
executive constraints up to 2000. This measures the average value of the variable
xconst (from Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010)) from 1800 (or inde-
pendence date if later) up to 2000. The average is taken over non missing values
of xconst (values outside [1, 7] are treated as missing). This variable is normalized
so that each country’s scores lie between 0 and 1 (subtract 1 and divide by 6 as
the possible range for the average score is from 1 to 7). This variable captures the
parameter θ in the model."9
Political Stability is the variable "mgamma00" of Besley and Persson (2011):
"Average non-open executive recruitment up to 2000. This measures average values
of the sum of xropen and xrcomp variables in Polity IV dataset (Marshall and
6Variable description is taken from the codebook of Besley and Persson (2011). The codebook
and the data are available at http://www-2.iies.su.se/pop/Data_1.html.
7Variable description is taken from the codebook of Besley and Persson (2011). The codebook
and the data are available at http://www-2.iies.su.se/pop/Data_1.html.
8Variable description is taken from the codebook of Besley and Persson (2011). The codebook
and the data are available at http://www-2.iies.su.se/pop/Data_1.html.
9Variable description is taken from the codebook of Besley and Persson (2011). The codebook
and the data are available at http://www-2.iies.su.se/pop/Data_1.html.
A.2. VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND ADDITIONAL FIGURES 147
Jaggers, 2010) from 1800 (or independence if later) to 2000. Note that the average
is taken when both xropen and xrcomp are not missing (we treat xropen and xrcomp
as missing if they are less than one). The sum of xropen and xrcomp takes values
between 2 and 7 in any given year so in order to normalize the average we subtract
2 and divide by 5. To get a measure of political stability this average is inverted
(multiplied by minus one and add with one). This variable corresponds to the
parameter 1− γ in the model."10
Debt to GDP is the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2000, taken from Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009). It measures the central government debt-to-GDP ratio. For 8 countries,
this measure is not available and we use the general government debt-to-GDP ratio
instead.11
10Variable description is taken from the codebook of Besley and Persson (2011). The codebook
and the data are available at http://www-2.iies.su.se/pop/Data_1.html.
11The data is available at http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/data/browse-by-topic/
topics/9/.
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B. Additional Figures
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Figure A.1: Country names of Figure 2.2
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Figure A.2: Country names of Figure 2.3
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Figure A.3: Country names of Figure 2.4
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Figure A.4: Country names of Figure 2.5
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Correlations with debt:
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Figure A.5: Cross-country correlation between fiscal capacity and public debt (ex-
cluding countries with high cohesiveness). Correlation 0.2152; p-value 0.2145
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Pr
op
er
ty
 R
ig
ht
s 
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
In
de
x
0 50 100 150
Debt to GDP
Countries Low/Medium cohesiveness 
Fitted values
Figure A.6: Cross-country correlation between legal capacity and public debt (ex-
cluding countries with high cohesiveness). Correlation -0.2002; p-value 0.2282
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Figure A.7: Cross-country correlation between fiscal capacity and public debt (ex-
cluding countries with high cohesiveness). Correlation 0.0416; p-value 0.8040
Further figures:
Figure A.8: This figure is the corresponding one to Figure 2.1 for the model without
debt and is derived from equations 3.4 and 3.5 on p.111 in Besley and Persson
(2011).
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Additional Tables and Figures
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
D
en
si
ty
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Overall compliance rate per subject
Figure B.1: Histogram of the overall compliance rate per subject, i.e. the average
compliance rate across all rounds per subject
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Table B.1: Estimation results for Compliance rate
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
Tobit(0) Tobit(0/1) Tobit(0) Tobit(0) 1-30
Income -0.0030∗∗∗ -0.0106∗∗∗ -0.0030∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0022) (0.0006) (0.0007)
High audit rate -0.0202 -0.0315 -0.0202 -0.0364∗
(0.0157) (0.0519) (0.0157) (0.0215)
High audit rate * currInf 0.5480∗∗∗ 1.5899∗∗∗ 0.5480∗∗∗ 0.5561∗∗∗
(0.0659) (0.2586) (0.0659) (0.0725)
Lag high audit rate -0.0277 -0.0690 -0.0277 -0.0208
(0.0192) (0.0629) (0.0192) (0.0328)
Lag high audit rate * pastInf 0.2927∗∗∗ 0.9057∗∗∗ 0.2927∗∗∗ 0.2055∗∗∗
(0.0606) (0.2140) (0.0606) (0.0714)
Lag high audit rate * currInf -0.1083∗∗∗ -0.3240∗∗∗ -0.1083∗∗∗ -0.1075∗∗
(0.0342) (0.1045) (0.0342) (0.0494)
Amnesty 0.0130 0.0751 -0.0715∗∗ -0.2482∗∗
(0.0220) (0.0727) (0.0337) (0.1081)
Amnesty * currInf -0.0845∗∗ -0.2918∗∗
(0.0422) (0.1272)
Amnesty * pastInf -0.0571 -0.1756 0.0274 0.2083
(0.0419) (0.1321) (0.0479) (0.1470)
Amnesty * noInf 0.0845∗∗ 0.1758
(0.0422) (0.1374)
Amnesty first half -0.1104∗ -0.2619 -0.1104∗
(0.0620) (0.2135) (0.0620)
Age 0.0078 0.0352 0.0078 0.0075
(0.0073) (0.0290) (0.0073) (0.0067)
Male -0.1304∗∗ -0.3923∗∗ -0.1304∗∗ -0.1208∗∗
(0.0586) (0.1928) (0.0586) (0.0547)
Prepared own tax return -0.0036 -0.1231 -0.0036 0.0012
(0.0755) (0.2143) (0.0755) (0.0713)
Risk aversion 0.0515∗∗∗ 0.1503∗∗ 0.0515∗∗∗ 0.0358∗∗
(0.0174) (0.0595) (0.0174) (0.0156)
Lag vol. disclosure -0.1794∗∗ -0.5959∗∗ -0.1794∗∗ -0.2666∗∗
(0.0872) (0.2387) (0.0872) (0.1301)
Lag vol. disclosure * currInf 0.1874∗ 0.6014∗∗ 0.1874∗ 0.2334
(0.1065) (0.3049) (0.1065) (0.1696)
Lag vol. disclosure * pastInf 0.1988 0.5793 0.1988 0.0710
(0.1213) (0.3625) (0.1213) (0.4305)
Lag audit -0.1706∗∗∗ -0.5096∗∗∗ -0.1706∗∗∗ -0.1000∗
(0.0510) (0.1563) (0.0510) (0.0537)
Lag audit * currInf 0.1078 0.3414 0.1078 0.0654
(0.0714) (0.2216) (0.0714) (0.0868)
Lag audit * pastInf 0.0359 0.0943 0.0359 0.0230
(0.0598) (0.1861) (0.0598) (0.0612)
Round -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0053∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0008) (0.0022)
Round * currInf 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0012
(0.0012) (0.0035) (0.0012) (0.0028)
Round * pastInf -0.0028∗∗ -0.0082∗∗ -0.0028∗∗ 0.0012
(0.0012) (0.0040) (0.0012) (0.0030)
currInf -0.4647∗∗∗ -1.2062∗∗∗ -0.4647∗∗∗ -0.4039∗∗∗
(0.0773) (0.2508) (0.0773) (0.0806)
pastInf -0.0925 -0.1494 -0.0925 -0.1582∗
(0.0674) (0.2504) (0.0674) (0.0919)
Constant 0.6977∗∗∗ 1.1148 0.6977∗∗∗ 0.8135∗∗∗
(0.1919) (0.7287) (0.1919) (0.1771)
N 7080 7080 7080 3480
Subjects 120 120 120 120
Log-Likelihood -3996.105 -5082.827 -3996.105 -1985.169
The dependent variable is the compliance rate (declared income over true
income) per subject and round. Cluster-robust standard errors (subject level,
for Tobit estimations obtained via bootstrapping with 100 replications) are
provided in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level. Tobit(0) treats 0 as censored data while Tobit(0/1) treats 0 and 1
as censored.
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Table B.2: Estimation results for Full compliance
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Probit Probit Probit 1-30
Income -0.0158∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗∗ -0.0151∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0026)
High audit rate 0.0526 0.0526 0.0370
(0.0530) (0.0530) (0.0827)
High audit rate * currInf 1.6988∗∗∗ 1.6988∗∗∗ 1.7021∗∗∗
(0.2166) (0.2166) (0.2315)
Lag high audit rate -0.0403 -0.0403 0.0159
(0.0872) (0.0872) (0.1241)
Lag high audit rate * pastInf 1.0306∗∗∗ 1.0306∗∗∗ 0.7570∗∗∗
(0.1950) (0.1950) (0.2347)
Lag high audit rate * currInf -0.3548∗∗ -0.3548∗∗ -0.3927∗∗
(0.1392) (0.1392) (0.1903)
Amnesty 0.1220 -0.2679∗∗ -0.7735∗∗∗
(0.0882) (0.1293) (0.2977)
Amnesty * currInf -0.3899∗∗
(0.1565)
Amnesty * pastInf -0.1820 0.2079 0.5128
(0.1598) (0.1857) (0.5133)
Amnesty * noInf 0.3899∗∗ 0.5048
(0.1565) (0.4889)
Amnesty first half -0.4358∗ -0.4358∗
(0.2436) (0.2436)
Age 0.0413 0.0413 0.0478
(0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0347)
Male -0.2078 -0.2078 -0.0990
(0.2386) (0.2386) (0.2247)
Prepared own tax return -0.1868 -0.1868 -0.1293
(0.2436) (0.2436) (0.2226)
Risk aversion 0.1358∗∗ 0.1358∗∗ 0.0888
(0.0676) (0.0676) (0.0632)
Lag vol. disclosure -0.6650∗∗∗ -0.6650∗∗∗ -0.7147∗
(0.2414) (0.2414) (0.4073)
Lag vol. disclosure * currInf 0.6116∗ 0.6116∗ 0.9130
(0.3621) (0.3621) (0.6098)
Lag vol. disclosure * pastInf 0.5652 0.5652 0.0647
(0.3634) (0.3634) (0.7424)
Lag audit -0.4555∗∗ -0.4555∗∗ -0.2754
(0.1888) (0.1888) (0.1951)
Lag audit * currInf 0.3049 0.3049 0.1529
(0.2348) (0.2348) (0.2674)
Lag audit * pastInf 0.0331 0.0331 0.0049
(0.2574) (0.2574) (0.2741)
Round 0.0018 0.0018 -0.0083
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0082)
Round * currInf 0.0014 0.0014 0.0101
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0110)
Round * pastInf -0.0062 -0.0062 -0.0024
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0111)
currInf -1.0973∗∗∗ -1.0973∗∗∗ -1.1087∗∗∗
(0.3157) (0.3157) (0.3183)
pastInf -0.1651 -0.1651 -0.2053
(0.3393) (0.3393) (0.3520)
Constant 0.3524 0.3524 0.4322
(0.8375) (0.8375) (0.8080)
N 7080 7080 3480
Subjects 120 120 120
Log-Likelihood -3085.246 -3085.246 -1650.626
The dependent variable is Full compliance (1 or 0) per subject and round.
Cluster-robust standard errors (subject level) are provided in parentheses.
***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table B.3: Estimation results for Full compliance
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Logit Logit Logit 1-30
Income -0.0283∗∗∗ -0.0283∗∗∗ -0.0268∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0044)
High audit rate 0.0976 0.0976 0.0710
(0.0902) (0.0902) (0.1454)
High audit rate * currInf 3.0147∗∗∗ 3.0147∗∗∗ 3.0591∗∗∗
(0.4130) (0.4130) (0.4363)
Lag high audit rate -0.0836 -0.0836 0.0098
(0.1486) (0.1486) (0.2197)
Lag high audit rate * pastInf 1.8601∗∗∗ 1.8601∗∗∗ 1.3666∗∗∗
(0.3493) (0.3493) (0.4126)
Lag high audit rate * currInf -0.6361∗∗ -0.6361∗∗ -0.6819∗
(0.2494) (0.2494) (0.3499)
Amnesty 0.1998 -0.4705∗∗ -1.3717∗∗
(0.1537) (0.2262) (0.5486)
Amnesty * currInf -0.6702∗∗
(0.2736)
Amnesty * pastInf -0.3051 0.3652 0.9179
(0.2797) (0.3254) (0.9202)
Amnesty * noInf 0.6702∗∗ 0.9076
(0.2736) (0.8810)
Amnesty first half -0.7836∗ -0.7836∗
(0.4407) (0.4407)
Age 0.0765 0.0765 0.0880
(0.0649) (0.0649) (0.0627)
Male -0.3847 -0.3847 -0.1701
(0.4331) (0.4331) (0.4009)
Prepared own tax return -0.3208 -0.3208 -0.2177
(0.4422) (0.4422) (0.3975)
Risk aversion 0.2384∗ 0.2384∗ 0.1540
(0.1217) (0.1217) (0.1132)
Lag vol. disclosure -1.1782∗∗∗ -1.1782∗∗∗ -1.2809∗
(0.4141) (0.4141) (0.7257)
Lag vol. disclosure * currInf 1.0732∗ 1.0732∗ 1.6348
(0.6167) (0.6167) (1.0718)
Lag vol. disclosure * pastInf 1.0038 1.0038 0.1465
(0.6248) (0.6248) (1.2870)
Lag audit -0.8139∗∗ -0.8139∗∗ -0.4585
(0.3290) (0.3290) (0.3411)
Lag audit * currInf 0.4864 0.4864 0.1858
(0.4052) (0.4052) (0.4555)
Lag audit * pastInf 0.0116 0.0116 -0.0363
(0.4494) (0.4494) (0.4869)
Round 0.0025 0.0025 -0.0141
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0142)
Round * currInf 0.0036 0.0036 0.0172
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0191)
Round * pastInf -0.0098 -0.0098 -0.0055
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0193)
currInf -1.9942∗∗∗ -1.9942∗∗∗ -1.9662∗∗∗
(0.5786) (0.5786) (0.5820)
pastInf -0.3026 -0.3026 -0.3206
(0.6123) (0.6123) (0.6317)
Constant 0.6343 0.6343 0.6858
(1.5185) (1.5185) (1.4490)
N 7080 7080 3480
Subjects 120 120 120
Log-Likelihood -3075.539 -3075.539 -1644.768
The dependent variable is Full compliance (1 or 0) per subject and round.
Cluster-robust standard errors (subject level) are provided in parentheses.
***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table B.4: Estimation results for Full compliance
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Linear probability Linear probability Linear probability 1-30
Income -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0038∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
High audit rate 0.0119 0.0119 0.0093
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0204)
High audit rate * currInf 0.4339∗∗∗ 0.4339∗∗∗ 0.4504∗∗∗
(0.0486) (0.0486) (0.0525)
Lag high audit rate -0.0110 -0.0110 0.0020
(0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0322)
Lag high audit rate * pastInf 0.2411∗∗∗ 0.2411∗∗∗ 0.1858∗∗∗
(0.0486) (0.0486) (0.0601)
Lag high audit rate * currInf -0.0814∗∗∗ -0.0814∗∗∗ -0.0857∗
(0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0455)
Amnesty 0.0294 -0.0562∗ -0.1811∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0309) (0.0743)
Amnesty * currInf -0.0856∗∗
(0.0377)
Amnesty * pastInf -0.0491 0.0364 0.0956
(0.0368) (0.0428) (0.1233)
Amnesty * noInf 0.0856∗∗ 0.0899
(0.0377) (0.1223)
Amnesty first half -0.1164∗∗ -0.1164∗∗
(0.0552) (0.0552)
Age 0.0106 0.0106 0.0108
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0073)
Male -0.0362 -0.0362 -0.0101
(0.0556) (0.0556) (0.0556)
Prepared own tax return -0.0484 -0.0484 -0.0299
(0.0588) (0.0588) (0.0572)
Risk aversion 0.0328∗∗ 0.0328∗∗ 0.0224
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0152)
Lag vol. disclosure -0.1764∗∗ -0.1764∗∗ -0.1549
(0.0739) (0.0739) (0.1111)
Lag vol. disclosure * currInf 0.1771∗ 0.1771∗ 0.2107
(0.0997) (0.0997) (0.1571)
Lag vol. disclosure * pastInf 0.1776∗ 0.1776∗ 0.0022
(0.1000) (0.1000) (0.1869)
Lag audit -0.1138∗∗ -0.1138∗∗ -0.0661
(0.0491) (0.0491) (0.0511)
Lag audit * currInf 0.0720 0.0720 0.0265
(0.0598) (0.0598) (0.0671)
Lag audit * pastInf 0.0188 0.0188 0.0053
(0.0633) (0.0633) (0.0691)
Round 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0022
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0020)
Round * currInf 0.0007 0.0007 0.0025
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0026)
Round * pastInf -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0000
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0027)
currInf -0.2979∗∗∗ -0.2979∗∗∗ -0.3216∗∗∗
(0.0780) (0.0780) (0.0844)
pastInf -0.0815 -0.0815 -0.1041
(0.0835) (0.0835) (0.0883)
Constant 0.5629∗∗∗ 0.5629∗∗∗ 0.6467∗∗∗
(0.1810) (0.1810) (0.1793)
N 7080 7080 3480
Subjects 120 120 120
R2 overall 0.1348 0.1348 0.1215
The dependent variable is Full compliance (1 or 0) per subject and round.
Cluster-robust standard errors (subject level) are provided in parentheses.
***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table B.5: Estimation results for Compliance rate
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
fractional GLM fractional GLM fractional GLM 1-30
Income -0.0135∗∗∗ -0.0135∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0032)
High audit rate -0.0848 -0.0848 -0.1402
(0.0711) (0.0711) (0.1025)
High audit rate * currInf 2.1158∗∗∗ 2.1158∗∗∗ 2.1783∗∗∗
(0.2457) (0.2457) (0.2694)
Lag high audit rate -0.1404 -0.1404 -0.1124
(0.1214) (0.1214) (0.1903)
Lag high audit rate * pastInf 1.3319∗∗∗ 1.3319∗∗∗ 1.0608∗∗∗
(0.2833) (0.2833) (0.3500)
Lag high audit rate * currInf -0.3273∗ -0.3273∗ -0.2871
(0.1706) (0.1706) (0.2548)
Amnesty 0.0567 -0.2436∗ -0.8093∗∗
(0.1216) (0.1295) (0.3825)
Amnesty * currInf -0.3003∗
(0.1795)
Amnesty * pastInf -0.2716 0.0287 0.4552
(0.1879) (0.1926) (0.5439)
Amnesty * noInf 0.3003∗ 0.4534
(0.1795) (0.5022)
Amnesty first half -0.4305∗ -0.4305∗
(0.2282) (0.2282)
Age 0.0436 0.0436 0.0460
(0.0327) (0.0327) (0.0319)
Male -0.4544∗ -0.4544∗ -0.4271∗
(0.2370) (0.2370) (0.2232)
Prepared own tax return -0.1064 -0.1064 -0.0431
(0.2901) (0.2901) (0.2857)
Risk aversion 0.1959∗∗∗ 0.1959∗∗∗ 0.1320∗∗
(0.0656) (0.0656) (0.0615)
Lag vol. disclosure -0.5239 -0.5239 -0.6169
(0.4631) (0.4631) (0.6425)
Lag vol. disclosure * currInf 0.4321 0.4321 0.5421
(0.6064) (0.6064) (0.8560)
Lag vol. disclosure * pastInf 1.1309 1.1309 1.2194
(0.8333) (0.8333) (1.2724)
Lag audit -0.5854∗∗ -0.5854∗∗ -0.3606
(0.2478) (0.2478) (0.2598)
Lag audit * currInf 0.4124 0.4124 0.1523
(0.3029) (0.3029) (0.3383)
Lag audit * pastInf -0.0295 -0.0295 -0.0303
(0.3114) (0.3114) (0.3263)
Round -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0270∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0110)
Round * currInf 0.0042 0.0042 0.0150
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0133)
Round * pastInf -0.0107∗ -0.0107∗ 0.0089
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0142)
currInf -1.7154∗∗∗ -1.7154∗∗∗ -1.7725∗∗∗
(0.2964) (0.2964) (0.3154)
pastInf -0.3897 -0.3897 -0.7414∗
(0.3350) (0.3350) (0.3969)
Constant 1.0365 1.0365 1.5331∗∗
(0.8040) (0.8040) (0.7501)
N 7080 7080 3480
Subjects 120 120 120
Log-Likelihood -3595.247 -3595.247 -1734.253
The dependent variable is the compliance rate (declared income over true
income) per subject and round (values above 1 are treated as 1 in these esti-
mations). Cluster-robust standard errors (subject level) are provided in paren-
theses. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table B.6: Estimation results for Compliance rate
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
GLS currInf GLS pastInf GLS noInf
Income -0.0029∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗ -0.0029∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008)
High audit rate 0.3991∗∗∗ 0.0064 -0.0397∗∗
(0.0416) (0.0163) (0.0172)
Lag high audit rate -0.0969∗∗∗ 0.2037∗∗∗ -0.0121
(0.0197) (0.0409) (0.0198)
Amnesty -0.0498∗∗ -0.0336 0.0124
(0.0251) (0.0250) (0.0184)
Amnesty first half -0.1278 -0.0251 -0.0827
(0.0783) (0.0816) (0.0580)
Age 0.0070 0.0122 0.0048
(0.0114) (0.0076) (0.0062)
Male -0.0801 -0.0710 -0.0895
(0.0950) (0.0765) (0.0585)
Prepared own tax return 0.0865 -0.0878 -0.0613
(0.1014) (0.1157) (0.0653)
Risk aversion 0.0558∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗ 0.0153
(0.0212) (0.0203) (0.0179)
Lag vol. disclosure 0.0102 0.0049 -0.1583∗∗
(0.0553) (0.0650) (0.0807)
Lag audit -0.0451 -0.1129∗∗∗ -0.1383∗∗∗
(0.0317) (0.0311) (0.0458)
Round 0.0002 -0.0027∗∗∗ -0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Constant 0.3057 0.4587∗∗ 0.9641∗∗∗
(0.2635) (0.2316) (0.1527)
N 2360 2360 2360
Subjects 40 40 40
R2 overall 0.2583 0.1211 0.0735
The dependent variable is the compliance rate (declared income over true
income) per subject and round. Cluster-robust standard errors (subject level)
are provided in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
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Table B.7: Estimation results for Number of voluntary disclosures
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Poisson Poisson Poisson
currInf 0.5280∗ 0.5062∗ 0.4677
(0.2887) (0.2883) (0.2860)
Mean auditrate 14.2334∗∗∗
(4.7963)
Log mean auditrate 1.4656∗∗∗
(0.5021)
Log jumps 1.0463∗∗∗
(0.3683)
Amnesty first half 0.2690 0.2615 0.1566
(0.2907) (0.2863) (0.2620)
Age -0.0549 -0.0532 -0.0586
(0.0431) (0.0423) (0.0448)
Male 0.3309 0.3170 0.2676
(0.3456) (0.3418) (0.3112)
Prepared own tax return 0.1759 0.1641 0.2406
(0.4022) (0.3991) (0.4056)
Risk aversion -0.1581∗∗ -0.1558∗∗ -0.1475∗∗
(0.0756) (0.0747) (0.0654)
Constant 0.1784 4.9990∗∗∗ 0.4936
(1.1196) (1.8773) (1.0205)
N 80 80 79
Subjects 80 80 79
pseudo R2 0.1372 0.1399 0.1427
Log-Likelihood -118.946 -118.5771 -117.101
The dependent variable are the number of voluntary disclosures per subject. The
sample comprises the treatments currInf and pastInf. Robust standard errors are
provided in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level.
Table B.8: Voluntary disclosures by income (noInf treatment)
Income Number of voluntary disclosures Number of voluntary disclosures
without the two outliers (cf. Figure 3.4c))
60 12 4
70 9 7
80 7 6
90 7 5
100 10 6
total 45 28
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Table B.9: Estimation results for Revenue share (excluding round 30-33)
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6
currInf currInf pastInf pastInf noInf noInf
(GLS) (OLS-FE) (GLS) (OLS-FE) (GLS) (OLS-FE)
Mean auditrate 0.8009∗∗∗ 0.5838 0.6755∗∗∗ 0.7027∗∗∗ 0.2589∗ 0.1190
(0.2941) (0.3590) (0.1520) (0.1759) (0.1408) (0.1440)
Amnesty 0.0093 0.0130 -0.0018 -0.0018 0.0030 0.0016
(0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0055) (0.0053)
Constant 0.1216∗∗∗ 0.1403∗∗∗ 0.1582∗∗∗ 0.1556∗∗∗ 0.2075∗∗∗ 0.2205∗∗∗
(0.0290) (0.0323) (0.0155) (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0127)
N 80 80 80 80 80 80
Subjects 40 40 40 40 40 40
R2 overall (FE: within) 0.1824 0.1832 0.1540 0.2398 0.0752 0.0164
The dependent variable is the revenue share (total taxes, penalties and amnesty payments over to-
tal income) per subject, separately calculated for rounds with and without permanent tax amnesty.
Cluster-robust standard errors (subject level) are provided in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
B.2 Instructions
The original instructions are written in German. In the following, you will find an
English translation. The parts which are specific to the treatments are surrounded
by square brackets, i.e. [currInf: ...], [pastInf: ...], [noInf: ...].
A. Instructions for sessions with the permanent tax amnesty during the
second half of the experiment:
Welcome to this experiment! Please read the following instructions carefully. Your
final payoff depends among others on how well you have understood these instruc-
tions. You can ask questions at any time, just raise your hand. But please do not
talk anymore to the other participants of the experiment.
Overview
You participate in a study about "taxes". Each of you has the role of a taxpayer who
receives an income in each round and has to pay taxes on it. In each round, there
is a probability of being selected for a tax audit. In this case, your tax declarations
of the current round and the three previous rounds are investigated. If you have
evaded taxes in these rounds, you have to pay the evaded taxes plus a penalty.
Concrete procedure
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The experiment consists of several rounds. After some rounds, there can be
changes. In this case, you are provided with additional instructions. The num-
ber of rounds that will be examined in case of a tax audit and the penalty fee for
discovered evaded taxes will, however, not change at all. The number of rounds of
the experiment is unknown to you, the duration of the experiment is, however, at
most 1.5 hours. Before each round the computer will randomly assign an income
of 60, 70, 80, 90 or 100 points to you. Each income is equally likely. Each round
proceeds as follows:
Phase 1: (Tax Declaration)
Your income of the current round is displayed. You will also see the form of your tax
declaration, in which you are asked for your income. You can enter values greater
than or equal to 0. Your stated income is then taxed at a tax rate of 25%. (If you
state more than your actual income, you pay more taxes than required. However,
you cannot redeem evaded taxes from other rounds in this way.) In the following,
you see the screen which is displayed during Phase 1. On the top right, you will see
the time that you have for your decision. When the time has expired and you have
not decided yet (i.e. you have not submitted your tax declaration in time by clicking
OK ), you will be immediately selected for a tax audit and your current income is
considered as completely evaded. Otherwise, tax audits are purely random, i.e. the
tax audits are independent of your decisions as well as of the outcome of past tax
audits. The probability of a tax audit is greater than 0% and less than 100 %. A
probability of X % means that, on average, X from 100 tax returns are selected for
a tax audit.
[currInf: The probability of a tax audit in the current round is displayed.]
[pastInf: The probability of a tax audit in the current round is unknown to you,
however, the probability which existed in the previous round is displayed.]
[noInf: The probability of a tax audit in the current round is unknown to you.]
The probability of a tax audit can vary over the rounds between two values. Start-
ing from the default value (= value in round 1), the probability of a jump at the
transition to the next round is 15%, i.e. on average in 15 of 100 cases in which the
probability of a tax audit is at the default value, there is a jump to a higher value
for the next round. This probability of a jump to the higher value is independent of
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how many rounds the default value was already in force. If there is a jump to the
higher value, the probability of a tax audit remains for a length of 1-5 rounds (each
equally probable, so on average 3 rounds) on the higher value, before it falls back
to the default value.
Phase 2a: (Tax Audit)
You are informed whether you have been selected by the computer for a tax audit.
If so, you have to pay the evaded taxes of the current round and the three previous
rounds. In addition, a penalty will be charged. This is the sum of evaded taxes. So,
in the event of a tax audit you have to pay twice the evaded taxes of the current
and the three previous rounds.
Phase 2b: (Result)
A summary of the current round is displayed, with the total income at the end. This
is composed as follows:
Total income = income at the beginning of the round
- taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration
- If applicable, subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round
- If applicable, subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds
- If applicable, penalty fees
Note:
During the experiment, the following additional information are available:
- Your evaded taxes of the three previous rounds
[currInf: - The probability of a tax audit in the current round]
[pastInf: - The probability of a tax audit which existed in the previous round]
Payments
At the end of the experiment you will be paid individually and confidentially. Your
payoff is the sum of the total incomes from the individual rounds (see Phase 2b).
The points are converted as follows: 3.5 points = 1 eurocent. The taxes and penalty
fees, if applicable, paid by you are also converted into euros and are transferred
after the experiment to the account of Bundeskasse and flow into the federal budget
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of the Federal Republic of Germany. At the end of the experiment, you have the
option to enter your email address to receive a copy of the deposit slip.
Examples
Situation 1: Income in the current round is 100 points. In the tax declaration,
100 is stated as income. No tax evasion in the three previous rounds. Tax audit
occurs.
Taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration = 100 * 0.25 = 25
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = 0
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = 0
Penalty fees = 0
Total income = 100 -25 -0 -0 -0 = 75
Situation 2: Income in the current round is 100 points. In the tax declaration,
50 is stated as income. In the three previous rounds evaded taxes are 30 in total.
Tax audit does not occur.
Taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration = 50 * 0.25 = 12.5
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = 0
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = 0
Penalty fees = 0
Total income =100 -12.5 -0 -0 -0 = 87.5
Situation 3: Income in the current round is 100 points. In the tax declaration, 60
is stated as income. In the previous round, evaded taxes are 20, in the round before
10 and in the round before 5. Tax audit occurs.
Taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration = 60 * 0.25 = 15
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = 40*0.25 = 10
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = 20+10+5= 35
Penalty fees = 10+35=45
Total income =100 -15-10-35-45 = -5
Further procedure
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If you have read the instructions, please work on the further situations in the
following. Of course, you can always ask questions. When all participants have
answered these correctly, the actual experiment starts.
Please edit!
Situation 1: Income in the current round is 80 points. In the tax declaration, 80
is stated as income. No tax evasion in the three previous rounds. Tax audit occurs.
Taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration =...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round =...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds =...
Penalty fees =...
Total income =...
Situation 2: Income in the current round is 80 points. In the tax declaration, 40
is stated as income. In the three previous rounds evaded taxes are 30 in total. Tax
audit does not occur.
Taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration =...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round =...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds =...
Penalty fees =...
Total income =...
Situation 3: Income in the current round is 80 points. In the tax declaration, 0
is stated as income. In the previous round, evaded taxes are 5, in the round before
10 and in the round before 5. Tax audit occurs.
Taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration =...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round =...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds =...
Penalty fees =...
Total income =...
Instructions II [distributed after round 30]
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For the further course of the experiment there is a change in the instructions: From
now on there is in every round the option of a voluntary disclosure, i.e. to admit tax
evasion. This results in an additional phase at the beginning of each round:
Phase 0: (Voluntary disclosure)
Your income of the current round is displayed. You have the possibility to opt for
a voluntary disclosure, i.e. to admit tax evasion (this option exists regardless of
whether you actually have evaded taxes or not). If you have evaded taxes in the
previous rounds and opt for the voluntary disclosure, your income of the current
round is fully taxed and you have to pay the evaded taxes of the three previous
rounds - but no penalty - and you arrive directly at phase 2b. In the event of a
future tax audit, the redeemed taxes are treated as if they had been correctly paid,
i.e. you will not receive punishment for these. If you do not opt for a voluntary
disclosure, you get to phase 1. Below you can see the screen that is displayed during
Phase 0. If you want to choose the voluntary disclosure, you must check the box
(click into the white box) and then click OK. The time that you have for your
decision will be shown. When the time has expired and you have not yet decided -
i.e. you have not yet clicked OK - you also get to phase 1.
Everything else remains as described in the previous instructions.
Example
Situation 4: Income in the current round is 100 points. Voluntary disclosure is
chosen. In the previous round, evaded taxes are 20, in the round before 10 and in
the round before 5. (Note: corresponds to situation 3 of the examples so far, only
with voluntary disclosure instead of further tax evasion)
Taxes of the current round according to the voluntary disclosure = 100 * 0.25 = 25
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = 0
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = 20+10+5= 35
Penalty fees = 0
Total income =100 -25-0-35-0 = 40
Please edit!
Situation 4: Income in the current round is 80 points. Voluntary disclosure is
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chosen. In the previous round, evaded taxes are 5, in the round before 10 and in
the round before 5. (Note: corresponds to situation 3 of the examples so far, only
with voluntary disclosure instead of further tax evasion)
Taxes of the current round according to the voluntary disclosure = ...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = ...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = ...
Penalty fees = ...
Total income = ...
B. Instructions for sessions with the permanent tax amnesty during the
first half of the experiment:
Welcome to this experiment! Please read the following instructions carefully. Your
final payoff depends among others on how well you have understood these instruc-
tions. You can ask questions at any time, just raise your hand. But please do not
talk anymore to the other participants of the experiment.
Overview
You participate in a study about "taxes". Each of you has the role of a taxpayer who
receives an income in each round and has to pay taxes on it. In each round, there
is a probability of being selected for a tax audit. In this case, your tax declarations
of the current round and the three previous rounds are investigated. If you have
evaded taxes in these rounds, you have to pay the evaded taxes plus a penalty.
However, in every round you can opt for a voluntary disclosure, i.e. to admit tax. If
you have evaded taxes in the previous rounds and opt for the voluntary disclosure,
your income of the current round is fully taxed and you have to pay the evaded
taxes of the three previous rounds - but no penalty. In the event of a future tax
audit, the redeemed taxes are treated as if they had been correctly paid, i.e. you
will not receive punishment for these.
Concrete procedure
The experiment consists of several rounds. After some rounds, there can be
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changes. In this case, you are provided with additional instructions. The num-
ber of rounds that will be examined in case of a tax audit and the penalty fee for
discovered evaded taxes will, however, not change at all. The number of rounds of
the experiment is unknown to you, the duration of the experiment is, however, at
most 1.5 hours. Before each round the computer will randomly assign an income
of 60, 70, 80, 90 or 100 points to you. Each income is equally likely. Each round
proceeds as follows:
Phase 0: (Voluntary disclosure)
Your income of the current round is displayed. You have the possibility to opt for
a voluntary disclosure, i.e. to admit tax evasion (this option exists regardless of
whether you actually have evaded taxes or not). If you have evaded taxes in the
previous rounds and opt for the voluntary disclosure, your income of the current
round is fully taxed and you have to pay the evaded taxes of the three previous
rounds - but no penalty - and you arrive directly at phase 2b. In the event of a
future tax audit, the redeemed taxes are treated as if they had been correctly paid,
i.e. you will not receive punishment for these. If you do not opt for a voluntary
disclosure, you get to phase 1. Below you can see the screen that is displayed during
Phase 0. If you want to choose the voluntary disclosure, you must check the box
(click into the white box) and then click OK. The time that you have for your
decision will be shown. When the time has expired and you have not yet decided -
i.e. you have not yet clicked OK - you also get to phase 1.
Phase 1: (Tax Declaration)
Your income of the current round is displayed. You will also see the form of your tax
declaration, in which you are asked for your income. You can enter values greater
than or equal to 0. Your stated income is then taxed at a tax rate of 25%. (If you
state more than your actual income, you pay more taxes than required. However,
you cannot redeem evaded taxes from other rounds in this way.) In the following,
you see the screen which is displayed during Phase 1. On the top right, you will see
the time that you have for your decision. When the time has expired and you have
not decided yet (i.e. you have not submitted your tax declaration in time by clicking
OK ), you will be immediately selected for a tax audit and your current income is
considered as completely evaded. Otherwise, tax audits are purely random, i.e. the
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tax audits are independent of your decisions as well as of the outcome of past tax
audits. The probability of a tax audit is greater than 0% and less than 100%. A
probability of X % means that, on average, X from 100 tax returns are selected for
a tax audit.
[currInf: The probability of a tax audit in the current round is displayed.]
[pastInf: The probability of a tax audit in the current round is unknown to you,
however, the probability which existed in the previous round is displayed.]
[noInf: The probability of a tax audit in the current round is unknown to you.]
The probability of a tax audit can vary over the rounds between two values. Start-
ing from the default value (= value in round 1), the probability of a jump at the
transition to the next round is 15%, i.e. on average in 15 of 100 cases in which the
probability of a tax audit is at the default value, there is a jump to a higher value
for the next round. This probability of a jump to the higher value is independent of
how many rounds the default value was already in force. If there is a jump to the
higher value, the probability of a tax audit remains for a length of 1-5 rounds (each
equally probable, so on average 3 rounds) on the higher value, before it falls back
to the default value.
Phase 2a: (Tax Audit)
You are informed whether you have been selected by the computer for a tax audit.
If so, you have to pay the evaded taxes of the current round and the three previous
rounds. In addition, a penalty will be charged. This is the sum of evaded taxes. So,
in the event of a tax audit you have to pay twice the evaded taxes of the current
and the three previous rounds.
Phase 2b: (Result)
A summary of the current round is displayed, with the total income at the end. This
is composed as follows:
Total income = income at the beginning of the round
- taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration
- If applicable, subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round
- If applicable, subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds
- If applicable, penalty fees
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Note:
During the experiment, the following additional information are available:
- Your evaded taxes of the three previous rounds
[currInf: - The probability of a tax audit in the current round]
[pastInf: - The probability of a tax audit which existed in the previous round]
Payments
At the end of the experiment you will be paid individually and confidentially. Your
payoff is the sum of the total incomes from the individual rounds (see Phase 2b).
The points are converted as follows: 3.5 points = 1 eurocent. The taxes and penalty
fees, if applicable, paid by you are also converted into euros and are transferred
after the experiment to the account of Bundeskasse and flow into the federal budget
of the Federal Republic of Germany. At the end of the experiment, you have the
option to enter your email address to receive a copy of the deposit slip.
Examples
Situation 1: Income in the current round is 100 points. In the tax declaration,
100 is stated as income. No tax evasion in the three previous rounds. Tax audit
occurs.
Taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration = 100 * 0.25 = 25
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = 0
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = 0
Penalty fees = 0
Total income = 100 -25 -0 -0 -0 = 75
Situation 2: Income in the current round is 100 points. In the tax declaration,
50 is stated as income. In the three previous rounds evaded taxes are 30 in total.
Tax audit does not occur.
Taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration = 50 * 0.25 = 12.5
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = 0
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = 0
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Penalty fees = 0
Total income =100 -12.5 -0 -0 -0 = 87.5
Situation 3: Income in the current round is 100 points. In the tax declaration, 60
is stated as income. In the previous round, evaded taxes are 20, in the round before
10 and in the round before 5. Tax audit occurs.
Taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration = 60 * 0.25 = 15
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = 40*0.25 = 10
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = 20+10+5= 35
Penalty fees = 10+35=45
Total income =100 -15-10-35-45 = -5
Situation 4: Income in the current round is 100 points. Voluntary disclosure is
chosen. In the previous round, evaded taxes are 20, in the round before 10 and in
the round before 5. (Note: corresponds to situation 3 of the examples so far, only
with voluntary disclosure instead of further tax evasion)
Taxes of the current round according to the voluntary disclosure = 100 * 0.25 = 25
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = 0
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = 20+10+5= 35
Penalty fees = 0
Total income =100 -25-0-35-0 = 40
Further procedure
If you have read the instructions, please work on the further situations in the
following. Of course, you can always ask questions. When all participants have
answered these correctly, the actual experiment starts.
Please edit!
Situation 1: Income in the current round is 80 points. In the tax declaration, 80
is stated as income. No tax evasion in the three previous rounds. Tax audit occurs.
Taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration = ...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = ...
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Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = ...
Penalty fees = ...
Total income = ...
Situation 2: Income in the current round is 80 points. In the tax declaration, 40
is stated as income. In the three previous rounds evaded taxes are 30 in total. Tax
audit does not occur.
Taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration = ...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = ...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = ...
Penalty fees = ...
Total income = ...
Situation 3: Income in the current round is 80 points. In the tax declaration, 0
is stated as income. In the previous round, evaded taxes are 5, in the round before
10 and in the round before 5. Tax audit occurs.
Taxes of the current round according to the tax declaration = ...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = ...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = ...
Penalty fees = ...
Total income = ...
Situation 4: Income in the current round is 80 points. Voluntary disclosure is
chosen. In the previous round, evaded taxes are 5, in the round before 10 and in
the round before 5. (Note: corresponds to situation 3 of the examples so far, only
with voluntary disclosure instead of further tax evasion)
Taxes of the current round according to the voluntary disclosure = ...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from the current round = ...
Subsequent payment of evaded taxes from past rounds = ...
Penalty fees = ...
Total income =...
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Instructions II [distributed after round 29]
For the further course of the experiment there is a change in the instructions: The
possibility to opt for a voluntary disclosure will be abolished after the next round.
Phase 0 will disappear from then on.
Everything else remains as described in the previous instructions.
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B.3 Screenshots
currInf:
Figure B.2: currInf: Voluntary disclosure (Phase 0)
Figure B.3: currInf: Tax declaration (Phase 1)
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pastInf:
Figure B.4: pastInf: Voluntary disclosure (Phase 0)
Figure B.5: pastInf: Tax declaration (Phase 1)
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noInf:
Figure B.6: noInf: Voluntary disclosure (Phase 0)
Figure B.7: noInf: Tax declaration (Phase 1)
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Robustness
This section provides additional robustness checks.
Table C.1 shows that our findings are robust when including the interactions be-
tween GDP and tax complexity (Spec. 1), bureaucracy and the corporate income
tax rate (Spec. 2), and enforcement and the corporate income tax rate (Spec. 3).
Enforcementj is the log of the variable "Coverage" of Robinson and Slemrod (2012),
which measures the number of administrators of the tax authority per thousand of
working age population in 2005. Since we have this data only for one year, we
cannot include the variable itself (due to the fixed effects) but we can include its
interaction with the corporate income tax rate. Specification 4 shows the estimation
results when we use the effective marginal tax rate (data source: Oxford Univer-
sity Center for Business Taxation). However, since we investigate lumpy investment
decisions, economic theory suggests that the effective average tax rate is the more
appropriate measure, as used in Table 4.3 Specification 3. Specification 5 includes
Tax paymentsj (which measures the total number of tax payments per year, taken
from the Doing Business data) in the estimation without finding a significant coeffi-
cient. This suggests that not the number of tax payments but indeed the amount of
time needed to comply with taxation causes compliance cost, which is not surprising.
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Table C.1: Estimation results
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5
Tax complex.j -4.4481∗ -2.8604∗∗∗ -2.3036∗∗ -1.2340∗∗ -2.3944∗∗∗
(2.5582) (1.0985) (0.9398) (0.5732) (0.9196)
Corp. taxj -0.2188∗ -0.3055∗∗ -0.2783∗∗ -0.2932∗∗
(0.1226) (0.1326) (0.1256) (0.1232)
Corp. tax ∗ Tax complex.j 0.0429∗ 0.0671∗∗ 0.0539∗∗ 0.0560∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0279) (0.0244) (0.0240)
Enforcement ∗ Corp. taxj -0.0107
(0.0214)
EMTRj -0.2498∗
(0.1453)
EMTR ∗ Tax complex.j 0.0470∗
(0.0284)
V ATj -0.0539 -0.0811∗∗ -0.0611 -0.0497 -0.0670∗
(0.0422) (0.0373) (0.0382) (0.0395) (0.0402)
GDPj 2.3342∗ 2.6987∗∗ 2.8572∗∗ 2.9804∗ 2.9443∗∗
(1.4085) (1.3400) (1.4260) (1.6187) (1.4242)
GDP ∗ Tax complex.j 0.0901
(0.0912)
Tax paymentsj 0.0478
(0.1032)
Bureaucracyj -0.1048∗ 0.3250 -0.1016 -0.1094∗ -0.1031∗
(0.0628) (0.3170) (0.0620) (0.0652) (0.0617)
Bureaucracy ∗ Corp. taxj -0.0149
(0.0113)
N 118992 118992 118992 118992 118992
Affiliates 4474 4474 4474 4474 4474
Countries 27 27 27 27 27
pseudo R2 0.1223 0.1224 0.1223 0.1223 .1223
Log-Likelihood -12881.82 -12881.09 -12882.24 -12882.56 -12882.29
Clusters 71 71 71 71 71
Country FE X X X X X
Country controls X X X X X
The dependent variable is ykj (i.e. 0 or 1). All independent variables correspond to the
year t(k) − 1 before the investment k takes place. Cluster-robust standard errors (re-
garding affiliate sector) are provided in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All specifications are conditional logit estimations. Coun-
try controls are the variables Labor costsj , Trade freedomj , Corruptionj , Inflationj ,
Exch. ratej , Country riskj , Lending ratej and Invest. freedomj .
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Table C.2: Estimation results
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5
Tax complex.j -2.4741∗∗ -3.3281∗∗∗ -3.5153∗ -2.9216∗∗ -1.0055
(1.0927) (1.2452) (1.9983) (1.1591) (1.6069)
Corp. taxj -0.3069∗∗ -0.5256∗∗ -0.5214∗∗ -0.4257∗∗ -0.3752∗
(0.1459) (0.2327) (0.2327) (0.2073) (0.1976)
Corp. tax ∗ Tax complex.j 0.0586∗∗ 0.0819∗∗ 0.0820∗∗ 0.0703∗∗ 0.0601∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0306) (0.0297)
V ATj -0.0667∗ -0.0598 -0.0609 -0.0589 -0.0656
(0.0361) (0.0383) (0.0387) (0.0401) (0.0401)
GDPj 3.0298∗∗ 3.3852∗∗ 3.4464∗∗ 2.9406∗∗ 2.8569∗∗
(1.4775) (1.5409) (1.4132) (1.4208) (1.3913)
Corruption2j -0.0739 -0.4514 -0.5588
(0.1623) (0.3287) (1.0102)
Corruption2 ∗ Corp. taxj 0.0120 0.0114
(0.0104) (0.0106)
Corruption2 ∗ Tax complex.j 0.0233
(0.1987)
Corruptionj -0.2026 0.9077
(0.2389) (0.7245)
Corruption ∗ Corp. taxj 0.0078 0.0086
(0.0086) (0.0090)
Corruption ∗ Tax complex.j -0.2057
(0.1508)
N 118992 118992 118992 118992 118992
Affiliates 4474 4474 4474 4474 4474
Countries 27 27 27 27 27
pseudo R2 0.1223 0.1224 0.1224 0.1223 0.1224
Log-Likelihood -12882.06 -12880.84 -12880.83 -12881.71 -12880.17
Clusters 71 71 71 71 71
Country FE X X X X X
Country controls X X X X X
The dependent variable is ykj (i.e. 0 or 1). All independent variables correspond to
the year t(k) − 1 before the investment k takes place. Cluster-robust standard errors
(regarding affiliate sector) are provided in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All specifications are conditional logit estimations. Country
controls are the variables Bureaucracyj , Labor costsj , Trade freedomj , Inflationj ,
Exch. ratej , Country riskj , Lending ratej and Invest. freedomj .
Table C.2 shows that our findings are robust when including the interactions be-
tween corruption and the corporate income tax, and corruption and tax complexity.
Moreover, our findings do not change when we use an alternative measure for corrup-
tion, i.e. Corruption2j. Data for this corruption measure comes from the variable
"Control of corruption" of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and
was rescaled to range approximately from 0 to 10 instead of a range from -2.5 to
2.5. As for Corruptionj, a low value for Corruption2j means high corruption.
Specification 1 in Table C.3 shows that our findings are robust when excluding the
variable Labor costsj. The reason for this robustness check is the high correlation of
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Table C.3: Estimation results
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Tax complex.j -2.1479∗∗ -2.3341∗∗ -2.6700∗∗
(0.8514) (1.1203) (1.0691)
Corp. taxj -0.2575∗∗ -0.2833∗∗ -0.3300∗∗
(0.1172) (0.1417) (0.1471)
Corp. tax ∗ Tax complex.j 0.0490∗∗ 0.0541∗ 0.0637∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0280) (0.0287)
V ATj -0.0563 -0.0639 -0.0686∗
(0.0419) (0.0405) (0.0388)
GDPj 2.3406∗ 2.9245∗∗ 3.4701∗∗
(1.3881) (1.4253) (1.5451)
N 118992 110720 99216
Affiliates 4474 4325 4134
Countries 27 26 24
pseudo R2 0.1223 0.1277 0.1327
Log-Likelihood -12883.06 -12232.93 -11394.29
Clusters 71 71 71
Country FE X X X
Country controls Xexcluding X X
Labor costsj
The dependent variable is ykj (i.e. 0 or 1). All independent vari-
ables correspond to the year t(k) − 1 before the investment k
takes place. Cluster-robust standard errors (regarding affiliate sec-
tor) are provided in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All specifications are conditional
logit estimations. Country controls are the variables Bureaucracyj ,
Labor costsj , Trade freedomj , Corruptionj , Inflationj , Exch. ratej ,
Country riskj , Lending ratej and Invest. freedomj .
this variable with GDP if the variables are demeaned by country, as shown in Table
C.4. Specification 2 and 3 of Table C.3 show robustness when we vary our country
sample. In Specification 2, we exclude Belgium. The reason for this robustness check
is that Belgium is an outlier regarding the percentage change in tax complexity (the
variable "Time" of the Doing Business database increases from 2004 to 2008 by over
150%. However, this is not completetly unrealistic since it increases from a relatively
low level). In Specification 3, we exclude Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland.
The aim is to check robustness when excluding these countries where investment
decisions might be special due a very low corporate tax rate (Ireland 12.5% which
is clearly the minimum in the OECD) or a dominant financial sector (Luxembourg
and Switzerland).
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C.2 Additional Tables and Figures
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Figure C.1: The coefficient of tax complexity conditional on the corporate income
tax rate (based on Table 4.4, Spec. 3)
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Figure C.2: The coefficient of tax complexity conditional on the corporate income
tax rate (based on Table 4.4, Spec. 2)
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Figure C.3: The coefficient of tax complexity conditional on the corporate income
tax rate (based on Table 4.5, Spec. 3)
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Figure C.4: The coefficient of tax complexity conditional on the effective average
tax rate (based on Table 4.3, Spec. 3)
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Figure C.5: Kernel density estimates
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(a) Kernel density estimate for the coefficient of GDPj in
Table 4.3, Spec. 2
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Figure C.6: Kernel density estimates1
1An explanation for the multiple peaks in Figure C.6 a) would be that there are several cate-
gories of FDI projects which depend on GDP to a different extent. For example, holding companies
might be less depending on GDP than manufacturing firms.
An explanation for the two humps in Figure C.6 b) could be horizontal FDI and vertical FDI, since
for the latter VAT is expected to have a smaller effect.
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